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ABSTRACT
This thesis addresses certain a ects of the issue of what it
is to develop children's thinking and understanding with
particular reference to primary education, and against the
backdrop of the National Curriculum. It begins by identifying
some of the professional responsibilities of teachers in this area
and some of the judgments that they have to make in the course
of their practice. Some of the pr blematic assumptions which
underlie commonly held responses to the issues these judments
raise are set out. The relationship between the development of
thinking and understanding and other aspects of human life such
as action and emotion are also given some preliminary discussion.
The middle sections of the thesis explore and refine in a
more theoretically systematic way some of the central issues
previously raised by considering insights which have arisen in the
context of two broad and contrasting perspectives - loosely
termed "rationalist" and "existentialist" respectively. The
conceptions of thinking and understanding that each of these
emphasise and their broad curriculum implications are developed.
It is argued that as well as suggesting certain basic dimensions to
thinking - the "calculative", the "authentic" and the "poetic"
(distinctions taken originally from Martin Heidegger) - the
considerations raised by these views need to some extent to be
interwoven if an adequate account of what it is to develop
children's th nking and understanding s to be achieved
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In the final part of the thesis m re specific issues relating to
the structuring and assessment of children s learning, and central
aspects of the relationship between teacher and pupil n primary
education, are explored in the light of previous analys s. Certain
aspects of the National Curriculum at the primary stage of
education are considered and some critical evaluation f some of
its main features is offered.
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PREFACE
The intention of this thesis is to make accessible some
work in ph osophy and philosophy of education on the nature of
th nking and understand ng to teachers and others concerned with
the education of children in the primary age range. The topics of
thinking and understanding are clearly important ones which lie
at the heart of any worthwhile conception of education and
human development as a whole, and one of the effects of the
introduction of the National Curriculum has been to provoke a
wide ranging re-appraisal of them. But what exactly is involved
in their development, and what is the role of the teacher in
facilitating it? The pursuit of these questions leads to further ones
such as:
What is it to think, and to understand?
Are there significantly different kinds of thinking and
understanding, and if so what is their value?
How can we help children to "think for themselves"?
How do thinking and understanding relate to conscious
fe as a whole, behaviour, and our ways of relating to
thers and the world in general?
Like anyone else who makes curriculum proposals, the
authors of the National Curriculum
	 make many assumptions
regarding th se questions, but perhaps n the interests of political
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expediency and achieving quick consensus they have often
preferred to eave them tacit and unexamined. To this extent their
proposals remain unclear and unargued, possible errors and
inc nsistencie remaining undetected. But to those wh really care
ab Ut the tr th and about how best to interpret and implement
the Nationa Curriculum in the educational interests of the
children in their care - and, equally importantly, about how to
help it evolve in ways that are educationally desirable - these
questions ha e to be acknowledged and pursued. Such questions
form the focus of this thesis. They will lead us into fundamental
issues concerning the nature of meaning in its different forms and
the kind of education needed to allow individuals to develop
qualities of reedom and responsibility. It will be argued that no
matter what the stage of our involvement with the development
of children, o contribute responsibly we must have a better than
average awareness of the possibilities of human devel pment as a
wh le and the world into which we are giving children entrance,
and in which they must take up their place. No doubt ome of the
issues involved are difficult, but I cannot but think that to shirk
them - to s mply follow other people's prescriptions unthinkingly
- is to do a grave disservice to the children in our care.
Particularly when, as we shall see, certain aspects of the National
Curriculum nd possibilities of implementing it are so seriously
flawed.
Yet the overarching purpose of this thesis is not
essentially to evaluate any one set of curriculum proposals
however prominent they may be at this time. It does not aspire to
be "current' n this sense and I have not felt constrained to give a
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survey of a wide ra ge of t e latest research and discussion th t
might be held by some to have a bearing on the issues under
debate. On the contrary, this has been deliberately eschewed to a
large extent as it seems to me that such an emphasis is bo h
unnecessary and undesirable. The key issues in the area are ion
standing and are appreciated more through sy tematic reflecti n
than through the acquisition of myriad research findings - the
common effect of the sheer volume of which being to intimidate
rather than stimulate thinking and understanding. What s
required is not yet more "evidence", but to perceive the
significance of what we often in some sense already know. But
this is perhaps already to anticipate one of the central themes f
this thesis with regard to what actually counts as developing
thinking and understanding in the first place!
One final point: for those who have little or no
previous involvement with a philosophical approach to issues
some of the views, ideas and names listed in the Contents and
Bibliography may appear daunting. Such apprehension is
understandable in the light of popular concepti ns of philosophy
which depict it as unduly "heavy" and academic in the sense of
being abstracted from the real concerns of life. But this conception
is largely a caricature. Philosophy and philosophers, proper, have
always been concerned with issues that lie at the heart of human
consciousness and are readily recognizable as such by those wh
are prepared to reflect on such issues for themselves. It is a
central aspiration of the thesis to introduce some releva t
thinkers and ideas in a way that makes clear their essenti
contribution to the to ic of developing children's thinking and
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understanding in the primary school. This will be done by relating
their views to familiar situa ions and ideas and illustrating how
they can enlarge and refine ur understanding of them.
It is hoped, too, that in this way a c ntribution to research
will be made: in addition to providing some exploration of the
complexity of the idea f developing children's thinking, the
critique of certain aspects of rationalist thinking which has been
prominent in setting out the general framework and agenda for
the discussion of curriculum issues may be of interest to those
working in the field of curr culum studies, as may some of the
insights derived from what I have termed the "poetic" approach
which have hitherto received little systematic attention. Taken
together it is hoped that they make a contribution to developing a
basis for the appraisal of aspects of a range of curriculum models
and proposals, including a much needed critical evaluation of
some central assumptions that appear to underpin the National
Curriculum With regard to he latter, some f the details of this
are explored particularly in the final Part in relation to issues of
structuring children's learn ng, assessment, and teacher pupil
relationships.
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PART ONE:
THINKING AND UNDERSTANDING IN THE CONTEXT OF THE
PRIMARY SCHOOL CURRICULUM
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION: WHAT'S THE PROBLEM?
It perhaps borders on the truistic to say that one of the
central features that we have in mind when we speak of the
development of a person is the development of their capacity to
think and to understand. It is largely in terms of these capacities
that, for example, we assess a person's ability to take
responsibility for their actions and their lives, cope with new
situations, move on to the next challenge, or contribute to a
demanding enterprise. Indeed, it is largely in terms of the quality
of their thinking and understanding that we judge their
intelligence, their overall level of maturity, and sometimes their
worth. Someone who can't or doesn t think about situations in
which they find themselves, or whose thinking is confused or
chaotic, is ill-equipped to deal with life and in extreme cases
would normally be put into care.
Thus we don't have to go quite as far as Descartes' famous
dictum "I think therefore I am" to recognise the centrality of the
capacity to think to human being. And it is not surprising that
amongst primary teachers at least - if not some politicians - it has
become a commonplace now to denigrate in education the mere
learning up of facts and theor es, mechanical skills, and other
people's views. Rather teachers claim to seek to develop
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understanding of what is learnt, they want children to think
about what they are do ng, indeed they want them to think for
themselves
Without this underlying philosophy much current pracfce in
primary scho is would make no sense. The moves in mathematics
teaching over the last three decades are a case in point. In
"modern maths' the emphasis has been placed upon the
development of mathematical literacy: a grasp of mathematical
ideas and concepts - the "language" of mathematics - as against
prowess in mechanica computation exercises. Similarly, the
emphasis in the teaching of reading and writing has come to focus
on gaining and communicating meaning, articulating ones own
thoughts and ideas, expressing oneself and understanding the
expressions of others.' And what is true for the "three R's" is even
more true for many o her areas of the curriculum such as art,
music, drama, project-work, science etc. where firsthand
research, exper ment and discovery, discussion and the relatively
free exchange of ideas are frequently advocated. Much of what
currently goes on in schools would have to be regarded as at best
inefficient, and at worst a scandalous waste of time if the simple
accumulation o stocks of facts and mechanical skills was the
overriding concern of education. And this, of course, is precisely
the criticism that many traditionalist spectators of education have
been making with increasing vociferousness They claim that
under the influence of "progressivism' education has indeed lost
its way and that there is a pressing need to return to more
didactic teaching aimed at clearly specified and measurable goals
- a theme embraced by the authors of the National Curriculum.
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On the one hand, then, there seems to be implicit in much
recent practice a claim that certain approaches to teaching and
learning are justified because they develop children's think ng
and understanding. On the other hand, there is the vigoro sly
pressed counter-claim that much of what has happened over
recent decades in primary schools has been thoroughly misguded
and has led to a serious decline in educational standards. The
question is, then, how are we to assess such competing claims?
And further, even if it turned out that so called progressive
approaches to teaching were justified in terms of the quality of
thinking and understanding they enabled pupils to deve p.
should education be given this sort of emphasis to any high
degree anyway?
A number of reservations have been voiced. For example, it
might be said that there is more to the full development of a
person than the development of their thinking and understanding
- which has a rather intellectual ring to it. What of other facets of
personal development such as the emotions, moral sensitivity,
good habits and general character formation? Also, is there not a
large body of practical skills and sheer factual knowledge that a
person needs simply to get by in our society, and to meet the
requirements of prospective employers? After all, is it not a
central function of education to prepare children for adult life and
the "world of work" - to enable them to make their contribution t
the growth of our modern industrial and technological society?
Might not an education that focuses on depth of intellectual
thought and understanding be in danger of ignoring these ba ic
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practical needs of many pupils and society in general? And now,
since it would no doubt be over simple to assume that these aims
are mutually exclusive, a further important question arises: in
what ways, if any, is the development of these other qualities
related to the development of thinking and understanding?
To make progress on any of these important questions one
thing seems unavoidable: we must try to get clearer about what
thinking and understand ng are! - Not, I hasten to add, in the
sense of expecting to arrive at some neat definition - the notions
involved are much too subtle and complex for that - but in the
sense of grasping more adequately the extent of this complexity
and characterising some of its important aspects and their
interrelationships. Only then can we be in a position to judge the
contribution of thinking and understanding to other important
facets of human development and competing suggestions
regarding the aims of educati n. Subsequent upon our answers to
these questions we may then be able to formulate guidelines and
criteria for both the teaching approaches necessary to foster their
devel pment in children and also suitably sophisticated and
flexible mechanisms of m nit ring and assessment. These will be
some of the main themes of this thesis. They are likely to lead us
far and deep
However, before pursuing them, there are some important
pre iminary points that need to be made. The first is that not all
the aims popularly attributed to education should go
unquestioned either in terms of the degree of emphasis placed
up n them or, indeed, their very interpretati n. Every educational
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a m represents a value po ition that itself stan s in need of
justificati n - it is expressing some view about the good life" and
the "good society". It is encouraging one or other versi n f what
is to be valued in life and in our social arrangements. And what
constitutes the most worthwhile or fulfilling sorts f life to lead
and the kind of society that will best allow these o flourish is a
matter of considerable moral and p litical debate.
Take the previously mentioned claim that educati n should
prepare for the world of work. It might be thought that this seems
straightf rward enough: everyone needs to be able to earn a
living. But questions of interpretation and emphasis would be
very important here. "Work" in any society is always undertaken
in a particular social/economic/pol tical context. f we consider
this context in the case of our own society it clear y could not be
taken as self evident that the value and attitudes f the 'market-
place" are the ones that should pervade educat on or life in
general 2 Attempts to introduce such values into the caring
professions and services have attracted large scale criticism, and
presumab y few would dream of them forming an appropriate
basis for, say, family life and the realm of personal relati nships
as a whole. (They would also clearly be antithetical to long-
standing educational notions of the pursuit of truth and beauty in
their various forms for their own s ke, or the intrinsic enrichment
they give to the life of the mind) We need to be ab e to earn a
living, but for many earning a living in our society is a means not
an end. Nor, given that it s still true that the maj rity f the
workforce is involved in repetitive and inte ectually
undeman ng j bs can the world of work properly set the goals of
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education in any very extensive way. A piece of recent research
has shown that for 87% of the workforce of one urban community
the most demanding and skilful thing they did each day was to
drive to work. 3
 And that of course gn res the significant number
of 1 ng term unemp oyed.
Clearly preparation for the world of work as an
educational aim needs to be carefully analyzed for its different
interpretations and each of these need to be considered n terms
of how they would relate to other, perhaps more central,
educational aims connected to the fu I development of the
individual person in a democratic society. Now it is largely beyond
the scope of this work to systematical y address these wider
matters, but it is important to recognize that teaching and
education cannot be dissociated from contentious issues relating
ultimately to conceptions of the "good life' and the "good society"
and we will unavoidably be drawn back into some of them during
the course of our enquiries.
The second important p0 nt th t needs to be addressed
at this early stage is the following: does not the fact we now have
the Education Reform Act of 1988 in place make any questioning
of the kind that I am inviting a purely academic exercise? While it
is my intention to examine some of the detailed implications of
this Act in Part Four, it is I think important to address this
particular issue concerning the role of the teacher a d others
responsible for curriculum decisions within the primary school
now.
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The first important thing to recognize in this regard is that
the framework that the Act provides is far br ader and less
specific than the version of the National Curriculum which finds
its way into schools at any particular time. This is amply
evidenced at the macro level by the fact that subsequent
Secretaries of State for Education have been able to change quite
significant aspects of the National Curriculum such as the range
and forms of assessment across the foundation subjects and the
number and range of attainment targets in, for example, science
without having to change the legislation. Thus the helpfulness of
the National Curriculum in its various aspects is not a given, but
something which has yet to be developed and demonstrated. Then
again, at the micro level it has to be interpreted by those who are
practically implementing it in a way that is to the educational
benefit of the children in their care. That is to say it has to be seen
as something which must evolve in response to on-going
professional judgment both within the classroom and, if necessary,
in terms of its broader structure. Teachers as professionals have
responsibilities for the future development of the National
Curriculum at both these levels - though not of course
exclusively. 4
 For the responsible exercise of such discretion on the
part of teachers and other interested parties it is clearly
important that they have thought through the underlying issues
that affect the quality of children s learning for themselves. They
need a basis of understanding which is independent of the
National Curriculum in order to be able to evaluate it and to av id
the excesses of dogma that accompany the ascent f a mon lithic
orthodoxy.5
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Yet there is a further important aspect to this issue. It
will be argued that as it stands at the moment even for someone
who felt highly committed to the National Curnculum it is simply
not possible to follow t in any straightf rward way. This is n t
only because in teaching there are too many variables involved
for any recipe to be successful in all situations, it is because the
National Curriculum c nta ns within itself many tensions and
some outright contradictions For example, this seems to be most
strikingly true with regard to its aspiration for depth and quality
of understanding at the same time as a considerable breadth of
pre-specified knowledge The achievement of both of these in
anything other than token form is neither possible practically in
terms of the time available, nor, it will be argued, logically in
terms of the degree of openness that the development of real
understanding requires. Thus such a teacher is still placed in a
position of having to decide priorities and emphases within the set
of requirements made by the National Curriculum. Here again
professional judgement will be required which will need to be
informed by an understa ding of the kinds of issues I have raised.
It is interesting t note here that this need will not be
circumvented if - perhaps as a response to practical objections
expressed by the pro ession - the breadth of content of the
National Curriculum were to be significantly reduced. In such an
event the problems of justifying what remained are likely to
become that much more acute: Why precisely this and n t that?
Also, if the scope of what is to be drawn on within the compulsory
foundation subjects were to be narrowed, this would place
renewed importance on the curriculum which lies outside them
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the "whole curriculum" of which the foundation subjects were
only originally intended to be a part. In this scenario then, the
role of teacher discretion w uld therefore achieve increased
significance in providing an ed cation that was balanced and best
suited to her children.
Thus, notwithstanding the aspirations of some critics of the
profession who have sought a "teacher-proof" curriculum and
indeed possibly the hopes of some teachers themselves looking for
a lightening of professional responsibilities, teachers have not yet
been relegated to the role of mere operatives who mechanically
follow instructions handed down to them. And as we will see,
because teaching essentially involves a relationsh p between
unique human beings there are many very good rea ons why a
significant degree of professional autonomy and discretion will
always be necessary if they are to do the job properly.
Let me now move onto a somewhat d fferent but
equally important consideration. It is this: though as teachers
typically we have a particular involvement in one stage or facet of
the education of a group of children, in order to do ur best by
them we need to be able to place what we are doing in the context
of their education as a whole. We need to be able to see how what
we intend to do in one situation relates to experiences they have,
or are likely to have, in other situations; we need to have a
concepti n of what we are build ng upon and where we are g ing,
ie., the possibil ties and the imp cati ns of the experiences we are
giving to children in the present In other words we must develop
as best we can an appreciati n f the organic wholeness of a
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life as experienced by any individual, for that is precisely what
each child has himse f to come to appreciate at some p mt if his
education is to contribute to his development as an integrated
pers n.
Now it is important to recognise that this demand is n t at
all adequately accommodated by, say, looking back over what a
child is supposed to have been previously taught or by knowing
the content specified in different stages of the National
Curriculum. This is because what constitutes organic life
experience is not so much a matter of what is taught as what is
learnt, and the quality of that learning. It was this latter
point, perhaps, that was not sufficiently recognised by H.M.I.
when over a period of some years they called for greater
continuity and coherence in project work in the primary school
and assumed that this would be chiefly provided by increasing
the degree of pre specified structure in this area of work. This
clearly seems to underplay the extent to which cont nuity and
coherence from the learner's point of view are likely to
depend upon opportunities for him or her to influence the content
and manner of what is to be learnt.6
As educators, then, it simply is not sufficient to have
an expertise in the teaching of a specialism (even if we are
employed as a specialist teach r), we must at the least have as full
an understanding as possible of the part that specialism may play
in an organic life. It follows that as teachers, we ourselves have
need of a way of thinking and understanding that can give us this
larger per pective, for this - the forming of organic life experience
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- must be a case above all others where the whole is more than
the simple summing of its parts. Amongst other things, I will hope
to show dur ng the course of this thesis the contribution that a
philosophical perspective can make to this kind of thinking.
As a result of considerations such as those mentioned
above we seem to be placed in the following situation: Primary
teaching remains essentially problematic. The requirements of the
National Curriculum have always to be interpreted in the context
of unique situations. They are in any case confused in significant
respects and therefore incapable of being implemented in any
straightforward way. The detailed framework of the National
Curriculum is itself evolving and teachers as members of a key
professional group can and should influence this. Further, and in
any event, teachers are themselves moral agents responsible for
what they do. The fact that they can be regarded as filling a social
role should not be allowed to blind us to their ultimate personal
responsibility for what they do under its auspices: they are
accountable not just to the system, their "line managers" etc., but
to themselves and the children they teach. 7 Now these general
aspects of the teaching situation raise many issues which the
reflective practitioner cannot avoid. One of them will be how best
can I develop the thinking and understanding of the children in
my care? And how does this aspect of their education relate to
and contribute towards other legitimate educational aims? No
authority, no institution, can simply legislate the truth on such
issues; this has to be discerned by honest and open reflection.
Here, then, is the key problem that we will be addressing in the
rest of this thesis.
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Finally, a point concerning the strategy I shall be adopting in
the pursuit of this problem. The topic of thinking and
understanding is vast. It is one which has been of abiding interest
to thinkers over a very long period of time, and has therefore
generated a wealth of views and perspectives and a body of
literature whose size is commensurate with this. Not only would it
be a task way beyond the scope of this work to attempt to
produce an adequate survey of this accumulation of material, it is
not possible here to produce examples which could even claim to
be representative of its range. However in the spirit of my main
intention these limitations may not be a disadvantage. By
eschewing any ambition to "cover the ground" it is hoped that
some depth of thought may be achieved, and by focusing on a
limited number of contrasting perspectives (basically two) it is
hoped that some central issues will arise in a relatively clear cut
and manageable way which will invite, rather than overwhelm,
the reader's own thoughts on the matter so that he or she may
begin to formulate his or her own position.
Thus the approach taken is to begin by looking in a
preliminary way at some very general issues relating to thinking
and understanding and the curriculum in the next two chapters
and then to take up some central problems raised in more depth
in the remaining Parts. In Part Two we shall examine in detail
some responses to these issues which derive from a viewpoi t
currently influential in educational thinking and which I have
termed "rationalist" because of its focus on the development of
children s reason in its various forms. In Part Three we will
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subject this approach to criticisms deriving from a radica y
different perspective which seeks to reaffirm the importance f
more intuitive aspects of thinking rooted in the development f
children's direct awareness of their own individual existence a d
felt involvement with things. This latter perspective I have
dubbed "existentialist". In Part Four I shall be concerned to relate
the discussion to the general social and institutional climate n
which education operates in Britain today, particularly wi h
regard to the requirements of the National Curnculum.
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CHAPTER TWO
WHAT'S INVOLVED IN DEVELOPING CHILDREN'S
THINKING?
In this chapter we will begin our reflection by asking some
preliminary questions about the sorts of things we might
ordinarily have in mind when we speak of developing children's
thinking, and the ways it may relate to other aspects of a child's
development. So, what counts as developing children's thinking?
The following is a list of some possible candidates:
- they know more than they did before
- they can think what to do in new situation
- they can discuss or explain something that they could not
before
they see something different
- they feel differently about something
- they can work s mething out for hemselves that they
could not before
- they have s me new thoughts, fee ings, understanding,
appreciation, awareness.
Perhaps the most obvious feature of each member of the list
is that it seems to pick out something which is mental i n
character, that is to say it refers to something which in some sense
affects or characterises the m nd of the child - the quality of his or
her mental life. But it is important to note at this early point that
to say this is not to deny that thought may also affect behaviour:
an action can be more r ess thoughtful and our undertaking a
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course of action will normally be related to what we think about
the situation in which we re operating. It is imp rtant to
recognise this, for it carries the implication that to develop a
children's thinking may also be to develop - at least potentially -
the quality of their actions. Indeed, since actions - as aga nst mere
bod ly movements such as twitches and reflex jerks - are
purposive, ie., they involve the expression of intentions on the
part of an agent, one of the chief ways of improving their quality
precisely will be to improve the thinking which is involved in
them. Much has been written in philosophy about the relationship
between thought and action - too much for us to go into here - but
that action in some sense involves thought is a critical point for
education, and we need to say a little more about it here if we are
to properly appreciate the implications of our investigations for
teaching.
Thought and action
There are varying kinds of action, and several ways in which
thought may be involved. While it may be obvious that thought is
invo ved in certain clearly "intellectual" kinds of actions such as
those involved in setting up a scientific experiment or playing
chess, it is clearly no less involved in actions which are, for
example, more physical such as playing tennis or football. While
sheer physical capacity is of great importance in the e activities,
such capacity alone will not d . We still evaluate perf rmance in
these areas largely in terms f the degree f intelligence they
exhibt vis-a vis achieving the goals of the game. Skilful play
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remains largely a matter of thoughtful play. Thus we should not
be surprised to hear trainers exh rting their charges to 'think
about what they are do ng , or to discuss matters of strategy with
them. This is still true of sports where the emphasis is even m re
clearly placed upon sheer physical prowess or stamina, such as
athletics.
In any action the agent has to have some conception of
what he or she is doing, and how he or she is doing it, and this
involves thought in some sense. It also means that the action can
be assessed for its appropriateness to the situation and its success
in achieving its goals. It is true, of course, that once learnt some
actions such as those involved in driving or dancing can become
automatic or mechanical - through practice or habit they may
become relatively thoughtless. But there are three important
things to notice about this. Firstly, to say that thought is involved
in action is not to say that we are always consciously thinking
about an action either before, or whilst, we perform it. 1 Secondly,
nonetheless we must have some minimal awareness of what we
are doing: if a ked, we must be able to give some sort of acc unt
of it in terms of what we are doing and why. To be unable to bring
to mind any conception of what we believe ourselves to be d ing
(which may or may not, of course, accord with how others
perceive our action) means that we are not "doing" anything
properly speaking, but merely caught up in certain bodily
movements. Thrd y, even with actions that have bec me
automatic, if we wish to improve them we need to pay attention
to them again, ie. start to think about what we are doing. It is this
feature of actions that makes them educable, as against merely
28
being altered through some sort of mindless haping process such
as reflex conditioning.
Acceptance of the claim that the quality of our thinking cn
affect the quality f our actions serves to underline, then, t e
general importance f the development of a child's thought for h s
or her education. This point is reinforced when we consider that
there is yet a further respect in which the development of a
person's thinking has been held to be central to their educational
development - its relationship to the domain of feeling and
attitudes.
Thought and feeling
In a way which somewhat parallels the claim that action
properly so described involves thought, it has been claimed that
emotions and attitudes also have thought at their heart. 2 For
example, does not the ability to feel guilt assume that one has the
concept of responsibility, which in turn assumes that one h s
some concept of causality? These are concepts that children take
time to develop as part of their own thinking. Further, if we
consider such emotions as anger, fear, jealousy, does not each of
them involve some sort of cognitive appraisal of the world? Does
not anger involve seeing one's situation as in some way
frustrating, fear as seeing it in some way danger us, ealousy a
seeing it in some w y unjust in that we perceive someone else a
possessing something to which we feel ent tled? It has been
claimed that it is this 'thought" element in em lion that allows u
29
to distinguish one emo on from another
	 thus envy
distinguished from jea ousy in that the element of entitlement is
missing in the f rmer.
It also ilows the possible further refinement of emotions
and the possi ility f ed cat ng them. For example inapprop iate
fear of an object may evaporate when one learns that it is not
actually harmful and inappropriate desire when one learns that it
is. Of course there wi 1 always be counter-examples to this as in
the case of phobias such as fear of spiders and addictions such as
cigarette smoking. But there are two points to be noted here.
Firstly, the fact that some appraisals are very resistant to change
or that even when changed they are overridden by ingrained
associations or overweening desire (thus our use of the language
of "phobias" and "add cti s" in no way detracts from the claim
that feelings can be evaluated for their appropriateness and that
appraisals involved in emot ons can be impr ved - be better
informed, m re sen t e e c., and that this provides a basis for
the education of the emot ns. On this view developing sensi vity
of emotional res onse wll be largely a matter of helping chi dren
to achieve wider and more refined appraisals of situations eg , by
putting themselves in another s shoes or noticing relatively subtle
but significant features of a situation which they had previously
overlooked (The LION is in a cage! . ..The show-off is very
Ionely...The broken toy was unintentional... The big fast car
pollutes the atmos h re more than
	
the small one..) 3 Suc
considerations are perhaps pre-eminent in areas of education to
do with prejudices and stereotypes. Information and d scussion
which, say, deepens appraisals of the potential of individuals
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regardless of gender, race r age, and develops an appreciation of
the significance of different cultural traditions is seen as
contributing to the forma ion of more appropriate emotions and
attitudes in these important areas.
Now it has been argued that this way of characterising
emotional development puts too much stress on the intellectual
and overlooks the way, say, mood can colour our perceptions and
appraisals and how in general our affective state forms a
backdrop to, and motivates, the way we apprehend the world
around us. 4 That there is a reciprocal relationship between
thought and feeling - and the extent to which it is even helpful to
separate the two - are ssues whose clarification must await
discussion in later chapters, but at this stage it must at least be
clear that thought and feel ng are intimately related and that how
we develop children's thinking may therefore carry extensive
consequences for the development of their emotions. With this in
mind let us now return to the question of what counts as
developing children's thinking.
Criteria of development of thinking: the issue of
standards in education
To what extent does the list of qualities at the beginning of
this chapter adequately characterise the development of thought?
In addition to their saying something about the mental ife of the
child, they seem to share another general fea u e. They each
represent an achievement of some kind: the child has acquired
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some new capacity, disposition, or awareness. But does each of the
achievements of itself denote the development of thinking? For
them to serve as criteria in this regard clearly much will depend
up n how they are interpreted.
For example, to take the first item on the list, would simply
knowing more facts than previously mean that a person's thought
had developed? No doubt in some sense it would be conceded a
considerable mental achievement to have learnt off the contents
of an entire telephone directory, or f r that matter the entire
contents of The Encyclopedia Britannica But, useful as either of
these mental feats might be in certain circumstances, would this
necessarily constitute the development of a person's thinking? Or
does this latter require something more, perhaps that such facts
as they have learnt come to be seen to exhibit some kind of
pattern, or have enabled the person to grasp or apply something
which was previously beyond them?
Similarly, do seeing someth g differently, feeling
differently about something, or having new thoughts and feel ng
themselves necessarily constitute the development of thought?
Can any (new) way of seeing or feeling - any new thought - count
as the development of thought, or could some be retrograde (eg.,
as when a child who previously thought decimal points to be
significant in numbers now came to think that they weren't)? That
is to say, to count as development do not such changes have to
meet certain criteria of quality, ach eve some new, higher,
standard? Indeed is not this idea of meeting relevant standards,
in some sense, implicit in all claims con erning the development f
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thought? In which case what are these standards and where do
they come from?
This idea of thought needing to match up to certain
qualitati e standards is perhaps what was really meant when
thinking was earlier described as an achievement and perhaps
suggests that to think well is something that has to be learnt, for
are not standards matters of social convention, and therefore
things one is born to rather than with? In which case are there
not issues to be confronted concerning how these standards are to
be se ected? This may not seem a very pressing problem in some
areas such as mathematics, but in the areas of art, literature and
morality problems are rarely far below the surface, and even in
history, geography and science there are significant controversies
concerning matters of interpretation and emphasis which would
have implications for what would count as good thinking and
theref re approaches to teaching at primary level. Whether
commerce with the Third World is to be thought of as trade or
exploitat on, the extent to which empathy enhances historical
understanding might be cases in po nt.
But, of course the issue of standards in education is
much broader than this, and has been a focus for considerable
pubi c debate. For some years there has been much talk about the
need to raise standards in the primary school - particularly with
regard t the so-called "basics" of reading, writing, maths, and
m re at ly, science. Notwithstanding the fact that many of the
views popularly expressed concerning the rise or decline of
standards have yet to be adequately substantiated by research
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evidence, there a e surely some very important prior questions to
be asked ab Ut the nature of the standards in terms of which the
debate is to be c nducted.
Take an example which is currently very prominent in this
regard - standards in reading. Is a good reader to be measured
primarily in terms of ability to identify and pron unce words and
provide standard definitions of them, or ability to engage with the
meanings expre sed through some kind of dialogue? In an
interesting discus ion of this point Victor Watson (1992) describes
h w he found many of the qualities of what he terms a
responsible reader" to be present in a group of reception class
"pre-readers":
"Working with reception children in a school which has
adopted an apprenticeship approach to reading has taught
me that pre readers discussing a story shared with a
sympathet c adult show most of the characteristics of a
resp ns ble reader: they discuss the story, they 1 sten to
their partner; they show an extraordinary awareness of
deta , they relate the story to their own lives; they consider
alternative versions; they make moral judgements ('That is a
wicked picture! said about an illustration of Gretel shoving
the witch nto the oven); and they make thoughtful decisions
about whe her they want to reread the story or choose
another Many of these 4- and 5-year-olds have become
readers in this sense before they are readers in the more
usual sense associated with interpreting print."
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The force of this sort of observation is not of course to suggest
that "interpreting print" is unimportant but to get us to que t on
any assumption that it alone should set the st ndard as to what
counts as a good reader For such an emphasis could well lead to
incipiently good reader in the broader sense being "discouraged,
or silenced, or side-tracked".5
Thus in the various areas in which children's thinking
is to be developed there is a need to be alert to the nature of the
standards being applied. Do they do justice to the qualities of
understanding that we should be seeking to develop or do they
represent an impoverished view? Presumably everyone who
cares for education will support the endeavour to raise standards.
But often the crucial first question to ask is this: Which standards
should obtain and how should they be interpreted? Put this way,
we are rapidly confronted with the underlying issue which is
essentially at stake: the question of what is really to be valued in
education and why. Clearly this is an issue which deserves careful
analysis and reflection, but which is in serious danger of being
conveniently obscured and short circuited by protagonists in a
debate who speak as if educational standards are themselves
unproblematic and the only issue is how to raise them.
Finally, let us return once more to our initial list, for
there are two other things that we might notice about its
members. Firstly, one of them directly refers to observable
behaviour, whilst the rest seem to refer to things that have
happened primarily "in the mind'. This perhaps alerts us to the
possibility that thinking may be displayed in action rather than
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being present only as some sort of accompaniment to it. The skill
with which a fisherman casts his line or a musician expresses the
mood of a piece of music in the playing of her instrument might
be examples of this - as may the way a child contributes to a
discussion, reads a story or poem, applies paint or collage,
performs in dance, drama, or P.E. etc. In this sense thinking need
not be something that goes on only "in the head" and the way we
teach and assess such thinking - the nature of the standards
referred to - would need to be matched accordingly.
Secondly, some members of the list seem to refer to
active abilities (eg. being able to work something out), while
others (eg. having some new awareness, or feeling and seeing
differently) have a more passive tone to them: they seem to
intimate ways in which we may be affected by things rather than
active upon them. This all perhaps suggests that we should not
assume that thinking is any one thing, maybe there are radically
different kinds of think ng which are organised around qu te
distinctive sets of standards.
This is certainly a commonly held view in education. Thus
teachers sometimes speak of developing thinking in different
subject areas, or they identify different sets of "thinking skills"
such as "research skills", "communication skills", "interpretative"
and "translational" skills Indeed it sometimes seems as if almost
any situation which differs from another requires its own way of
thinking. In order to understand what is involved in developing
children's thinking, we need to sort out these issues, for we shall
clearly be involved in a rather different kind of enterprise
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depend ng on, say, whether thinking is basically of one kind, or
many. We will now turn to this important issue.
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CHAPTER THREE
HOW SHOULD CHILDREN'S LEARNING BE STRUCTURED?
The role of the teacher
The general point has been made that notwithstanding
the introduction of the National Curnculum the teacher retains a
responsibility for the organisation of learning opportunities within
her class and also a wider professional responsibility to the
overall character of education. As a prelude to the question of
structuring learning it will be helpful to amplify the nature of this
responsibility a little further.
Basically it comes down to this: because the teacher is the
person who has to mediate the curriculum in the specific contexts
in which education occurs she must have a substantial
interpretive and formative role to play. Not only is she generally
in the best pos ii n to make informed judgments about the ability
levels, concerns and interests of the children in her class, her own
strengths and weaknesses, and the resources available, she is also
the person who is most intimately involved in the interactive
process of children's learning. She is the person who will have to
respond to the myriad contingencies that arise on a minute to
minute, day to day, week by week basis within her classroom. She
is the person who has to make on going decisions concerni g how
to create and sustain an environment within which these
particular children's learning will be most likely to flourish.
Who else can decide when something is or is not "working' for a
particular group of children at a particular time, at which point a
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different approach should be tried, and what approach is mo t
likely to succeed?
In this sense, then, the curriculum always needs to be to
some extent negotiated - always in part determined by the
children's response to what the teacher presents them with. It
therefore cannot be completely pre-specified in advance. Once it is
properly acknowledged that it is what children learn rather than
what the teacher "teaches" that constitutes the child's education
even the most formal of teachers will have to be prepared to
modify what they have planned in the light of children's
responses to it. This is a clear instance of the important point
made in Chapter One that teachers cannot be regarded as
operatives mechanically following instructions.
There is, then, simply no escaping an area of
professional decision-making that will clearly cover a wide range
of aspects and will be at varying levels of generality. It will range
from more immediate responses to, say, specific breaches of
discipline and how to deal with a particular child's learning
difficulty to wider policies concerning, say, general rules of
behaviour and interaction and the best way of communicating
certain broad areas of curriculum content. These are the decisions
that ultimately determine the curriculum a particular child will
experience: decisions made on the ground by a particular
practitioner or school staff. And these decisions will of course
reflect the understanding and underlying educational values of
those practitioners. It is thus essential for the pracftioner to have
thought these through: to have developed his or her own
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understanding out of which he or she can act intelligently in the
face of changing circumstances. And this is not simply a matter of
accepting proper professional responsibility for what one does,
but takes account of another important facet of primary teaching.
Given the level of personal involvement that working closely with
perhaps thirty plus young people demands, it is likely that a
teacher must feel a ubstantial level of personal commitment to
the policy she is following - and feel she personally understands it
- for it to be undertaken with the best chance of success and
personal satisfaction. Teaching in a primary school is simply not
something that can be successfully undertaken "at a distance'
Given, then, this important element of a teacher's
professional responsib lily along with other more general aspects
previously mentioned, how are we to make a start on the issue of
structuring children s learning? How can judgments in this area
be given s me reasonably objective basis? It might be thought
that one fairly bvious possibility would be to look at pa t or
current practice f r s me initial guidance.
Past and current practice as a guide to structuring
children's learning
Suppose we were to look at that relatively easily acce sible,
albeit crude, md cator of how a child s education is being
organised - the timetable. It would probably be one of the first
things that someone enquiring about how children's work in the
classroom was organ sed would ask about. Taking factors of the
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kind outlined earlier into account, it is perhaps not surprising that
despite the recent moves to introduce more uniformity into
primary scho is, if we were to look at the timetables for different
classes in different cchoois we would p otice some similarities and
many differe ces. We would probably notice some differences in
the names g yen to certain activities; we would certainly notice
differences i terms of when they took place, and the amount of
time devoted to them. For example one might find that something
called "creative writing" was timetabled to take place regularly on
Wednesday mornings at eleven o'clock for one clas , whilst in
another, perh PS even in the same schoo, it does not appear at all.
Similarly we may find that one class has "project work" for three
afternoons per week, whilst another has none. Even such
commonly regarded fundamental subjects as maths and language
will appear as such on some timetab es and not others. Indeed
some classes operate without any firmly fixed timetable at all.
On the surface there ap ears to be considerable
disparity. But this appearance can be deceptive and ften covers
an underlying curriculum which has m ny features common from
one class to another. Thus it is no doubt true that language work
and maths have always taken up a very significant part of the
school week for every normal junior school class in the country,
including those who do not have them labelled as such on their
timetable, but, perhaps, do them during 'pro ect work'. The same
may well become increasingly true f r science and the other so-
called "foundati n subjects" of the National Curr culum. Now
whil t this apparent disparity is n t merely a matter f different
labels hiding comm n features (for wh t we call som thing may
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reflect how we think about it, and thus our approach to it -
consider the way "language' has been renamed "Engi sh' in the
National Curriculum), there is undoubtedly a signif cant element
of this. And then there is the other side of this coin: common
labels can hide different features. The diversity of practice that
might be going on under the label "maths' could be very
considerable, the emphasis ranging perhaps from d ing carefully
sequenced sets of computation exercises to engaging in
investigations, working with concrete apparatus, or playing a
mathematical board game or bingo.
This now leaves us with the problem: if the timetable is not
necessarily a very adequate guide to the nature of the curriculum,
what is? What are the basic considerations in terms of which
children's learning should be structured and the curriculum can
be properly understood?
One answer to this is that it is the different ways of
thinking that should determine the underlying structure of the
curriculum, for they represent the most fundamen a! means by
which we organise experience. Knowledge, skills, and techniques
may all be important, but these are all to some degree the product
of thinking, it may be claimed. They also require thinking - ie.,
have to be located in patterns of thinking - if they are to be
understood and intelligently applied. So, are there fundamentally
different ways of thinking which we employ to orga ise and make
sense of our experience? And if there are, does it follow that it
should be a central purpose of the curriculum to i itiate children
into each of them?
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If we look back over the way that learn ng has trad tiona y
been organised into eparate subject areas such as Eng ish maths,
science, history, geo graphy, art etc., it would seem that there has
been an underlying assumption that there are distinct a d
separate ways of thinking that children should master. And at an
intuitive level this seems to make sense: surely, one might say,
there are important differences to be recognized between doing
science and art, or maths and history? It is not merely that in
each of these activities the object of our attention s often
different - maybe, in maths its numbers or geometrical sh pes, in
science its things in the physical world, in history its how we lived
in the past, in art its beauty in its various forms - its the way in
which our attention is focused that differs. It has been said that in
maths and science we look at things "logically", whereas in art and
literature we look at them "creatively" or "imaginatively". Another
way in which this has been put is to say that maths and science
are "objective", while art and literature are "subjective".
Clearly, then, at an intuitive and commonsense level there
are a number of assumptions in play which would incline us to
think that traditional school subjects represent distinct k nds f
thinking, and insofar as it is plausible to see such subjects as
derivative from the distinct disciplines of thought researched in
universities and other institutions of higher education, th view
would seem to gain further credence. But, of course, e eryday
intuition and commonsense are strongly influenced by our wn
socialisation, indeed they are largely the product of this 	 We,
therefore, cannot be content to accept their deliverances
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uncha lenged. And there are many questions to be asked in this
particular case.
We might begin by noticing that even within some of these
tradit onal subject compartments seemingly different kinds of
thinking are taking place. Punctuation, composing or appreciating
a poem, discussing the morality f a character in a novel or the
under ying philosophy of its author, would seem to involve
significantly different thinking capacities, yet might all feature in
a series of "English" lessons. Similarly, observing and attempting
to explain certain land or rock formations, exploring the nature
and development of human communities or trading arrangements,
and analyzing statistics on the economic growth of different world
regions, while falling under the heading of "geography" seem to
encompass somewhat differing skills of thought. If this is so, that
is to say, if what typically goes on within a school subject can lack
horn geneity in terms of the thinking and understanding being
drawn upon, it is clear that we would need to look elsewhere than
the structure of the trad tional school curriculum in order to
ident fy fundamentally different ways of thinking.
But perhaps this supposit on that there are distinct ways of
think ng is itself an illusion. Perhaps, as Dewey has been held to
claim, there is only one proper way of thinking: the scientific or
pr blem-solving approach (Dewey 1933). The claim here is that,
no matter what the subject matter, thinking essentially proceeds
in the same way. Put very schemat cally, it goes something like
this. Firstly there arises a sense of puzzlement in the context of
s mething we are doing. We next try to formulate this into an
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identfiable problem. This is followed by an attempt to generate
hypotheses which would solve the problem and thus remove our
original puzzlement. And finally we set out to test these
hypotheses to see which, f any, works. If we find that one of our
hypotheses does work, then thinking has been successful to that
degree, concrete progress has been made and we can move onto
deal with further puzzlements. If none of our hypotheses work,
then we attempt to generate further ones or reformulate the
problem.
Now, it seems to me, that much of our thinking is something
like Dewey's description, and this is true whether it be in the area
of maths, science, history, or art. But it is far from clear that this
account does not raise as many problems as it answers. Consider
the following important questions:
1) This description may apply to much of our
thinking, but does it apply to all of it? Is all valuable
thinking a matter of problem-solving? What of
contemplation, ruminating, daydreaming, revelation,
reverie, wonderment, thanks-giving and celebration?
And what of human dilemmas as against problems?
The former are things which we may have to learn to
live with rather than solve, and how best to live with
them will not be accomplished by attempting to
dissolve them through some problem-solving
technique.
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2) Does not this description itself incorporate different
kinds of thinking, eg. the "creative" thinking involved
in generating hypotheses as against the "deductive'
thinking mv ived in testing them?
3) Despite the ability to describe it in common terms,
are the think ng processes involved the same across
subject areas? For example, is the capacity to generate
hypotheses and see if they work the same in maths,
as in science, as in interpersonal relations, or morality?
Is mathematical creativity and critical acumen
basically the same as when we speak of these things in
the field of literature, say?
If we are to make honest progress on the issue of how to
develop children s thinking we must try to give more careful
answers to such questions than they often receive in much of the
current pubEc discussion concerning the nature of the primary
school curriculum includ ng the merits or otherwise of the
National Curriculum and how schools should respond to it. For
example we cannot simply assume that the Foundation Sub ects
represent the best way of packaging knowledge and
understanding for assimi ation by children - this must depend
upon whatever logic there is to learning and understanding and
the structure of knowledge tself. At its inception Kenneth Baker
claimed that the sub ects of the Natio al Curriculum simply
"choose themselves" 1 , but what is, say, Technology" as a separate
subject? What gives it its integrity and 	 how is it to be
d stinguished from science? And what of the many important
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areas of human experience and understanding that re not
obviously represented as a F undation Subject such as moral
understanding, drama, or philo ophy? In order to undertake the
task of interpreting the National Curriculum in the way that is
educationally best for the child en we are teaching such questions
cannot be ducked. It is now time to turn to what I have dubbed
the 'rationalist" perspective on developing children's thinking for
some more systematic guidance on these important issues.
47
PART TWO: SOME ANSWERS: RATIONALISM AND
THINKING
CHAPTER FOUR
THE RATIONALIST VIEW OF THINKING
'He who will not reason, is a bigot; he who cannot is a fool;
and he who dares not is a slave." (Sir William Drummond
1585 - 1649)
Clearly, to grasp the perspective that rationalism has to offer
with regard to the kind of curriculum that will best develop a
child s capacity to th nk and understand - and how this relates to
his or her genera education and development - we need to get
clearer as to what ra ionality itself means. Presumably it is a way
of thinking that values the seeking and giving of reason , but
what, precisely, does this involve, and what are its effects on
thinking and the kind of understanding of the world that r sults?
I will try to provide some clarification of these issues by firstly
drawing upon the work of some recent writers in the field, and
then exploring the underlying ideas that emerge in more detail.
Some characterisations of rationality
In their Introduction to Philosophy of Education (1990, Ch.
6) Barrow and Woods characterize rationality in the fol owing
terms:
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"It was Aristotle who first defined man as a rational animal,
and he meant by this that man was to be distinguished from
other an mals in that he had the ability to think, calculate or
reason.
Man differs from other animals in that he is able to act
purposively, to plan, to choose ends and adopt means, and in
that he is able to control his environment rather than
simply respond to it. He is able to memorize, to imagine, to
foresee, to predict, to hypothesize. To use the imprecise
term which in common language includes all such activities,
man has the capacity to think.......
'Clearly when people talk of aiming to promote rationality
or to make people rational, they mean they want them to
think well."
a rational man is, by defin tion, one who approaches
matters with a concern and an ability to assess them by
means of relevant reasoning......
This character zation is useful in that it makes quite explicit two
important features of the claims that are made on behalf of
rationality and its underlying nature. Firstly, it is clear that there
is a tendency to equate rationality with good thinking, or indeed
even with the 'capacity to think" itself. Secondly, it is clear that
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rationality is not entirely neutral in its stance towards th ngs it
has its own inherent purpose, viz, to evaluate them. Rational
thinking, therefore, attempts to subject things to some kind of
scrut ny and control. This has an important, but often
unrecognized consequence: since "to evaluate" is precisely to judge
the fitness or quality of something in terms of some further more
general goal or standard, rationality ultimately sees th ngs from a
perspective which subordinates them to something other than
what they are in themselves. Some of the more serious
implications of this are explored in later chapters, but the manner
in which it is achieved is made plain in the following quotation
from R.S. Peters (1972) in Reason and Passion
"The most obvious and all pervading feature of reason is
surely the transcendence of the this, the here and the now...
Explanation, planning, justification, all share in common this
obvious characteristic. They connect what is, what is done
and what is to be done with the past and the fu ure by
means of generalisations and rules."
Reason works, then, by standing back fr m things,
disengaging thought from the immediacy of what is present in the
here and now so that it sees things in terms of their location in
some more general explanatory or justificatory framework. This
framework itself consists of sets of rules for classifying things and
connecting the clas es of things so produced. Rati ality, then,
produces for itself a certain kind of reality whose structure is
determined by its classificatory rules. Peters then goes on to point
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out that these rules have to be "public" ie. agreed and shared, so
that anyone who kn ws them can check that they have been
properly applied in a particular situation. It
	 the presence of
such public tests of correctness that can:
guarantee objectivity and the escape from arbitrariness"
and it is for this reason that he regards science as "the supreme
example of reason in action" and the physical sc ences as:
.perhaps the finest product that yet exists of the
sustained and controlled imagination of the human race."
It validates its claims through appeals to universal laws that, in
principle, anyone can test.
Before bringing the focus a little more directly upon
educational concerns, t would, I think, be help ul to refer to one
more writer to flesh out further some of the general features of
the operation of rationality, and its relationship to "good" thinking.
David Pole (1972), in a paper called "The C ncept of Reason"
writes:
"Reason is the sole route to truth, or the only non-arbitrary
route."
As with the previous writers, there is the ci m that all good
('non-arbitrary") tho ght is subsumed under the heading of
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rationality, and again, this latter is characterized by Pole through
its appeal to rules and standards. It is these that are seen as both
relating thought to reality (eg. as in judging that that is a dog),
and relating one thought or aspect of reality to another, as in the
making of statements such as "The dog is in he doorway" or "Dogs
and cats are both domestic pets". Thus the fundamental units of
thought are concepts - that is to say categ ries in terms of which
we classify things in accordance with features they are considered
to have in common, and of which such particular things therefore
come to be regarded as instances. But thi of course, is not the
end of the story: these concepts themselves belong to further
conceptual schemes or theories by being subsumed under other,
more general concepts than themselves (such as 'dogs' and 'cats'
both being 'pets' or 'living organisms' etc) with all the additional
elements of significance that this brings with it. In this way,
rational thinking performs the task of bringing the "brute data'
which we receive through the senses to order, organizing it by
means of a net of interrelated concepts thr ugh which everything
in thought is given a place, and therefore a meaning.
Thus central to the operation of rationality is the making of
judgments. Good thinking is based on eeing how things in
experience measure up to the agreed criteria or standards
relevant to deciding membership of the various categories in
which they might be placed. It is a matter of judging when
something is an instance of a more general category and of
judging the relationships between different categories.
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So far this has a been couched in rather ab tract terms. Let
me now give an example to illustrate these c aims. Imagine
entering a strange room for the first time. The curtains are dra n
and your eyes take time to adjust to the lack of 1 ght. Slowly you
become aware of certa n barely discernible objects in the dimness.
Now what they are in that experience - ie., what one understands
them to be - will depend upon what categories you judge each of
them to belong to. That long dark object over there - is it a bed or
a sofa? Is that a pillow lying at one end or perhaps a cushion, and
are those the ruffled sheets of an unmade bed or something else
altogether? Clearly, one is here trying to define different aspects
of the object to see if they match the requirements of one of the
categories one has in mind. Your judgement on this will both
define the reality of the object, and also, perhaps, the nature of
the room you have strayed into: bedroom or sitting room. In turn,
this judgement itself will set up a whole range of expectations
concerning the other things in the room and wi 1 influence the
way you interpret - ie classify - some of the other dim shapes
you can just pick out. For example, the large dark shadow in the
alcove opposite might on the one hand be perceived as a
wardrobe, or on the other as a bookcase. The po nt is, what the
thing is is decided by the category it is placed in: its "one of
those". Its significance, its value, indeed its very nature is
determined by this classification. This might be powerful y
experienced if, in the c ntext of the above examp e, while feeling
our way around the edge of the darkened room we were to
stumble upon a light witch and with some rel ef are able to
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clearly identify the objects as falling mt the familiar pattern of,
say, bed, wardrobe, curta ns etc.
So, at its most fundamental level rational thought operates
through seeing things as instances of categories. It makes
experience manageable by organizing it in accordance with a
complex set of public y shared defin tions (ie. criteria, or
standards). And these definitions determine what the thing is, if
and how it is related to other things, and its place in the general
scheme of things - that is to say its meaning. Thus a child cannot
see something as a tree, a triangle, or a tragedy until she has
learnt what counts as being these things - ie., the criteria by
which they are distingu shed. It seems to follow, then, that the
categories - concepts - which a child can apply in experience will
be fundamental in determining the kinds f experience she will be
capable of having. They will determine what she can see, what she
can feel, and what she can understand. That is to say the very
quality of her exper ences.1
Now for the mo t part, this categonzing is totally implicit in
experience, as in our unreflective use of concepts in our everyday
going about our business, but sometimes this is all done very
explicitly as in attempts at scientific exp anation. For example the
theory of evolution brings otherwise disparate phenomena such as
adaption, competition, and gene mutation into relationship, and in
so-doing gives them added significance Indeed each of these
elements is itself a re ationship between less abstract elements,
"adaption', say, claiming a relationship between the physical or
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behavioural constitution of the organism and its habitat. And so
on down a hierarchy of ever more primitive elements in the
explanation. (For the rational st, something of a parallel kind
would be at the kernel of any sort f explaining - how else can
connections between things be made than through linking them
into conceptual schemes?)
Similarly, things change their meaning (and their value) as
we re-classify them for new purposes. Again this is happening all
the time in ways of which we are often not consciously aware, as
when some subtle shift in our view of another person occurs over
a period of time. But this, of c urse, might be far more explicit in
the case of, say, a detective in the process of investigating a crime.
Here as the investigation develops and new evidence comes to
light, things and people may become radically re-classified and
their significance radically altered. Thus an occurrence that
originally seemed trivial may take on a new cogency, someone
initia ly thought of as honest now seems dishonest, a sound alibi
now appears fatally flawed etc.
The point is that throughout this process the meaning and
value of the things under con ideration depends on two things:
firstly, the categories in which t ey are placed; secondly - and this
is very important - the purposes or motives that underlie
our categorizing activity. Arguably, categories are not simply
present - ready made and manifest - in the physical world, they
are applied to the world by c n cious beings in the course of the r
interaction with it. But such interacti n always has a purp Se, or
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complex of purposes, which will heavily condition the kinds of
categories that will be applied in particular experiences Thus
differing purposes may yield very differing views of the same
phenomenon - what a child sees as a tatty toy an antiquarian may
see as a treasure (and vice versa') - and in this way our
perception of things is never "neutral".2
Some broad considerations raised for teaching
This preliminary account of the operation of rationality in
thinking leads t a number of general points with regard to the
development of children's thinking. The first is that it makes
absolutely clear what the central task of the teacher must be at
whatever level: to help children to acquire an increasingly refined
systems of categories for classifying things. If things only have
their meaning and value according to the categories in which we
place them, then clearly it is crucial that children learn the
shared pubi c rules and standards involved in doing this. Th s will
be central to their very ability to experience things - and the
quality of that experience.
This leads to a further point. Insofar as these standards are
matters of socia convention, which, for example, may differ in
some regards from culture to culture, and since they are clearly
very large in number (just consider all the things and
relationships an adult in our society can conceive of), it would
appear that they will need to be deliberately taught rather than
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picked up by chance. This requirement seems to receive further
support from the observation that a great many pub! c concepts
are not man fest on the surface of the world simply to be
discovered by the use of the senses. For example, while a child
may be able o see, hear, touch etc., and learn shared labels for,
such purely physical properties as cot urs, sounds, textures etc.,
and maybe al o physical things such a plants and animals, there
are many categories whose defining attributes cannot be
perceived through the senses in this way. One cannot in the same
way simply " ee" such things as 'uncle, 'freedom', 'mu tiplication',
'atom', or even 'school'. Acquiring such concepts is more than - or
not at all - a matter of observing physi a! properties, but a matter
of grasping various abstract relations and social or theoretical
purposes which will need to be explained by someone who
already understands them.
Arguments such as these, then, seem to support the
extensive (but not exclusive) use of inctruction to demonstrate to
children the relevant rules, standards and relationships; the
provision of clear definitions and illu trative examples, followed
by practice in applying what they have learnt to new experiences
arranged by the teacher. 3
 Further - and arising from the
observation that rational thinking is not neutral - it will involve
getting children to understand the purpose which the use of
certain sets of categories serves. Thus developing their thinking in
the area of, say, science will not be adequately described in terms
of them coming to know certain class f atory rules and standards,
but will need o include some grasp of the nature of the enterprise
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of science: its motive to provide causal exp anations of
phenomena. Some, at least tacit, understanding of thi would seem
to be necessary if scientific concepts are to be intelligently applied
in experience.
Now it seems to me that both so-called 'content" based and
"process" based views of primary science are in danger of paying
too little heed to this. Of themselves, neither factual knowledge
nor acquiring so-called "skills" of observation, hypothesising, and
testing etc., contribute much to scientific understanding unless
they are taught in a way that conveys the character of the
underlying achievements being sought: the quality of explanation
and its purpose. For example the appropriateness and accuracy of
observation will clearly be dependent upon an understanding of
the sort of thing you are looking for and why. Similarly, the
usefulness of an hypothesis will depend upon an understanding of
the sorts of questions to ask in a particular context. That is to say
there is a danger here of conjuring up the chimera of teaching a
set of free-floating "skills" when what is really required is
understanding - through which skills are em edded in an
apprehension both of what in general counts as and motivates a
scientific enquiry and the rationale of a particular investigation
under way. Skills, conceived as specific abilities, remain "blind" if
not underpinned by such understanding of the contexts in which
they are to be applied. In a parallel way the same can no doubt be
said for other curnculum areas such as history and geography
where "knowledge' and "skills" talk sometimes d minate debate
about what should be taught.4
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It is clear, then, that the demands for the development f
rational thought go well beyond the mere rote learning of facts
and mechanical thinking skills. There may be an emphasis on
instruction in teaching, but it will be of a form intended to lead to
a certain kinds of understanding on the part of the pupil such that
he or she is able to apply what they have learnt to the r
experience in a coherent and publicly accepted manner. But there
are perhaps some important questions being begged by the
account I have so far given. Questions largely to do with the place
of individuality of thought and the possibilit es of individu 1
discovery, invention, and creation in the development of thinking.
Some exploration of these questions, and an examination of more
developed and sophisticated rationalist perspectives in education
which attempt to deal with them, will be taken up in the next
chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE
RATIONALITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL
In the previous chapter I outlined the way in which rational
thinking operates by the application of publicly shared systems of
classificat on to experience - ie. conceptual schemes - which
themselves express certa n purposes or motives with regard to
experience. We noted that the use of such schemes involves the
application of chared rules and standards in accordance with
which things are placed in their proper categories, and that this
placement defines the th ng both in terms of its meaning and its
value. We then raised some questions concerning the place of
individuality in the development of thinking in the context of a
view which places so much emphasis on s cia! convention in the
structuring of thought. By way of developing these important
issues, and the way in which the rationalist view might deal with
them, I would now like to refer to some central ideas developed
by some recent thinker in the tradition In considering these
ideas, we will see how rationalism modulates the idea of human
individual ty within a framework of social conventions such that
the very idea of an md vidual human mind comes to be seen as
parasitic upon them. The first of these views develops this theme
by !ooking at the relationship between the possibility of
developing a person's thinking, ie., his or her mind, and his or her
culture.
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Michael Oakeshott: md vidual and culture
Michael Oakeshott s view of the relation shin between the
development of the human mind and culture is nicely summed up
in the following claim:
"Human being has a history, but no 'nature'."
o keshott strongly believes that we are mislead if we think of the
development of an individual human being as akin to a process of
growth in which some inn te or settled nature unfold . He wishes
to stress the point that human development is basica ly a matter
of an on-going transaction between an individual and the human
w rid, and that our mdiv dual humanness is the product of a
history of such transaction from birth. Now the important thing
about this is how he goes n to characterise the human world, He
makes the point that the human world is not merely a world of
physical things, but of intelligibles, ie., understandings,
significances, beliefs, ideas etc. Thus everything in a human world
from everyday things such as chairs and postboxes, t institutions
such as marriage and the family, or schools, colleges, and the
H uses of Pan ament, are what they are according to the meaning
they have within a social f rm of life. It is this shared way of
liv ng together that forms the context and the material for the
gr wth of any individual, determining both what is possible and
what is valuable.
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So of what, fundamentally, s this shared way of living
composed? And how precisely does t enter into and shape the
development of the individual? Oake hott suggests that at ba e
our human world is made possible by a wide range of shared
procedures through which meanings and significances are given
and communicated. Over the period of our history we have
developed, and continue to devel p, sets of social rule
conventions, and standards for discriminating and evaluating
things. These shared procedures permeate and give sense to all
aspects of our life, governing both thought and behaviour. They
constitute our culture in its broadest and deepest sense and
structure aspects of our lives as various as buying some breakfa t
cereal to writing a will or offering up a prayer. It should be
stressed at once here that this view f culture does not see it as
static, but rather, to use Oakeshott's wn analogy, as an on going
"conversation". In this conversation, wh ch began with the dawn f
human awareness, the languages of fee ings, sentiments, desire
recognitions, moral and religious beliefs, intellectual and practi I
enterprises etc. interplay, constantly creating the parameters a d
possibilities for human being. It is only through engaging in t s
conversation, entering the interplay f these various language
that "self-disclosure" and "self-enactment" of the individual
can occur. We find out who we are, and express ourselves, by
participating in the sets of shared procedures (ie. "languages") that
are our culture. All talk of human or individual potential
presupposes this.
It can be seen, then, that culture, in Oakeshott's sense, is not
a set of rigid formulae or recipes for hought and behaviour - in a
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language one can say many things, though not anything eg. we
cannot say with literal meaning that "justice is pink"). Rather, for
Oake hott, culture is living, and represents invitations for
engagement in the conversation of humankind. Through such
engagement culture is continuously invented and added to. But
where does this leave the individual? For we are all born into a
culture, but not with a culture. Oakeshott is uncompromising on
this: '..nobody is born a human being". If being human consists
precisely in participating in sets of historically developed
procedures, this is something that must be learnt, for:
To be without this understanding is to be not human, but a
stranger to the human condition."
Studies of so-called "wolf-boys' - boys raised by wolves from
birth and who, when found, exhibited the behavioural
characteristics of their surrogate parents - might be taken to
amply demonstrate the truth f this claim. 2 Before we can
proper y be said to have entered the human condition, we need to
have acquired the basic social rules, conventions, standards, ie.,
procedures, that enable us to participate in and contribute to
culture. Thus education must be seen as an initiation into this
inheritance of understanding and belief.
This is not, however, qu te the end of the story, for at this
point Oakeshott adds an important caveat. Culture - these
procedures, this conversation - is not to be equated with the talk
and bustle of the everyday world whose current engagements and
occup tions are directed at more immediate results. Here, n the
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hustle of consumerism, sensationalism, and passing fashion, n the
blandness of mediocrity and preoccupation with immediate
practical gain, Oakeshott believes that the true conversati n has
largely been f rgotten, abridged, and corrupted. Culture pr per -
our "civilised inheritance" - is largely unfamiliar both to the child
and everyday I fe. Thus schools should be - as they were
origina ly - monastic in character, places set somewhat apart from
the everyday world so that serious and systematic study can go
on undisturbed, and where:
excellences may be heard because the din of
worldly laxities and partialities is silenced or abated."
This concern for true culture to be "heard" by the child leads
Oakeshott to reject both child-centred approaches to education
and the notion that the basic aim of education is socialisation (ie. it
sh uld be d m nated by what is considered to be "s cially
relevant ) He fears that the former with its empha s on
children s interests will distort the enterprise of enabling
engagement with what is to them, by definition, an unfamiliar
inheritance of human achievement. (If it were familiar,
presumably children would not need to go to school) He fears that
the latter with ts attempt to make people "current" -attuned to
the changing needs of a largely unauthentic society which has
forgotten its 'civilised inheritance' - would be to sh'rk the central
duty of a real education.
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Now it seems to me that his view draws a numb r of
important a pects of education to our attention which do more
than simply act as a timely det rrent to any tendencie we may
have towards either rampant individualism, or eleating the
norms and immediate needs of modern society as a central g 1 of
education. If the continuity provided by public traditions of
thought give us a characteristically human world with it sense of
security and purpose necessary for sustained engagement, they
should not, and indeed cannot, be easily overturned. Rather they
deserve a certain reverence which should be ref ected in
education.
This serves to extend, I think, a point touched upon towards
the end of the previous chapter about the need for content and
skills to be embedded in a context. When certain aspects f a
subject are analyzed out and identified as central teaching
objectives which are comprehensively set out in a detailed and
systematic manner, there may be a tendency for them to be
taught rather clinically in an effort to cover the ground in
	 the
most efficient way. Oakeshott's view nvites us to see them in an
altogether d fferent light - not just as curriculum subjects
consisting of various components of facts, theor es, concepts and
skills - so many commodities to be delivered" - but as ho tic
traditions which embody that which is of enduring value and
which it is the sacred task of the teacher to initiate pupils nto.
They are not simply to be made "fun' or "interesting' or relevant
(indeed, on t s view they are the standard of what hould c unt
as relevant), but to be conveyed as 1 ving traditions with their
own ethos, utlo k, and sense of il umination.
	 Teaching must
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reflect this by re-embedding the components that may have been
analyzed out for planning and monitoring purp ses in a
developing sense of the tradition as a whole, presumably by
reference to the great themes, moments, and figures which
comprise it and conveying something of the fascinations,
enthusiasms, nuances, moods which lend it its living character and
which it contributes to the greater "conversation' of which
Oakeshott speaks.
In short, then, the overriding aim should be not merely for
the various areas of the curriculum to be "encountered" or
"delivered", but to be lived. As well as providing tremendous
scope for the imagination of teachers such an approach of course,
raises serious questions about how to provide a suitable
curriculum framework, classroom organisation and teaching ethos
at the primary level. But it is also strongly suggest ye of two
aspects of the way forward. The firi is that, given the character
of what is to be conveyed, it would seem to speak in favour of
some form of apprenticeship approach to children s learning. The
second is that it could be taken as re-assert ng the value of a
perhaps currently oft-neglected but powerful source of motivation
in education: emulation (in contrast to -but not necessarily in
conflict with - competition, intrinsic interest, immediate
relevance). These two aspects are clearly intertwined and I should
like to say just a little more about them here.
It would seem that crucial to developing a sense of the life
of a tradition is to work alongside someone who shares in that life.
Someone with significant knowledge, insight, and "feel" for the
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area concerned and who exhibits this in their manner of going
about things. While this does not necess rily support specialist
teachers in primary schools it probably doe require teachers with
specialisms, ie . strong abiding personal interests. Such role
models can convey in a concrete and often incidental way the
outlook and qua! ties of the traditions they have become engaged
with - for to some extent here we are talk ng about ways of life,
or important constituents thereof. For th s to happen, though,
children themselves would need to begin to engage in the
problems and not simply the solutions in an area and to be able
to discuss their ideas both freely and under the guidance of those
with relatively greater insight and feel, who could draw
judiciously on their own knowledge and experience in a way that
integrates the thoughts of their pupils with the tradition.
In the process of doing this it would, in addition, be
important to begin to establish a sense of history, ie., that ideas
have evolved, that certain basic themes have been of enduring
importance and that "real" people have contributed to their
development, bringing to bear concerns that are both perhaps
sometimes unique to individuals, but also reflecting their personal
circumstances and broader social/intellectual context. Such an
initiation might begin to help children get their own feel for the
underlying sense and direction of the aspects of culture with
which they are engaging by, as it were, listening in" to previous
parts of the "conversation", and to gain some appreciation of their
impact on living a human life.
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In the above ways, then, I believe that Oakeshott's
brand of "conservative rationalism" has important insights to offer
us in primary education. But it also provokes some significant
anxieties in relation to the question about individuality in
thinking from which this chapter took its start.
Clearly, on this view individuality and creativity can come
into play only on the back of the acquisition of culture, and in the
form of relatively minor modifications to it which its established
procedures permit. Indeed, on this account it would seem that
individuality need for the most part involve no modification of
culture at all, but simply an adherence to certain alternatives as
against others contained within that culture. Thus a person's
individuality may largely consist in such things as his tastes in
music and size in slippers which cumulatively mark him out as
different to most others. And much of this may be determined by
contingent facts of his own physiology, subcultural background,
and events and occurrences in which he has happened to have
been involved, which in turn will to some degree have been
conditioned by his cultural milieu. Now the quest on arises: is the
notion of individual that emerges here adequate to what we have
in mind when, for example, we speak of "valuing each child as an
individual" or of wanting to develop each child's "individual
potential"
While Oakeshott's account rightly reminds us that in large
degree it is culture that provides whatever means that are
available for expressing oneself, and that theref re a concern to
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develop individua potential must largely be understood in terms
of initiation into the traditions that constitute culture, the que tion
is surely raised s to why we should value any particular
individual portra ed as this rather arbitrary combination of
possibilities as aga nst his or her culture as s ch. That is to say, is
there not a danger of this view inclining us to see and value
individuals basica ly as representatives of their culture - and
perhaps as potent ally significant contributors to it - rather than
for themselves? (With regard to the latter, the temptation to give
a relatively specialised and accelerated education to child
"geniuses" might be a case in point. In a more general way the
dangers of cultural stereotyping of individua or of subordinating
the feelings and real aptitudes of individuals to what is currently
culturally valued can be very real - for even "high culture" can
have its fashions and paradigms that preclude other worthwhile
possibilities.)
What seems to be seriously underp ayed in Oakeshott's
account is the sense of the child as an ndividual centre of
consciousness exhibiting personal agency - which is perhaps one
of the most striking things about, for example, walking into an
infant reception c ass! In emphasizing the sense in which the
human condition is something to be achieved rather than innately
present, Oakeshott gives education a heavy future orientation in
which perhaps r ther too little attention may be given to
individuals as they are now as compared ith what they may
have the potential to become in cultural term
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We are, then, back with the problem as to in what true
individuality is taken to consist, and how we are to understand
aspects of a person's life (if any) which are not obviously to be
accounted for in the terms invited by Oakeshott. This is
underlined by what is perhaps a serious problem concerning
Oakeshott's implicit distinction between the public procedures
which he stresses and the substantive ideas, beliefs, sentiments,
behaviours etc. which they generate. That is to say, is Oakeshott
having to assume a hard differentiation between the form and
the content of a social way of life? If he does, can it be
maintained? (For example, do not procedures themselves partly
consist in substantive ideas and beliefs produced by prior
procedures, and indeed , do procedures have the logical priority
over ideas etc., that Oakeshott seems to assume?) If he does not,
ie., if acquisition of culture involves the acquisition of a large
number of detailed and substantive beliefs etc., would this not be
so constraining as to rule out the possibility of anything that we
would want to recognize as the expression of individuality, for
now not only the form, but the detailed content of the
"conversations" in which human beings par c pate would be
predetermined? This whole area seems to raise starkly the issue
of just what independent thinking consists in, and its relationship
to the social conventions which structure the status quo. To
pursue it , we will need to give some consideration to certain
aspects of the thinking of one of the most influential mainstream
philosophers of this century: Ludwig Wittgenste n
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Wittgenstein: Rules, meaning, and freedom 3
One of the contributions that Wittgen tein made to our
understanding of issue in this area was to intr duce an analogy
between human activity and games. One form of human activity is
that of understanding tself, and Wittgenstein began by trying to
characterise the condit ons under which we wou d be prepared to
say of someone that he or she understood something - or had the
concept of it.
Suppose we wished to teach a child the dea of a number
series such as that formed by the three t mes table. Perhaps,
amongst other things, we ask the child to colour in this series on a
one hundred number square. Maybe at first she colours numbers
in a relatively random manner, but with further guidance colours
them as follows: 1,3,5,7,9,11,13, etc. Here the numbers have not
been coloured in a simply random fashion, but have been coloured
in a way that incorporates a systematic mistake - the child has
"counted on" according to the logic "1,2,3 - 3,4,5 - 5,6,7 " etc. It's
not that the child has n o understanding, rather she has a
misunderstanding - which is a very significant step towards a
proper understanding. Perhaps the teacher now explains this
mistake and gets the pupil to colour in the f rst few correct
numbers. Now should we at this point say that the child has
understood this series of numbers? Wittgenste n says no, to
demonstrate this she must colour more of the ser es which she has
not been shown directly how to do by the teacher The point here
is that it is only when a person shows themselves able to carry
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on independently in new situations that we would be prepared
to say that they have understood. Parallel examples could be
drawn from the area of language such as the learning of
punctuation, or the past tense ("I catched , "I fighted"), or the
acquisiti n of new vocabulary where a child uses a new word
slightly inappropriately, its meaning being understood in one
context on y. The general point being that many mistakes are
stages in the growth of understanding, and that this is considered
to be achieved only as the child develops his or her own capacity
to respond correctly in new situations.
But, now, in what precisely does such understanding consist?
Is there some specific underlying feature that lies at the kernel of
this capacity to carry on independently in new situations? The
kinds of example we have been describing are taken to show us
several important features concerning the general nature of
understand ng.
The first of these is that understanding cannot simply be
some priva e inner mental occurrence such as a sudden feeling or
flash of ins ght. Clearly we could experience such a feeling but not
really have understood. Someone's crying "Aha!" or "Yes, now I
see!' cann t be taken to guarantee that they've got the right end
of the stick. But if understanding is not to be equated with some
private feeling, nor is it to be equated simply with public
be aviour. Surely, it is not the actual behaviour of "carrying on"
itself that constitutes understanding, for, to take the number
series example, we would not assume that understanding
suddenly ceases the moment the pupil stops writing. Nor would
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he need to actually continue the senes ad nauseam in order to
understand how this would be done. Thus behaviour may exhibit
understanding, but cann t be equated with it. So what is
understanding itself? W ttgenstein suggests that the child's
understanding simply con ists in her being able to follow a
rule. She has acquired the capacity to think in accordance with a
guiding principle, by reference to which she is able to distinguish
c rrect and incorrect ways of proceeding. Further thi capacity is
not a quality which is added to thought, it constitutes thought
itself. Thought (and understanding) is this capaci y of linking
things together and distinguishing them from other things not in
s me random or arbitrary way, but systematic ly, ie., in
accordance with a guiding rule.
Now it may at fir t blush seem that this notion of thinking
and understanding as a matter of rule-following s somewhat
unremarkable and almost too simple and innocent to warrant
much further attention. But actually a little furth r reflection
reveals some very signif cant implications which have wide-
r nging ramifications. To begin with, it carries t e following
important corollary: think ng and understanding are essentially
public in character. Whether a person is following a rule is not in
pr nciple a purely private r subjective matter, it is an essential
part of the nature of a rule that all who know it are n a position
t decide when it is being f ilowed. Further, even f a person
in ents a new rule for him elf, and does n t tell other what it is,
w ile it may be open to h m to change the rule ccordng to
subjective whim, it is not p rely a matter of subjective whim as to
w ether he is following t e original rule. If he priv tely invents
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a rule, say, of behaviour for himself and then ends up doing
something else, no matter what he, himself, might believe or wish
he simply is not following his own rule. Indeed in some
circumstances, if others were to infer from his previous behaviour
what his "secret t' rule was, or he were to divulge it to them, they
may on occasion make a better judgement as to whether he is
f liowing his own rule than he can.
The point is, that to follow a ru e is to have a standard of
reference which is in a very significant sense independent of
oneself, even if it were ones own invention. But there is a second
point to be made. The vast majority of rules which are important
in human life are not only public in principle, they are public in
fact. The whole of social life, including language and the
accumulated knowledge and understanding of a culture, is based
on a structure of publicly shared conventions, ie., rules. Without
this we would not even be able to c mmunicate with others, to
convey or compare our experiences Thus, on this account,
thinking and understanding have a str ngly public and therefore
objective character (because of the way shared rules enable
comparisons to be drawn and others to check on what one says
and their development in an individual will precisely consist in
acquiring more such shared rules for the structuring of thought.
So far we have taken as our starting point a fairly simple
case: the understanding of - or having a concept of - one
particular thing. But what of the who e bodies of understanding
we began to make reference to in the last paragraph? I-low are we
to characterize, say, the disciplines of maths, science, history, etc
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to which schools wish to ntroduce pupils (even if in many
primary schools they are not necessarily taught as separate
subjects, but through an inter-disciplinary approach)? It is at this
point that Wittgenstein's anal gy with games has been thought to
be illuminating and will he p to illustrate many of the points
stated in more abstract form above. The point about games is that
they are quite explicitly rule-structured activities, and herefore if
we examine the way that they function we will gain nsight into
the way aspects of human life which are more tacitly rule-
structured operate.
Suppose we were to witness the following incident. A
number of men wearing shorts are running about on a field
seemingly chasing a ball. The ball passes between two white posts
with a bar across the top, and this is immediately fol owed by the
sound of a whistle emanating from a figure dressed in black,
whose shorts are a little longer and baggier than th se of the
other members of the group. He then raises his arm, whereupon a
number of the men begin to embrace each other while others
stand dejected or begin gesticulating at the black figure Someone
unfamiliar with the rules of this game may wonder what all the
fuss is about. The events that he has witnessed can on y take on
their significance for him when he gets to know the e rules. For
example that the object is to get the ball between the posts -but
not n any old fashion - there is to be no handling f the ball, nor
deliberate obstruction of opponents, and the ball has be kept
with n the white lines which mark the perimeter of what is called
the pitch" etc. It is such rules that structure the activ ty, give it
its purpose, and make it the activity that it is. They indicate which
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particular events are important - f r example, one goal-keeper
stamping to keep warm is not important while the other div ng
for the ball is; they determine how th ngs are to be classified eg.,
as "goal", "foul", 'offside"; and how things are to be done, such as
the taking of a free kick or a throw-in. Importantly, it follows
from this that the rules will also determine the meaning of the
terms and statements relating to the activity and how one would
verify them. For example the mean ng and truth of the claim
"That's a goal!" is not a subjective matter, it will be determined by
the relevant rules. And, of course, what is to count as important,
as success, as true or false etc. will be different for other games.
Goals are scored differently in Rugby football, and not at all in
chess.
Now the claim is that much characteristically human activity
- including the pursuit of truth and understanding - is structured
by complex sets of rules in ways ana ogous to games. Thus to take
the "game" of natural science, it can be seen to be structured and
given its identity by its distinctive body of rules. The rules
determine what is to count as a sc entific explanation - that it
must ultimately be testable against observation through the
senses; the rules determine what counts as a satisfactory scient fic
experiment eg., that there should be controls, that it should be
repeatable; the rules determine what data are significant eg., the
scientist's subjective wishes and feelings are not relevant; the
rules determine the manner in which scientific observations and
conclusions should be written up, and so forth.
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But as well as these ru es of procedure, there are w at one
might term rules of content, ie , the rules used to organ se and
class fy the content of exper ence in shared ways, to wh ch we
have made previous reference. Thus as well as its distinctive
procedures, science has its d s nctive concepts such as those of
'causality', 'energy', 'velocity' and webs of concepts such as the
theory of evolution which give direction to the enterprise as a
whole, or particular aspects of t, and thus delineate the terrain
within which the scientist works. So to understand what a
scient St iS about requires an aw reness of such rules, and to learn
to do science is to learn how to apply them in one s own
exper ence, ie., to learn how to "play the game".
Similarly, just as there are different games to be played in
the conventional sense of that word, so the search for truth and
understanding in different areas, ie., the different disciplines of
thought, might be thought of as comprising different games:
different sets of rules constitute different forms of rationality
giving rise to different kinds of knowledge. Here, then, we seem to
have a fundamental basis for distinguishing between differing
forms of thinking and understanding, but before we go on to
consider how this view has been developed in the context of
education and its curriculum mplications, let me summarise
where we have got to and also make a preliminary point about
the nature of freedom and independence of thought on this view.
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Summary of rationalism and some implications for
freedom of thought
We have been explonng a rationalist view of the nature and
devel pment of thought and understanding, and it seems t have
the following centra characteristics:
1) thinking consists in our organising experience by defining its
different aspects in terms of systems of categories;
2) we do this by judgng the ways in which these aspects meet the
standards, ie., rules, which determine what counts as a member of
a certain category;
3) these categories form complex webs and theories, and the
meaning and value of the different aspects of experience th t we
articulate by means of them is determined by the place th y are
allocated in the web,
4) they give structure to living traditions of though and
awareness which form our "civilised inheritance" and con titute
what it is to be human in the full sense;
5) these webs and the procedures that give rise to them and are
used to validate them operate in a way analogous to game they
are governed by rules which are in principle public, and in fact
largely shared within a community;
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6) it is t s public and shared feature of the rules wh ch gives
objectivity to the enterprises which they govern, a d makes
communic tion possible;
7) each o the distinctive games that it is possib e t distinguish
constitutes one of the forms that rati nality can tate.
But what, now, of the following fundamenta object on to all
this: name y that it presents such a highly converiti n based view
of thinking that the notion of freedom of thought seems to be
quite redundant; that rather than de cribing the development of
an individual s capacity to think, th s view presents us with an
inhibiting strait jacket from which th ught would need to escape?
To this the rationalist seems able to make a number f replies.
The first is that at a very fundamental level with ut rules of
thought there can be no freedom of thought for there would be
no thought at all. To return to the games analogy: without the
rules of the game of football there is no game of I tba 1 and for
someone to claim that their freedom s curtailed by these rules is
simply for them to say that they do t wish to p ay fo tball. Of
course, the may wish to change some of the rules, but this is to
accept the vast majority which form the necessary context against
which changes would have a sense, and requires that t ey gain
the agreement of the other players to follow he new rules.
Freedom here, then, still consists in following rules - albe t,
including a limited number of new ones; indeed ths example
shows that freedom consists not in abandoning rule , but precisely
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in deciding which rules to follow. For someone to say they will
accept no rules is for them to refuse to p ay any game in which
case their "freedom' becomes a commitment to nothing.
Now, in the same way, the ratlona 1st can argue that for
someone to say that rules of thought - ie., any rules of thought -
denies their freedom of thought is for them to reject thought
altogether (which, of course, they have on y been able to do by
means of thought for, if the analogy with games holds here, they
are rejecting the basis upon which thought achieves its structure.
So here again, freedom consists in following rules, not rejecting
them, for it is the rules that provide the different possibilities of
thought - different "games" through whic i, and between which,
we may exercise judgement and choice, and thus express
ourselves.
But suppose someone intent upon avoiding the aspect of
conventionality that this argument s ems to wed to thought were
to say: "Very well, I accept that my freedom of thought is only
possible through, and consists in f ilowing, rules of thought, but
this does not mean that I have to fo low the publicly shared ones -
I will follow only my own idiosyncratic ones". While,
theoretically, this would no doubt be possible to some degree -and
perhaps even then only a relatively small degree, given the
background of language learning this decison itself presupposes -
such an aspiration would seem to be an expression of pedantry
rather than any good sense.
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To the extent that an individual ucceeded in f Ilowing rules
that were n fact private, he would have cut himself of from his
fellows (since communication is by definition only poss ble on the
basis of shared rules), and would be unable to ava 1 h 1ise f of
anything th t his culture had produced. His "freedom' w uld then
consist in thinking in accordance with the very ii ted and
isolated rules he was able to invent f r himself and enriched by
nothing outside his own narrow experience. Such an end could
hardly be the goal of education, nor could it constitute what an
educator could mean by the development of independent thought,
though the ability to think beyond (rather than without)
currently shared rule structures may be. But this would invo ye a
certain mastery of these rules rather than ignorance of them, and
would be the way in which a person working within a culture
might extend it. Here, then, inventiveness and creativity, freedom
and independence of mind, would occur not through a re ection of
shared rules and standards, but on the back of them Thr ugh
transforming rules from within the great public tradition - using
their own rule-governed critical pr cedures - the rationalist
would claim, veritable quantum shifts in the foundations of
thought have been achieved - to wit the thinking of C pern cus,
the 'Enlightenment', Newton, Darwin, Marx, and Einstein.
In the presence of such illustrious company, and given the
weight of previous argument, would it not be churlish to press the
freedom of thought issue any further? And yet........
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CHAPTER SIX
RATIONALITY AND LIBERAL EDUCATION
We have now considered the main foundations f what I am
terming the general rationalist position and it is time to look in a
more systematic way at some deta ed implications f this view
for the development of thinking and understanding in the context
of education. Traditionally it has led o what has become known as
a "liberal education', and I propose to consider two versions of
this in order to indicate something of the range of views and
issues that the rationalist position embraces.
P.H.Hirst: "Forms of Knowledge" and liberal education
One of the most influential views in the literature of
philosophy of education and curricu urn theory in recent years is
that of Paul Hirst. He has cia med that there exist a number of
fundamentally distinct ways of structuring and exp ring human
experience which constitute the bas s for all rational thought, and
which are therefore central to the mental deve opment and
education of any child. This thesis s, perhaps, so well known that
one is hesitant to give yet another exposition of t, but both
because of its wide influence and (equally important from our
point of view) because of its clear expression of what I have
identified as the central themes of rationalism in the educational
context, some rehearsal of its ma n elements is appr priate here.1
Building on the ideas of Wittgenste n and Oakeshott, and the way
in which human activity in its many manifestat ons can be
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considered to be rule governed, Hirst cia ms to have di tingui hed
around seven I gically distinct f rms in e heritage of knowledge
and understand ng as we have it today. These represent the basic
ways in wh ch rationality operates in its endeavour to experience
and understand the world, and each, to return to Wittgenstein s
analogy, is a game" with is own peculiar set of shared rules and
standards f r d ing this. We have already indicated the way in
which the activity of science could be seen like this, and indeed
along with maths, knowledge of persons, morality, aesthetics,
religion, and philosophy, this constitutes the current list of the
forms of know edge as discerned by Hirst
Before examining the differentiation of these forms in more
detail, it is worth saying something about their nomenclature.
They have variously been referred to by Hirst as "forms of
knowledge", "f rms of understanding", "f rms of thought', "forms
of rationality", 'forms of experience", and "forms of awareness",
and while it would perhaps be premature to assume from this
that Hirst simp y equates these terms, two things are clear: the
forms are cognitive/intellectual in character, and all
characteristical y human experience presupposes them. 2
 This
thesis, then, unreservedly places the development of the intellect
at the centre f the development of the child's consciousness
emotions, attitudes, dispositions, sensitivities etc., all being
parasitic on the different forms of intel ectual endeavour for their
structure. (We might recall here, for example, the sect on on
'Thought and f eling' in Chapter Two in which it was suggested
that what we feel is heavily dependent upon how we perceive a
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situation ie. the beliefs and understandings we bnng to bear on
it.)
But what is it that individualises each of the forms?
Consistent with the notion of them being forms of intellectual
endeavour, each is essentially seen by Hirst as producing its own
unique kind of statement about the world and consequently - and
this is very important - has its own peculiar method of testing for
their truth or falsity. Indeed, for Hirst, how you test for the truth
of a statement appears to be closely bound in with its very
meaning. He might ask what could even simple statements such as
"The grass is green" or "2 + 2 4" mean if we had no idea of how
to go about checking their truth ie., we didn't know what would
even count as being such a check? This is a central point and we
shall examine some of its consequences presently. For the moment
we can summarize by saying that each form of knowledge
investigates and reveals reality from a unique per pective whose
essential character is given by its fundamental concepts and truth
tests, and has generated over the course of its historical
development conceptual schemes and procedures - ie., a detailed
set of rules - for structuring the whole enterprise.
Let us now consider two examples that seem to match this
description quite well. The truth of the statements of mathematics
is tested ultimately by reference to whether they can be deduced
from certain basic axioms of a particular mathematical system
and the statements themselves are founded on certain
fundamental concepts which are peculiar to mathematics, such as
'number or 'matrix'. Though we may teach, say, number bonds
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through the use of concrete apparatus, the mathematical
statement "2 + 2 - 4" is true not because of anything about the
physical world, but by definition. If we c anged from base 10 to
base 3, "2 + 2' would not equal "4", but 11". Counting concrete
objects is an application f the number ystem, and while it is
certainly true that if we look at: * * * * we see 4 stars, this has
no bearing on the mathematical truth of the tatement: "2 + 2 = 4"
(in base 10). 3
 In contrast, the statements of the sciences do make
claims about the physical world and therefore are assessed for
their truth or falsity not, ultimately, in terms of their
compatibility w h a pre-specified set of basic definitions as in
mathematics, but through their compatibi ity with observations
made through the senses and guided by such fundamental
concepts as 'causality', 'energy', 'gravity, 'evolution'. Unlike
mathematics, th n, scientific understanding constantly changes as
a response to new observations of the physical world. It would
seem that if something substantially similar can be said about the
distinctness of the other members of Hirst's ist of forms, he would
indeed have identified a number of irreducible ways of making
sense of experience and communicating it.
Now the extent to which Hirst is right about this is of the
greatest importance with regard to the issue of developing
children's thinking, for it goes to the heart of the issue of the basis
upon which we make and articulate judgements - the basis upon
which we decide what is true or false, good or bad, and
communicate this to others. Consider the fo lowing statements:
That s a g od painting because I like t"
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"It was a poor film because the hero didn't win."
"It's wrong to kick people because its not allowed here."
"It's wrong to hurt people because God said so."
'It s not fair that lions eat the o her animals.
"That's a square because it's coloured blue."
"The answer is eight because eight has a nice shape to it"
'He looks ugly - he must be wicked."
"Plants grow towards the light because Miss Jones says so."
"Evolution can t be true because the Bible says so.
Some perhaps have a familiar ring to them, some are
understandable, some a little bizarre, but arguably - and I know
in some cases this will be contentious - from the point of view of
Hirst's thesis they all have something in common wrong with
them if taken 1 terally. Taken literally, they each exhibit an
inadequacy of judgement and this inadequacy arises not so much
because of having wrong factual information as through applying
inappropriate criteria - they refer to the wrong kind f
evidence - apply the wrong test for truth".
It may be perfectly true that "Miss Jones said so" but this is
not the sort of evidence upon which to base a scientific claim, the
fact of someone's being ugly is not an adequate basis for judging
their moral character, sheer personal preference is not an
adequate basis for judging the aesthetic worth of a panting, and
so forth. Often the inadequacy arises, to put it in Hirstian terms,
because, embryonically, criteria are being drawn from the wrong
form of knowledge: aesthetic to make a moral judgement, rel gious
to make a moral judgement, religious to make a scientific
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judgement, moral to make an aesthetic j dgement, phys ca r
aesthetic properties to make mathematical judgements tc Fr m
the point of view of the forms of knowledge, qualitative y dis nct
kinds of truth are being hopelessly confused and consequently t e
very meaning of the statements becomes pr blematic. What kind
of understanding of number and number bonds would a child
have who felt that the shape of a number should determine the
answer to, say, an addition sum? Thus a vit 1 aspect in developing
a child's thinking and understanding w 11 be to help him
distinguish between the different kinds of truth and to learn to
apply the standards and criteria appropriate to each.
Now there are a number of aspects to this. It will, of course,
partly involve acquiring the relevant concepts so as to grasp, for
example, that physical properties like colour are not defi ing
characteristics of mathematical shapes, that wild animals are not
really the sorts of things to which it is appropriate to apply
concepts like fairness. But importantly, it will also involve t em
learning to apply distinct objective procedures, the pub dy
agreed ways of test ng for truth in the area concerned, for surely
we are involved in a rather different - ie., qualitatively
different - kind of enquiry in, say, deci ng the motives f r
William's invasion f Britain (knowledge f persons) what is
great about a Beethoven symphony (aesthetic); whether ne
washing powder is better than another (sc entific); how many
prime numbers there are between five and f fty (mathematical);
whether its worse to hurt someone than to steal fr m t em
(moral) how God wants us to live our lives religious); what we
mean by "happiness or freedom" and ho important they re
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compared with, say, be ng truthful, or responsible
(philosophical). Attempts to explore experience, make
judgements, test ideas, justify v ews, prove or disprove claims and
pinions on such issues mv lye the use of distinct sets of critena
and standards. To hark back to the analogy of the previ us
chapter, they are "games" played by different ru es. Thus, to take
a recommendation I once encountered while attending a teacher
in-service course on "Science across the curriculum", would it not
be not merely incongruous, but downright incoherent to write up
a scientific experiment as a poem? The distinct qualities which
each seeks to exhibit simply seem not to be compatible.
Where, then, do these considerations leave us with regard to
the curriculum and the child s education? And what are their
implications for the development of children's thinking and in
particular their independent thinking? Put simply, if the forms of
knowledge are fundamental to thinking and mental development
in the way that Hirst describes, it would seem ssential to try to
initiate every child into each of the forms. Anyth ng less would be
to cramp their development in an arbitrary way - to deny them
the capacity to enter the full gamut of human understanding and
experience which would both enrich their lives and upon which it
is necessary ultimately to draw in the making of important
practical everyday and larger life decisions. Further, genuine
independence of mind (as against mere contra suggestiveness)
and constructive imagination a d creativity, wou d be achieved by
learning to play these fundamental "knowledge games": ie.,
learning the characteristic forms of expression, conceptual
schemes, truth tests, and procedures for each of the forms. For
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only upon this basis would an individual be able to assess the
claims of others and generate his or her own understanding - as
against being the passive receiver of other's views - and only on
this basis could his or her imagination and creativity receive
rational structure.
This last point is of utmost importance. Contrary to what
sometimes seems to be assumed in discussions about the purposes
of education, on Hirst's view there can be no general mental
powers - such as, say, the capacity to think logically, or critically
or creatively - which could simply be developed in their own
right. Like all other aspects of thought, mental powers must
derive their structure from the particular form of rationality
within which they are operating: there is mathematical
creativity, scientific creativity, philosophical creativity etc., but
not general creative power as such, unless this term is simply
used summatively to refer to a person's having developed a
number of distinct creative capacities. Being critical, creative,
ingenious etc., is a very different activity from one form to
another because they are structured by different sets of
procedures and standards and we would be quite wrong to
assume, then, that the development of these capacities in one area
will transfer to another. People could be	 and some are	 creative
mathematicians and pedantic poets.
Of course, to acknowledge the existence of such distinct
forms of knowledge is neither to say that they may not
interrelate, nor that necessarily they should be taught in separate
timetable slots. To take the first point, whilst it may be true that
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one might have a rich aesthetic experience of, say, a sunset quite
independently of any scientific understanding of it in terms of
refraction of light rays etc., and vice versa, it is equally true that a
great deal of our more devel ped scientific understanding would
not be possible without an understanding of some aspects of
mathematics. Simi arly, moral judgements clearly often require
knowledge and understanding drawn from ther areas such as the
phy ical sciences and knowledge of persons. With regard to the
sec nd point, we have already noticed in Chapter Three how
certain traditional school subjects such as English and geography
draw on a number of what would count as different forms of
kn wiedge in Hirst's terms. The fact that such "combinations" of
ways of thinking have a long tradition and have been valued over
a substantial period of time suggests that they are not merely
arb trary conglomerations.
But, now, if it is true some forms of knowledge draw on
others, and if it has been found valuable to combine a number of
f rms in exploring certain areas of experience, does it not begin to
seem that the forms are not as logically di tinct as Hirst supposes?
In wh ch case would not serious doubt be cast over the claim that
they are the fundamental forms that thought and understanding
take - and therefore their status as the basic planning units of
curriculum structure, setting its basic objectives?
Such a line of argument would, h wever, seem to be too
hasty. That one form of knowledge utilizes another in no way
affects the claim that one cannot be reduced to the other. Hirst
wo ld argue that no matter how prominent maths may become in
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science, there wi 1 always be something uniquely sc entific which
maths cannot replace and to which the maths has become
subservient. The motivation underlying the use of mathematical
statements in this context is the pursuit of ccie p tif c truth, not
mathematical truth. Similarly, that certain combina ons of the
forms have proved themselves valuable or convenient in human
affairs over a sustained period of time, is not necessarily to deny
that they are indeed combinations - that is, of dist nct elements
- and perhaps represents a good illustration of how human
problems and decision-making are dependent upon the forms.
Such considerations, then, should lead to the rej ction of any
quick assumption that on Hirst's view the forms should be taught
in isolation from each other. Whether this should be so would
depend on all manner of considerations concerning how children
learn best in the differing circumstances in which teaching is
taking place. Because of the considerable variation n individual
children's levels of ability and styles of learning, and in the
contexts of learning, it would be unwise to expect that there could
be any one universal recipe or prescription here. But whatever
methods and kind of curriculum organisation are considered, the
basic purpose, objectives, and criteria of success would remain
clear: their effectiveness as a means to enabling pupils to
acquire the rules, standards, and procedures that
constitute the distinct forms of knowledge such that they
would be able to begin to operate within these forms and
structure their own experience in terms of them. Only in this way
would they achieve rational consciousness and ga n objective
understanding of themselves and their environment. And this is
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the essence of the traditional notion of liberal education: a mind
liberated from ignorance and freed to e plore reality.
Here, then, we are given very considerable guidance as to
what the achievements are that const tute the development of
thought and understanding, and therefore what the general
compass and more specific goals of the curriculum should be. And
since a proper grasp of these considerations will clearly be beyond
the pupils themselves, the view would seem to lend support to the
notion of an extensive pre-specified compulsory curriculum whose
main objectives would be set out by those who had mastered the
various forms of rationality that our culture has so far produced.
This view seems to me to draw very faithfully the consequences
for education of those basic tenets of rationalism that I have
previously described, particularly in the way it orientates
education around the development of intellectual understanding
in its various forms and its emphasis on the public nature of this
understanding conferred by its underlying structure of
impersonal rules, standards, and procedures, whose aspiration is
the achievement of objective truth.
Because of its faithfulness to these defining characteristics of
rationality - both in the view of knowledge and understanding it
advocates and its heavy emphasis on logical analysis, even when
this leads to conclusions that are counter intuitive, in arriving at
this vew - I will term it a version of 'hard rationalism". Its main
strength is that it gives a systematic account of the different
forms that understanding may take, which, if correct, would
provide a clear and fundamental set of considerations to be
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bro ght to bear in thinking about how to structure the curnculum.
But its great strength is also its great weakness. In attempting to
describe the whole realm of human understanding as being the
product of rationality, and in attempting to organise its different
facets in accordance with a common model of rationality, it seems
to run into severe dangers of distorting at least some of the areas
it purports to be characterising. This criticism has led to what one
might term a form of "soft rationalism", but before we look at an
example of this it would be useful to examine the criticism a little
more closely.
The main source of this distortion is Hirst's determination to
characterise thought and understanding as ultimately revolving
around the notion of making statements whose meaning is largely
a function of the objective tests for truth used to verify them. The
problem here is that many areas of thought that intuitively one
feels to be of great value and to be integral - indeed, defining -
aspects of the human condition do not sit happily under this
description. The idea that the arts make statements in a way
ana ogous to, say, maths or science or morality, and that these
statements can be judged as true or false, just does not seem to
mesh with our experience in this area. The question as to, say,
what statement the 'Mona Lisa' makes, and whether it is true,
seems quite inappropriate, and in any case hardly seems to
characterise the essence of aesthetic contemplation. This is a
cruc a! point for the hard rationalist, suggesting as it does that
even if a fuller account than, as a matter of fact, Hirst has yet
prov ded of the objective tests for truth for each of the f rms was
f rthcoming (he has been conspicuously vague on this point in
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areas such as aesthet Cs, morality, religion), they might be of no,
or limited, relevance in characterising many of the most
fundamental domains of thought and understanding achieved by
human civi isation.
The seriousness of this dilemma in terms of the hard
rationalists' attempt to provide an important part of the rationale
for the curriculum is illustrated by the three possible responses
that seem left to them. Firstly, they may simply insist that the
arts are centrally concerned to make statements, but we have yet
to properly understand and describe the way in which this is so.
But this stance rests on a quite unwarranted article of faith, itself
denies one of the basic rationalist tenets of basing belief on good
reason, and must surely be treated as simply an unsubstantiated
and implausible cla m until the required demonstration of its
truth is provided.
Secondly, they may allow that the making of statements is
on y one aspect of he arts, and possibly not its central one. But
this would surely be to deny the original thesis that the forms of
knowledge are the source of mental structures and conscious
awareness, since it is to concede that in the arts at least there is
experience which lies outside and independently of them. It
would also mean that one would not turn to the forms of
knowledge thesis in setting out objectives in this area, since to
teach the arts in the way they appear from the perspective of this
thesis would be high y distorting.
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Lastly the hard rationalist may s y that the arts
	 n t,
essentially, m ke statements and are therefore not forms f
rational thought - and therefore not roper comp nents of a
liberal education. Such a response wou d at least be consistent
with the orig nal premises of the heory. But it has the
consequence of leading to a cabined nd unattractive v ew of
education, resu t O ng from dogma rather an genuine openness t
the nature and range of the achievements which have come to
define human consciousness and potentia
As md cated earlier, more recently a view of educat n has
been expressed which, while derived from the same bas c ten ts,
could be construed as giving them a fter" interpretation than
Hirst, and thereby provides an interest ng alternative. Since it
could be seen as avoiding some of the le s attractive features and
more obvious difficulties which attach to hard rationalism we will
turn to it now as a means of rounding out our view f the
rationalist perspective on the development of thinking and
understanding in the educational context prior to looking at m re
radical alternat Yes.
Charles Bailey: Beyond the present and the particular 4
Charles Bailey, who has clearly een influenced by 1 t e
writers we have so far considered, seeks to provide a view f
1 beral educafon based on a rationality which he feels t be less
abstracted from human experience than that of Hirst. Taki g p
the criticism th t Hirst s tendency to dw I on what he perceives
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to be strictly logical considerati ns runs the danger of sen usly
distorting the character of the activities which they purp rt to
describe, Bailey advocates a n ion of liberal educatio - and
theref re rational developme t of mind - formed on a dif erent
basis.
Following a point made by Oakeshott, Bailey cia ms that
human experience is subject to a duality of two worlds: the world
of persons, and the world of physical material and structures.
Thus, and in contrast to Hirst, he claims that there are nly two
fundamentally distinct forms of understanding: that whose focus
of attention is itself an exhibition of intelligence, ie., any form of
human practice; secondly that whose focus of attention is not itself
an exhibition of intelligence, ie , aspects of the purely physical
world. For Bailey, this is the only fundamental logical division
within the domain of knowledge, such other divisions as exist
be ng matters of tradition or co venience. Furthermore, he wishes
to maintain that these forms -particularly the former - are
concerned with a much richer ot on of meaning t an that
expressed in statements and den ed from their tests for ruth. He
points out that the notion of mean ng has many more se ses than
the hard rationalist seems to a low, or at least is prepared to
celebrate. For example there is meaning in the sense f intention,
personal point or significance, importance and purpose: a
richness of articulable understandings which the n lion f
statement making cannot e co pa s.
Thus Bailey gives a view of the development of thought and
understanding which is n t tied to the different classes of
96
statements it may be poss ble to make But if it is n t to be based
on this, what is it to be based on? Clearly, while the duality of
understanding thesis m y be very important, t is hardly
sufficient to the task of describing the content of a liheral
education. H w are we to select within the two gre t domains of
understanding so as to produce a curriculum w ich is both
balanced and conveys wh t is centrally important?
Bailey makes a start on this problem by prov ding a list of
principles upon which, in his view, the structure of a liberal
education should be founded. I pick out some of t e main ones
below. 5
 A liberal education should be
1) liberating from the restrictions of the present and the
particular;
2) concerned with knowledge and understand ng which is
fundamental and has general applicability;
3) concerned with intrinsically valued ends;
4) concerned with the development of reason;
5) concerned with what is objectively valuable, hat is, what
is justifiably to be Va ued.
Such a list clearly gives the impressi n of a more br adly based
v ew of liberal education t an the hard rationalist, f r example it
seems to suggest that the development of reason is n w only one
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end amongst others. But on this point, such an impression is, I
suspect, erroneous
Let us consider each of the princ pies in a little more detail.
The first is of pnme importance, providing as it does the title for
Ba ey s book. But what does it mean to be "liberated from the
restrictions of the present and the part cular"? Bailey seems to
have in mind here the development of a person's capacity to stand
back from his or her immediately present situation, locate it in a
wider framework of understanding, and thus be placed to some
degree in the position of being able to make autonomous choices
with regard to it. This is clearly a very important (for some,
almost a defining) human capacity and what seems to lie at the
heart of it is one of the basic motives of rationality which we
ide tif ed in chapter four: the desire to assess and evaluate, and
wh ch, as we saw in our discussion there, is a function of the basic
categorising activity in which rationality consists. We "liberate"
our elves from what is immediately present by seeing things as
instances of more general categories.
This connects with the second of Bailey's principles. The
generalisable knowledge and understanding which he envisages
are clearly also an expression of th s categorising activity
fundamentality of understanding referring to the acquisition of
cat gories which are of greater generality, and therefore
app icability - in the way, say, that c ncepts such as 'ritual' or
'au hority' can be applied across a wider range of situations and
Soc eties than those of 'shaking hands' or 'police constable'.
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That Bailey should be concerned with knowledge and
understanding which is "objectively valuable" is a point that any
rationalist account will wish to make for as we have seen its
central aspiration is the achievement of ohjectve truth arrived at
through shared forms of reasoning. And finally, that liberal
education must be concerned with intrinsically valued ends would
seem to follow from this: in the end reasoning must come to rest
on those things which are to be valued for their own sake and in
the service of which other things become means. Thus it is an
understanding of the intrinsically valuable which is of the most
fundamental kind, for it is this that gives direction to, and
overarches, all else. We have ultimately to decide what our
underlying purposes are in order to decide our priorities and the
most appropriate means to achieving them.
As we go through Bailey's principles, then, it becomes clear
that he is not attempting to give an account of liberal education
which goes beyond the concerns of rationality, rather he is
attempting to give an enriched notion of rationality itself.
What sort of curriculum would this more generous
conception of rationality suggest, and what will be the basis of its
justification once we move away from the objectivity that strict
logical analysis is supposed to provide? The spirit of what Bailey
wants is conveyed in the following quotation:
Education, in its liberating sense, is appropriate for persons
because only persons act out of their own understandings
of situations they find themselves in. They do n t simply
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react or live out built in instincts or behaviour patterns.
Persons enter a world already perceived through the
understandings, meanings and practices shaped and
modified by countless generations of persons before them,
and these understandings have themselves to be understood
by young persons, not merely received as passed on to
them. This is the vision, and to manage this with integrity is
the task of liberal education." (Bailey, 1983, p. 107)
The detail is roughly as follows. In the primary years of
schooling emphasis should be placed on the development of what
he terms the "serving competencies" of literacy, numeracy, logical
reasoning, physical education, and also certain dispositions (an
area not explicitly considered by Hirst) such as to attend,
concentrate, co-operate, reason, inquire, imagine etc. For Bailey,
these are all a necessary pre-requisite for the attainment of the
larger goals of a liberal education, including entrance to those "two
great orders of inqujry": understanding of human practices, and
understanding of physical material and structures. But now, how
are we to specify a content within these two great orders if we do
not admit any logical divisions within them of the kind that Hirst
did? It seems that we must be content with a justification of
somewhat "softer" objectivity.
In the case of inquiry into human practices we seek those
long established	 divisions	 which	 historically	 and/or
anthropologically have been valuable in "the developing
understanding of their situation by human beings". Interestingly,
and contra Hirst, Bailey makes it clear he does not mean by this
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that the value of these understandings is nece arily to be judged
in terms of their objective truth, it is rather the extent to which
such understandings have been of significance in human
history and development. For example, if we took the area of
religious practices and understanding, we could believe its claims
to be false but still argue for its inclusion in a beral education on
the grounds of its large influence historically, and across different
cultures, on the understanding and practices of human beings. In
the case of the fie d of inquiry into the physical world, the
criterion is in some ways parallel, but emb dies a significant
difference. The content is selected in terms of its importance in
developing understanding of oneself as a physical organism in
relation to other organisms inhabiting a physical universe. Here
there seems to be more emphasis on the notion of truth in that
presumably Bailey wishes what is taught about the physical world
to be warranted by the current state of the evidence, and would
thus preclude astrology even though, like religion, it has been of
enduring and widespread influence.
On the basis f the criteria set out above Bailey advocates a
pretty extensive compulsory curriculum. To the serving
competencies already mentioned, we must now add the
"humanities proper" literature, history, morality, religion), and
inquiries into the "makings and practices of persons" (including
their social, politic 1, economic, industrial, and commercial
institutions; mathematical and logical systems; religion and
morality; art, craft and design; literature and drama; music and
dance; games and physical activities). And this must be
complemented by an equally long list of top cs and areas of
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understanding of the physical world for example: the workings of
the human body; health, medicine, nutrition the behaviour and
ecology of plants and animals; simple technologies; astronomy and
cosmology; physical geography and meteorology; energy and
material resources; ecology and conservation With so demanding
a compulsory curriculum in mind, Bailey s suggestion that, in
response to certa n child-centred considerations, "there is no
reason why schools should not (also) have facilities for offering all
kinds of activities and studies to be chosen on the basis of
personal interest" must appear, at first blush somewhat tongue in
cheek.
However, Bailey's soft rationalism has certainly come up
with a rich view of what it is to be liberally educated, and the way
it attempts to firmly root itself in the needs of a person in
interaction with the social and physical wor d is attractive when
compared with the rather abstract feel of hard rationalism. It is
certainly more ikely to meet the demands for relevance to "real
life" that are sometimes made by the recipients of education, and
by teachers who both think it important for children to see a point
in what they are doing, and apprecia e the motivational
advantages of their doing so. But is it suff ciently well founded?
That is to say, has it shown with suffic ent stringency what
constitutes the different activities that it lists as contributing to
our understanding of ourselves in relation to the world and the
rationale for this particular listing? This is an important issue to
clarify: if we are to avoid a very content-led curriculum we need a
firmer sense of what it will be to engage with the topics listed
and precisely what they have to offer.
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For example, within each of the two great orders of inquiry
are there different thought games, or only one with differing
contents? What place, if any, w uld be given to the disciplines of
hist ry, geography, philosophy, psych nlogy, and sociology in, say,
the inquiries into the makings and practices of persons? And what
emphasis would be given to learning their own procedures and
ways of organising and expla fling things? Indeed, are the lists
themselves as much the result of the application of some kind of
imp icit wisdom as the strict application of the explicitly stated
criteria? For example, why not microbiology
	 or architecture
instead of astronomy? And finally, on a somewhat different tack,
does Bailey's whole view f the curriculum, just as hard
rati nalism does, too readily make the jump from the claim that
something is objectively valuable to the conclusion that it should
therefore be compulsory - motivational problems then being not
matters of choice of content, but problems only of method? A
more thorough consideration of the strengths and weaknesses of
"hard" and "soft" rationalism, and their consequences for teaching,
is the business of the next chapter, but before moving onto this it
will be useful to briefly con ider the perspectives these views
offer on another important issue.
Education and "the basics"
Closely associated with the issue of standards in education
which we discussed in Chapter Two has been the issue of the
extent to which primary educat n should focus on 'the basics". A
perennially recurring criticism over recent years has been that
the basics are receiving too little systematic attention in the
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primary curnculum and this has a seriously debilitating effect not
only on the general standard of performance of children in
primary schools but also in their ability to cope with secondary
education and the demands of life outside school. And again as
with the "standards" debate, protagonists of this view tended to
operate with a largely unexamined set of assumptions about what
the basics are. They took it as self-evident that they were to be
pretty well equated with the "3R's' - thought largely in terms of
factual knowledge such as multiplication tables and spellings and
relatively mechanical skills such as word recognition, punctuation
and handwriting, and numerical computation.
Now, of course even at this level of debate real problems are
in danger of being glossed over, notwithstanding the fact that
some are now very familiar. For example, in the age of cheap
calculators is it really speed of computation or understanding of
number operat ons that is basic: in what likely situations t day
would someone do 'm nually" a series of extensive long div si n
sums? Problems connected with what is basic to becoming a
reader have been	 llustrated in the previously menti ned
discussion on educat nal standards But the real issue with
regard to the "basics derives from the fact that what counts as
basic is dependent upon a perception of what is needed. And this
clearly involves reference to an underlying - if often implicit - set
of values. Is it usefulness in everyday life that should be the
criterion? Or what wi 1 be needed for future education? Or what?
If we take everyday uti ity as the justification for concentrating
on the 3R's, it is interesting to ask just how much of them does it
support? Exactly what level of w rd recognition, spelling etc, is
104
"basic". This is an important curriculum i sue if the force of
labelling something as "basic" is to give it priority over other
things in terms of time and resources.
Clearly also, we should need to keep abreast of changing
social and technological circumstances, eg., (extending the
"calculator" theme what effect should the likely availability in the
foreseeable future of cheap, portable word processors with spell
checks have on our perception of the "basicness" of certain
language aspects of the 3R's? And to move onto a more recent
candidate for treatment as a basic, how much of the National
Curriculum "core subject" Science can be said to be absolutely
necessary to get by in everyday life? Ironically, perhaps, in our
technological age, the very complexity and sophistication of the
machines and instruments that we commonly use and the
consequent proliferation of "black boxes" in our practical lives
gives a strong impetus to rely on experts rather than our own
scientific understanding of the things we use. Understanding and
soldering up a broken crystal radio receiver is one thing, but a
Nicam television set?... a computer?... CD car Ignition?
Further what is to be meant by "getting by in life" anyway?
Doesn't this beg all sorts of questions about the quality of life we
hope or expect to lead? If we mean something like surviving in
modern society, n t only do many people in 'average' occupations
seem to get by remarkably well with little or no systematic
scientific understanding (including, it might be noted plumbers
and garage mechanics), but also so do many highly successful
professionals. The underlying point here is that the quality f life
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we may desire is shaped by our outlook - our view of what life is
and how it could and should be led - and this in turn is
significantly shaped by our education. Thus what is considered to
be basic in education is perhaps more appropriately linked to the
intrinsic a ms of education itself - that is to say the question
becomes what things are basic to achieving the larger substantive
g als of education
Now if we take this stance clearly it will be important to
make as clear as possible what our underlying concept of
educati n is. This is where the two views of liberal education we
have been considering provide food for thought. They pose the
question: "What are the basic prerequisites for achieving
liberati n from ignorance and the full development of the rational
mind?" If this latter is conceived basically in terms of initiation
into the logically distinct forms of knowledge, then it is possible
that a much enriched view of the basics will begin to emerge.
T begin with, acquisition of central concepts, procedures
and ways of testing for truth in each of these forms will be basic
and wi 1 be of equal priority. (Thus there would be no "core'
subjects as with the National Curriculum.) And the 3R's
themselves would be treated differently. For example in
mathematics the emphasis would move away from computational
skills to understanding number operations and developing
broader mathematical concepts such as those of " et" and "matrix",
which arguably are basic to understanding so much else in that
area. Reading and writing, once they rose above the relatively
mechan cal level of word recognition and forming one's letters to
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the grasping and expression of meanings, would truly require a
"language across the curriculum" approach, for if, as Hirst claims,
meaning is embedded within the different forms, literacy must
itself involve engagement with the conceptual structures and sets
of procedures that constitute them. There can be no notion of
reading as a general skill which of itself will enable the child to
read with understanding across the forms of knowledge. To read
with understanding is precisely to engage with the concepts
peculiar to each of them. Thus the "basics" of reading and writing
on this view becomes the ability to engage intelligently with
material within each of the separate forms.
Similarly, Charles Bailey's version of a liberal education
invites a much enriched view of what counts as the basics, his
notion of "the serving competencies" (1983, pp. 110-114)
acknowledging a range of skills and dispositions which far
outstrips the 3R's. We have noted how, alongside fairly
conventional notions of literacy and numeracy he places:
logical reasoning - to be able to infer, avoid contradiction, to
hypothesize, to discern what is logically possible and what is
not;
to think critically;
physical fitness;
and importantly a range of dispositions such as:
to attend,
to concentrate;
to co-operate;
to organise f me, material, thought and action;
to reason;
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to imagine possib lines;
to inquire - try to understand.
On Bailey's view these are all instrumental to serving the larger
purpo es of a liberal education and suggest a set of priorities
which go way beyond traditional conceptions of the basics in
terms of what they imply for the experiences that the primary
curnculum should be providing for children.
While I am not here going to argue in detail the merits or
otherwise of these v ews, I suggest that claims of this kind
certainly need to be taken very seriously. They serve to provoke a
more thoughtful assessment as to what the basics in primary
education really are - along with what could be far-reaching
implications for establishing priorities within the curriculum. And
broad policy decisions about the basics apart, Hirst's emphasis on
central concepts and procedures, and Bailey's emphasis on what is
more fundamental and generalisable might provide useful criteria
in decid ng priorities when faced with a plethora of National
Curnculum objectives within an area (in which distinctions of kind
are not usually made) r the vast content potential of, say, a topic
on the Aztecs. Thus o e might give greater emphasis to objectives
that required understanding rather than say recall of information,
or the naming of parts, and to aspects of Aztec society which could
exemplify concepts transferable to understanding other societies
such as 'ritual', adapt on to environment', 'culture' ('way of life')
rather than very context specific items such as the names of items
of clothing, the locati n of towns, or particular customs taught for
their own sake.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
RATIONALITY AND EDUCATION RECONSIDERED
We have now considered the way in which rationalism
conceives the development of thought and understanding, both n
general terms, and in its "hard" and "soft" manifestations in the
context of education. But how adequate an account of thinking and
understanding does rationalism give, and how acceptable are its
broader implications f r teaching? We have already noted that
rationalism characterises thought as highly dependent upon public
conventions for its structure and objectivity, and I intend to begin
my evaluation by considering this aspect in a little more depth
Let us begin with some of its strengths.
Education, objectivity, and public standards
It seems to me to be quite correct to suppose that to
develop someone's thinking is to somehow improve it. And t
improve it is to say that it has now achieved some new, higher
standard which is in some sense objective. Certainly this element
of objectivity is of great importance in the educational situation,
for without it judgements of progress will be arbitrary and the
idea of educating someone unintelligible. For example, if no
objectivity attaches to the judgment that reading Tolstoy is
superior to reading the 'Beano" - if, at bottom, this is simply
matter of subjective wh m - then the notion of making progress i
the area of a child's appreciation of literature, ie , of educating in
this area, falls apart, for there could be no cause to wean him off
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the "Beano' nto anything else which is more demanding. (And
surely it is the case that within the field f children's literature
itself, Tom's Midnight Garden by Philippa Pearce, for example, is
more demand ng, m re perceptive, more ref fling of emotion and
outlo k - thus better literature and more educative in s me
bjective sense, than 'Desperate Dan'?)
Now there is a response to this sort of issue that is often
strongly voiced and which we had better deal with right now
since in my view it is as misguided and damaging as it is
pervasive and tempt ng. It runs something ike this: it does not
follow that a teacher needs objective values, for we could have as
our educational objective in the area of, say, literature the idea of
helping children to make their own informed choices. Such an
aim, it might be argued, need make no reference to any notion of
objective standards of qual ty in the arts since it simply seeks to
broaden the base upon which a child will make up his or her own
mind on such matters. Judgments of qua ity and va ue in this area,
and perhaps in many others, are ultimate y subjective, and to
encourage children to see some things as of higher quality or more
value than others, is to indoctrinate.
This way of thi king clearly has a g eat initial attraction: it
seems liberal in out ook and to relieve us of the often difficult
task of trying to identify, articulate, and demonstrate to the
satisfaction of others, the bjectivity of what we take to be of
value. The difficulty of this is so notorious in some areas, such as
the arts, that there can be an almost overwhelming temptation to
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say values here re purely subjective: a no on put succinctly in
the old adage: 'Beauty lies in the eye of the beholder". On a
broader fr nt, in a situation of cultural diversity and pluralism of
moral and social values that exists in many chools, this appal to
some form of relativism seems to grow in strength. I wish to
suggest that despite its undeniable attractiveness, it is a
temptation to which we should not, and probably as educators
cannot, succumb. Since I believe this to be a crucial, though
sometimes unrec gnised issue for teaching, I will develop it a
little further here.
The first point that must be made is that any course of action
involves commitment to a value, which is at the very least to treat
it as if it were objective. So the teacher who makes the above
response is herself committed to at least the value of informed
choice. Secondly, it may seem possible in many roles to live in the
spirit of the subjectivist thesis, but in the role of teacher, where
one has explicit responsibility to guide the development of others,
its problems are insurmountable and the intellectual self-
deception t invo yes is likely to lead to bad practice. Teachers
cannot avoid making decisions about what to do, the direction
they will encourage learning to take, and they will be exhibit ng
values throughout the whole gamut of their behaviour. To take
the example given above: decisions concerning what is to count as
a broad base of understanding, and what counts as representative
of different styles in literature, will involve many tacit values
which are being treated as if they are objective. The sub ectivist
outlook wi I leave all this largely implicit and unexamined - for
what could be the po nt of doing otherwise, if ultimately anything
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is as good as anything else? But if the teacher will be endorsing
certain values nonetheless by virtue of her guiding role, surely we
are entitled to ask that the values that are being endorsed are
made clear, and whether they are worthy ones?
Honest subjectivism would lead to paralysis or chaos: the
former, in the sense that there would be no basis for making any
choices (even to choose to do something purely out of whim, is to
be committed to the value of doing this); the latter, in the sense
that we are then left only with a world of mindless reaction. There
is an important sense in which the human condition is
characterised by its capacity to value. And unlike simply
desiring something, valuing it means that we attribute some
quality to it which is not purely the product of personal whim, but
has some objective basis. That is to say that internal to the
meaning of valuing is some notion of properness, fittingness,
appropriateness of the thing valued which belongs to it
independently of our caprice. It is experienced as a facet of the
situated thing itself and is therefore something that strictly
speaking we discern, rather than simply decide. Thus thorough-
going subjectivism is not merely a view about the nature of
values, it is a view whose consequence is a denial that there are
such things as values. And in so-doing, it denies an essential
aspect of what it is to be human.
The truth of the matter is, I think, that often those who say
that all values are subjective (or relative) in the kind of situation
we have been considering, do so out of the best of motives, but on
the basis of a confusion which actually works against what they
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seek. Concerns not to indoctrinate or to foist off values on pupils
are not based on subjectivism, but on a positive commitment to
such things as the individual subjectivity of pupils, the integrity of
differing cultures, and the value of tolerance. In other words it is
a commitment to a set of values that we might loosely call those of
a liberal democracy. To be so committed is not to believe that any
values are as good as any others, but that in some objective sense
liberal democratic values are more justifiable than others.
But what, then, is the source of objectivity in our judgments
of value? Could it not be at this point that the notion of public
conventions emhasised by rationalism has an important part to
play, for is it not largely in terms of sets of criteria that have
evolved throughout the period of human beings' interaction with
the various aspects of their environment that judgements of
worth are made which escape the purely arbitrary through having
become widely agreed and shared? The notion that
objectivity is achieved by reference to shared rules, or
conventions, seems to allow the possibility of objective judgement
in areas which otherwise would be hard pressed to rise above the
purely arbitrary (thus placing them beyond the pale of education),
and invites a more generous and sensitive conception of truth
than might otherwise be possible. There has been a tendency in
modern times to equate objectivity with scientific objectivity,
and as a result areas of thought and understanding, such as the
arts and humanities, which cannot produce the hard "proof" for
their claims that science is often characterised as doing, have
sometimes come to be regarded as merely subjective, inferior, or
even illusory. But if we allow that objectivity and truth result
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from the application of publicly agreed criteria, then it would
seem that there can be as many kinds of truth as there are sets of
conventions (or "knowledge games", to use the terminology of a
previous chapter), and the imperialism of science is broken. This
could be seen as both liberating and status-restoring to non-
scient fic studies, which would no longer be pushed into regarding
themselves as poor imitations of something else. Interestingly,
though, this possibility, which is so conspicuous in the hard
rationalism of Hirst, appears somewhat restricted in the soft
rationalism of Bailey, which allows of only two logically distinct
modes of thought - despite the wish of the latter to provide an
enriched view of rationality.
Another upshot of rationalism's emphasis on public
convention in the structuring of thought is that it holds out the
prospect of being able to set out objectively justifiable goals which
would constitute what is to count as progress in the development
of ch idren's thought in the different areas. By careful analysis of
each of the knowledge games it should be possible to identify
agreed key concepts, propositions, and procedures and set these
out in a graded way from the relatively simple to the relatively
complex. Such an approach is the basis of many maths and science
schemes in use in schools today, and seems to hold the important
benefit of both providing a coherent programme of work in the
area concerned, and an objective means of monitoring
achievement - the place reached on the scheme. If this could be
applied to other areas of the curriculum (and why should it not
be, if they, too, consist in sets of public concepts etc.?) this would
seem to be an important step towards developing children's
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thinking and understanding in these areas in the most efficient
way. Many aspects of the structure of the National Curriculum
clearly reflect an attempt to pursue this approach.
A further consequence of the view that thinking is
structured by shared conventions and agreed standards of truth,
quality, and value, is that claims made in the different areas of
understanding will be assessable in terms of the publicly accepted
reasons or evidence given to support them. Indeed, on this view,
what it is to have an understanding of something will largely be
to have acquired the public evidence and reasoning upon which
claims concerning it are based. Thus a child's understanding of,
say, how plants grow can be seen to be developed by providing
explanations on two fronts: a) explanation of the public meaning
of the terms used to describe this process; b) explanation of the
supporting evidence. Rationalism constantly draws our attention
beyond the question of "What do you know?" to the question of
"How do you know?", and insists that both must be answered in
accordance with publicly accepted standards. The task of the
teacher then, is to convey public meanings and evidence, and this
will involve an on-going process of de-centring on the part of the
child as her thinking develops by being confronted with
considerations other than those that derive from her own
affectively conditioned and impressionistic outlook, and becomes
organised around sets of impersonal public standards. As R.S.
Peters once put it, the rational thinker is one who takes on the
perspective of the "generalised other •1 In this way, through the
internalisation of such impersonal public standards and their
application in her experience, the child will come to perceive and
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believe in a way that is justifiable, ie., does not contravene the
rules of the relevant "game", and takes account of the available
evidence.
It can be seen, then, that rationalism seems to provide a set
of answers (some of which have been set out in more detail in
previous chapters to many of the most pressing questions that
face a teacher who is seriously concerned to develop a child's
thinking and capacity to understand. It gives an account of the
way in which thinking is structured, the importance and source of
any objectivity it may achieve, the extent to which it takes
radically different forms and what such differences consist in, and
what would be centrally involved in being critical, creative, and
capable of independent thought. It also gives suggestions for the
broad framework of a curriculum intended to develop pupil s
thinking, and something of the content which would flesh this out.
However, its attempt to provide this guidance is not without
its problems, some of which begin to surface in the tension
between what I have termed "hard" and "soft" rationalism. One of
the problems highlighted there is that just as hard rationalism
provides relatively sharp criteria for the distinctions it claims at
the price of plausibility in many areas, so soft rationalism
recaptures some plausibility at the price of lack of sharp
distinctions and justification. That rationalism presents us with a
choice between on the one hand, a view that is vitiated by its
attempt to be objective and clear, and on the other hand a view
that is vitiated by its attempt to stay in touch with experience,
perhaps suggests that it is not wholly adequate to the task it has
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set itse f. We will return to this pos ibility in Part Three. For the
moment, there are some other reservations to express.
Rationali m and the subjective dimension
To begin with, I think that a strong criticism can be made
with regard to the rationalist's assumption that to have shown
that an area of thinking has objective value carries the
consequence that it must therefore be compulsory. This seems to
embody an imperialism of the most strident kind, for though I
have argued that value is not simply arbitrary, it is nonetheless
contextual. That is to say, it is bound up with the particularities
of differing, and in many ways, unique situations. Thus we may
say, for example, that given a certain situation, an understanding
of some aspect of science is valuable in the objective sense that
we are cia ming this to be true for all relevantly similar situations.
But this, of course, is not to presume that everyone is in, or will
find themselves in, such a situation. This would be a further claim
yet to be demonstrated, and to make wholesale assumptions about
it is both arrogant and absurd. Einstein's theory of relativity is
doubtless f great objective value, but that hardly warrants a
claim that it should be compulsory learning for all children.
Something's being of objective value at most implies that it is of
potential rather than actual value to any individual at any
parfcular t me.
Such considerations concerning the nature of objectivity, and
its relati n h p with notions f a compulsory curriculum, bring us
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starkly up against the way rationalistic approaches to the
development of thinking and understanding tend to disregard
motivational aspects. It is not, of course, that a teacher persuaded
of this kind of view will be insensitive to the way one might
facilitate learning by presenting what has to be learnt in as
interesting and enjoyable a form as possible, but that for such a
teacher this comes essentially as an afterthought - something one
tries to do with or to a content which has already been chosen on
other grounds. Thus Charles Bailey (1983, p. 135) claims that:
problems of motivation are not essentially problems of
choice of content, but methodological and strategical
problems of pedagogy concerned with how to engage pupils
in what is demonstrably worthwhile."
But, quite apart from the fact that this puts a quite impossible
burden of responsibility on the shoulders of a teacher to make
what he or she is teaching interesting to all pupils - which if taken
seriously could only lead to feelings of guilt and frustration on a
fairly massive scale, or dishonesty about one's achievements - it
perhaps reflects something of a larger misconception concerning
the nature of understanding itself. I believe it is rationalism's
preoccupation with the public, the shared, and the rule-governed
that lies at the heart of the problem. To try to demonstrate this,
let us consider the following examples:
I know that William the Conqueror invaded England in
1066, but I don't understand it.
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I know Darwin's book "The Ongin of the Species", but I don't
understand it.
I ye known Richard for years, hut I've never really
understood him.
I knew that living in an old house would be damp, cold, and
inconvenient in many ways, but now (one winter later) I
understand just what that means.
I knew that lung cancer and smoking are related, but until
then (nursing a father suffering from cancer as a result of
smoking) that didn't mean much to me.
She thought she knew what sadness was until she said
goodbye to John.
How adequately does the rationalist account characterise the kind
of understanding picked out in the second part of each statement?
Let us begin by acknowledging straight away that insofar as
these statements refer to some kind of propositional knowledge,
the rationalist account makes many important points about what
it is to understand. Clearly one can have no understanding of a
proposition unless one has some correct understanding f the
public concepts in which it is framed. To take the first example, if
one thought that "William the Conqueror" was a variety of
Rhododendron, and '1066" the year before last, or worse, a
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telephone number, one has either a gross misunderstanding of the
proposition, or, in the second case, no understanding at all - the
statement becomes altogether unintelligible. This much, perhaps
seems too obvious to be worth saying, but it does make absolutely
clear the extent to which the role of the teacher in the
development of a child's understanding must be concerned with
helping him or her o internalise the correct - ie., publicly agreed -
meaning of terms.
But it also broaches another important issue for teaching:
while there must be some correct understanding, it does not have
to be complete. There is sometimes a tendency to suppose that
one has to understand one thing fully before proceeding onto the
next thing. This is clearly an error, and one which has no doubt
led to a lot of boredom and frustration in situations where
children have been cajoled into an endless series of repetitive
exercises intended t give them a complete grasp of some "vital"
point thought to be essential to any further progress. This "fallacy
of learn ng through perfected steps", as Robert Dearden once
called it, sets unnecessary obstacles to further learning,
undermines the confidence and curiosity of those children whose
learning is frequently stalled in this way, and quite
misunderstands the way in which public concepts get their
meaning.
One of the hings that the games analogy makes clear is that
concepts do not exist in isolation. They do not have discrete
meanings that can be fully comprehended: they depend upon
each other for their meaning. They exist in webs of
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interrelationship, and there is not necessarily one way into this
web, nor one route through it, and there is rarely any pre
specifiable "amount" of understand ng of any one term in the web
that must be achieved before some understanding of other terms
in the web can be gained. In the same way that the meaning of
the term 'goal' in football can only be understood in the context of
some understanding of the game as a whole, so terms such as
'mother' and 'son' can only be understood through their
relationship to a whole web of other terms such as 'father',
'daughter, 'sister', 'family', etc. which articulate a set of social
relations and responsibilities. A developed understanding of any
one of these implies some understanding of the others and thus
from the point of view of the concepts themselves, it is no more
easy, or more difficult, to begin with any particular one of them.
Similarly, in an area such as maths, frequently thought of as
highly "logical" and often conceived by teachers and authors of
schemes as something to be developed through a linear
progression of ideas, it is clear that, say, the term "seven" is
dependent upon the meaning of other numbers, the concept of
number itself, the operations that can be performed upon them,
and so forth, and that one gains in understanding of the
'seven ess of seven as one expl res this web of interrelationships.
There is no one route to achieving this because, in truth, there is
no such thing as the meaning of "seven". It has meanings, and
these depend upon the context in which it is being used.
This aspect of m re sophi ticated rationalist accounts lends
support to the view that learning i not linear, but spiral, and that
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it is rarely to be achieved through one avenue only. I think that it
is hard to overstress the importance of this for teaching,
programmes of learning, and consequently for the teacher-pupil
relationship as a whole. And it is a point whose importance is in
severe danger of being overlooked by those who advocate any
kind of national curriculum which seeks to impose detailed
sequential sets of attainment targets during the process of
education. Some characterisation of the broad framework of goals
that our education system should be working towards is perhaps
beneficial in giving teachers a keener sense of direction than they
sometimes have and of ensuring a certain kind of equality of
opportunity, but close pre-specification of learning objectives on
anything but an individual basis is likely to be highly detrimental
to the learners who are at the centre of the exercise. Such pre-
specification ignores the myriad routes it is often possible to take
through our complex webs of interrelated concepts, and nfringes
the freedom of individual children in consultation with informed
teachers to follow those paths which have most personal meaning.
Let us return now to our list of examples. Presumably it is
further knowledge of this interlinking kind that would make good
the lack of understanding claimed in the William the Conqueror
example. Above and beyond the meaning of the terms, the
speaker needs to relate this proposition to a web of others
concerning ambitions and motives, and social and economic
pressures. Similarly, to understand Darwin's book "The Origin of
Species" would require a grasp of the fundamental con epts of
evolutionary theory, and the evidence that Darwin marshals in its
s pport This all seems to fit fairly well with the rationa st view
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of understanding as inking things (eg., concepts, pieces of
information, evidence) together in accordance with publicly
shared rules and standards. But does this hold good in the same
way for the other examples?
In these examp es one could suppose that the person knew
the relevant facts, and that the facts were linked together in
accordance with the relevant public concepts. The enlarged
understanding was not so much a result of acquiring more of
these linked facts, rather somehow the person concerned came to
know these same things in a deeper way, ie., understanding has,
as it were, developed through qualitative deepening rather than
quantitative addition. Thus, to take the 'living in an old house
example', the speaker may have known in a perfectly adequate
way from the point of view of public meanings that a leaking roof
leads to dampness, drafts, and coldness in winter, but now in
some more subjective sense this actually means more to him.
This is not, I think, simply to make the well known point
that understanding requires that new information and ideas
become linked onto a person's existing understanding, beliefs, and
previous experience. It is, no doubt important to be aware of
understanding as having this subjective dimensi n, ie., that we
need to complement linking into the public network of shared
concepts with a linking into an individual's existing personal
framework of experiences. But such two-way linking rema ns
essentially concerned with understanding through breadth, rather
than depth, of relationship. The examples we are now considering
seem to suggest something rather different. The occupant of the
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old house had already related concepts of cold and damp to his
previous experience; in the smoking and lung cancer case the facts
and their relationship all made perfectly go d sense; Jane knew in
a perfectly g d way what sadness was before she said g odbye
to J hn; but each of them now knows what they already knew in
some further sense What was formerly known in an averaged
off way has gained a felt personal cogency, such that the person's
outlook has been significantly transformed. The meaning of what
they knew has been 'brought home" to them, their understanding
is such that they now real y appreciate the weight of what they
know. The origin and nature of this 'subjective weight" in
understanding is one of the chief concerns of the next section of
this thesis, but something of its importance is indicated by the
following illustration taken from the writing of the nineteenth
century philosopher, S ren Kierkegaard.
Kierkegaard: subjective depth of understanding
Kierkegaard was very much against what he regarded as the
shallow understanding of deep things possessed by many of his
post Enlightenment contemporaries. In particular he singled out
their attitude to the Christian Faith - their claims to have
outgrown such faith and to have supplanted it with something
superior, ie., more rational For Kierkegaard, these people who
had claimed to have such understanding of faith that they could
find it lacking and had now got beyond it, had no real conception
of what faith is. He tries to illustrate this by considering their
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understanding of the story of Abraham and I aac (Kierkegaard, S.
1970).
We may recall that contrary to expectation, and though late
in life, Abraham's great hope was realised, he had a son, Isaac. As
Isaac grew up he became the thing that Abraham loved above all
else in the world; for Abraham, Isaac was "the best". However, a
day came when God required Abraham to take Isaac to Mount
Moriah and sacrifice him as a burnt offering. And out of faith
Abraham travelled for four days with his son at his side, went
alone with him up the mountain, prepared f r the sacrifice, drew
his knife to strike - at which moment he saw the ram that God
had prepared and knew that his son was to be spared. Now
there, says Kierkegaard, was someone who knew faith, and what
an awesome thing it is. He invites us to imagine the thoughts that
must have been going through Abraham's mind as he journeyed
beside his son, knowing what he was to do - with his own hands,
for God was not going to do it for him. He would be responsible for
it, do it of his own will (he could always turn back), and all for no
reason that he could fathom. He would simp y do it out of faith.
Far from being something easily understood, such faith almost
defies our imagination and if we began to understand it, would
surely cause us to tremble.
Yet, many who in Kierkegaard's Denmark would know that
story off by heart and claim to understand t, would barely be
moved by it. "Abraham was a great man: he was prepared to give
to God the best" would be the sum of their understanding. How
easy it is for such a summation to run off the tongue, and with
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such little distress as to hardly give pause for thought, and
certainly not to impinge on the real business of getting on in life.
Kierkegaard imagines a parson telling the story approvingly in a
sermon, the parson himself hardly moved by it. He imag nes
members of the congregation listening comfortably to the story -
one, perhaps casually stretches his legs, another finds a moment
to tap out his pipe - as they hear again the story they all know
and understand so well. He then imagines the following comic-
tragic situation: one of the congregation, wishing to emulate
Abraham's greatness goes home and kills his own son.
"If the orator got to know of it, he perhaps went to him, he
summoned all his clerical dignity, he shouted, "0 abominable
man, off-scouring of society, what devil possessed thee to
want to murder thy son?" And the parson, who had not been
conscious of warmth or perspiration in preaching about
Abraham, is astonished at
	
himself, at the earnest wrath
which he thundered down upon that poor man. He was
del ghted with himself, for he
	 had never spoken with such
verve and unction. He said to himself and to his wife, "I
am an orator What I lacked was the occa ion. When I talked
about Abraham on Sunday I did not feel moved in the
least."In case the same orator had a little superabundance of
reason which might be lost, I think he would have lost it if
the sinner were to say calmly and with d gnity, "That in fact
was what you yourself preached on Sunday. How could the
parson be able to get into his head such a consequence?
And yet it was so, and the mistake was merely that he
didn't know what he was saying." (Kierkegaard, S. 1970)
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Lacking an understanding of the awesomeness of the story
he was telling, delivering it in a levelled off and essentially
uncomprehending manner, the parson had reduced Abraham's
supreme act of faith into a cosy commonplace which any man
might fo low to his profit. His incapacity to feel and communicate
the subjective weight of what he was saying and his inability to
empathetically enter into the situation he described left him
mouthing words both of whose real significance he had not the
faintest notion, and whose simple reasoned meaning he was
unable to accept, for in truth in his own mind they were
complete y worn out - he ran through them as a matter of form.
Here, then we seem to have a dimension of understanding that
goes far beyond the idea of thought organised in accordance with
public rules. A dimension of understanding which if not overtly
denied by rationalism (ie., soft rationalism), is certainly not much
illuminated by it, nor properly taken into account by it.
Yet, equally, may it not be thought from the example I have
used that such understanding lies beyond the compass of
education in the primary school? It is not altogether obvious that
this is in fact the case. We are in part here considering the way in
which one can, and sometimes should, be affected personally by
what one knows. This capacity to understand through being
affected, that is, through a form of passivity in which feeling
comes unbidden and seems to constitute some more direct
apprehension of a situation than calm rational scrutiny provides,
is not only not beyond the experience of young children, it is
largely their natural way of experiencing things. It is a
127
way of understanding - ie , standing under the sway of - things
that, largely under the influence of rationalism, we consistently
tend to wean children away from, destroy their confidence in, and
debase rather than develop and refine. By constantly demanding
that their thoughts assume rational form and are backed up with
rational justification we effectively communicate that rational
standards set the standard for all thought. It will be argued that
understanding as 'standing under", or "standing in the sway of" is
of great importance across the primary school curriculum,
representing, as it does, that dimension of understanding that is
the true child of one of the most precious but perhaps most fragile
motives for learning - a sense of wonderment.
In a time when so much emphasis is placed on learning for
instrumental purposes and on understanding which is therefore
shaped and restricted by those purposes, it may be of the greatest
importance to keep open the door for a relationship to things
which is not so restricted, but is more open and directly involved
with things in the richness of their possibilities. This is not to say
that the affective response to things which I am taking to be a
feature of young children's experience should simply be indulged,
for it is often, but not always, hopelessly self-centred and is
capable of being as blindly obsessive as it is in some adults.
Overweening jealousy, desire for power or material goods, are no
more open to the richness of things than rigid pigeon-holing It is
rather to say that the capacity for affective involvement which
has both a directness of contact with its object because it is felt,
and openness to it because of its directness and fluidity, is
something that needs to be cultivated in terms of its own
128
possibilities for integrity, rather than forced to wear the mantle of
rationalism. What the integrity of this kind of think ng might
amount to, and what it might mean for the development of
thinking and underctanding in the curriculum, will be explored in
the next Part. Before moving onto this, let us take the opportunity
of taking stock of some of the main themes which have arisen so
far in regard to rationalism.
Rationalism: some provisional conclusions
The rationalist accounts we have examined draw attention to
many points of importance in an understanding of what is
involved in developing children's thinking. They draw attention to
the variety of rule structured forms that thinking may take and
the way in which some aspects of meaning arise from these
structures themselves. They show how it is possible for a certain
kind of objectivity to gain a foothold in thinking by reference to
publicly shared standards and the richness of communication that
this makes possible. Clearly there must be immense implications
for primary teaching here. At the very least the need for some
careful analysis of the salient facets of the various thought games
presently available should be a matter of some urgency. What are
the fundamental procedures and standards that constitute these
activities? Can we identify certain key concepts and ideas which
could be progressively developed in children's think ng? If we
can, is there any hierarchy between them whch would indicate an
order in which learning must occur? Rationalism emp asises a
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way in which we must understand this "what" of teaching before
we can sort out the "how" of teaching
But there are further questions. What of the underlying
motivation of each game - what kind of project with regard to
reality does it express and what is its educational worth? As
against the attempt of Hirst's hard rationalism to provide a formal
blanket justification for the place of any knowledge game in the
curriculum, the claim of Bailey's soft rationalism to decide this
issue by the criterion of the contribution a form of thought has
made to the attempts of humankind to understand themselves in
their relationship to the world, suggests an important
consideration in evaluating the wealth of activities and material
available from an educational stand-point. So, too, is his gesture
towards recognition of the importance of the individual's own
understanding of things that are learnt. But the question remains
as to the adequacy of the conception of these things that
rationalism enables. Would a curriculum and approach to teaching
that was founded on the principles and understandings of
rationalism alone properly develop children's thinking and
understanding? Or do they risk, as I have suggested, the
development of fluency in the domain of conventional
understanding at the cost of a certain poverty of subjective
response - the result of which could on occasion be gross
misunderstanding?
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PART THREE: AN EXISTENTIALIST PERSPECTIVE
CHAPTER EIGHT
AN EXISTENTIALIST BACKDROP TO THINKING AND
UNDERSTANDING
In the last part of the previous chapter I began to indicate
some of the short-comings of the rationalist perspectives on
thinking in its ambition to give an account of the whole of
thinking. One of the main contentions voiced was its lack of
appreciation of the importance f "subjective weight" in a person's
understanding and general mode of relating to things, and its
consequent overlooking of the role played by a person's own
motivations in the meanings they are able to achieve in their
thinking. In this chapter I intend to explore these notions further,
and their consequences for how we understand the development
of children's thinking.
Perhaps the first thing that needs to be emphasised as we
enter this area of concern is that such a consideration undermines
any notion that thinking proper is a purely intellectual activity
that can somehow go on in splendid isolation from the personal
life of the thinker. On this view, a person thinks from out of the
particular situations in which they find themselves, and this
means that integral to a person's thought are the emotions,
attitudes, dispositions, and moE yes that constitute the way they
experience these situations. In an important sense, thinking is a
product of living, and not s me hing that goes on alongs de it on
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some other "pure dimension untainted by the whole gamut f an
individual's subjective concerns. It is not the creation of the
generalised other' as R. S. Peters characterised the stance f
rati nality, and its meaning and validity cannot be adequately
thought of in the terms that such a characterisation invites. We
are forced therefore to look beyond the confines of public rules of
thought to the quality of the conscious life of the thinker, f we
are to properly understand thinking and its development. This is a
central (and controversial) point, and it clearly demands a much
broader perspective than rationalism has, at least traditionally,
allowed. Candidates claiming to offer illumination on the qual ty of
human life are of course many and varied, but as previously
mentioned, I intend to look at the contribution of one such
perspective, namely that of existentialism, loosely conceived.
Existentialism and the extent of human freedom
Existentialism is a rich vein of philosophical and 1 erary
thought which begins with the premise that 'existence precedes
essence". This places it in direct opposition to much of trad ional
metaphysics which is the legacy of Plato. Instead of supposing
that thought has as its basic point of reference an underlying
world of objective truths and essences which the operati n of
rationality can disclose to us, it claims that the starting point for
thought is our involvement in a concrete world of part cular
things and situations in which we conduct our everyday bu mess
of living, and which is most directly revealed to us not by our
intellect but by our present mood. That is to say, it is how we
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are in the world in which we simply find our elves that
constitutes the reality which is the touchstone of thought not a set
of pure abstract ideas or "essences" which this world inadequately
reflects. Sheer existence comes first, and is the context in which
all our interpretations of experience are embedded.
Having pointed out this common element, it would be wrong
though to think of existentialism as a single homogene us school
of thought - any more than rationalism is. It represents rather a
mood, a stance towards life, susceptible to many derivations - for
example there are theistic and atheistic versions. But one
preoccupation which runs through much existentialist thinking is
the nature and place of human freedom and its affect on how we
think and understand the world. If thinking is embedded in
concrete human existence, and freedom or the lack of it, is an
essential feature of this existence, then a fuller examination of this
notion seems to be warranted. In what follows, I will draw
particularly on the views of Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul
Sartre to illustrate this connection between thinking,
understanding, and freedom, but first it is necessary to say a little
more about the general character of existentialism in ts attempt
to iluminate our situation.1
The first point to emphasize is that in keeping with its tenet
that existence precedes essence, existentialism does not attempt to
produce abstract general, "objective", principles to explain or
guide human behaviour. Rather it focuses on the issue of how
md viduals confront the problem of their own existence - what
they are to do with their 1 fe in the real situations in hich they
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find themselves - and their possible attitudes towards this. 	 It
f cuses, then, on the predicament of individuals in their unique
lived situations, and in this sense embodies an anti-intellectual,
anti the retical approach. Indeed, there is an important sense in
which existentialism would regard, for example, a systematic
morality with its assumptions of objective rightness and
wrongness which can be encapsulated in a set of binding u iversal
moral principles as something of a fraud - a form of self-
deception.
For example, to suppose that somehow one's choice over a
course of action was curtailed because moral principles demanded
it, and concomitant y to think that in this way one reduces the
level of personal responsibility for what one did, would be to
deceive oneself over the extent of ones essential freedom for the
way one conducts one's life. In this particular case the
exi tentialist would argue that we have no ultimate guarantees
that we ye got the right moral principles, therefore we ha e st 11
as individuals to a cept them, to choose whether to act upon
them. And even if we accept certain principles in a general sense,
we have still to decide how best to act upon them and to resolve
possible conflicts between them. That is to say general principles
have still to be applied to the particular situations in which
individuals find themselves, and there can be no complete, pre-
ordained, recipe for life. We must each make our own choices.
Here we have an example of existentla ism s sensitivity to, on the
one hand, the uniqueness of each person and the situations he or
she ives through, and on the other hand, the possibility of
ignoring this un queness - of lapsing into essentially unthinking
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conformity to mass opinion and group norms and standards
through apathetic obedience to social expectations and generalised
application of principles irrespective of subtle nuance of each
situation.2
Let me now explore this theme of freedom in a ittle more
depth For the existentialist, integral to the very idea of
distinctively human being, as contrasted with the way of being
of, say, things or animals, is a certain sort of freed m. Unlike
animals and things, human beings are not wholly causally
determined, they could always have done other than they
did. Whether they consciously acknowledge it or not, they are
always in a position of choice. What does this amount to
precisely? I think Max Scheler caught part of the mean ng of this
when he once referred to man as the animal that can say "no" to
nature. He meant by this that humankind has the capacity not to
act solely out of instinct and conditioned reflex. We need not
automatically hit out when angry, grab food when hungry, be
altruistic if this serves the survival of the species, etc. We can, as
it were, say "no" to such basic impulses. (Indeed, this precisely
what a growing baby has to learn to do.) Human beings can do this
because they have the ability to stand back from the immediate
situation and become an object for themselves: they have a
capacity for self-awareness.
Self-awareness, then, is an idea that is essential to the notion
of human being. Through acts of detachment from on going
events we can reflect upon our position in a particular situation -
can reflect upon not only what is the case, but on what could be
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the case, that is to say, on the poss bilities that are open to us.
And the point is that once we do his we are unavoidably in a
position of choice - like it or not Every act of choice, then,
involves detachment of oneself fr m the on-going world and
reflection on possible alternatives And every such act of
detachment and reflection condemns one to having to choose. To
do nothing is itself a choice.
To summarise, then, existentialism emphasises the way in
which human beings are agents in their own right: it is their
essence not to be just passively carried along by events, by blind
forces, like a dried leaf in the breeze, migrating lemmings, a herd
of cattle. They can have purposes that they have chosen for
themselves, and no matter what the objective situation, they
always have this choice. There is always some room for them to
choose.
But now, doesn't this emphasis on the pervasiven ss of
human freedom run counter to comm n experience? Aren t there
all sorts of situations which we wou d not naturally character se in
terms of freedom? For example c nsider a wartime situation of
possibly saving one's comrades but at the probable expense of
one's own life, eg., perhaps one cou d warn them of their danger
or escape oneself. Here the range of options is severely restricted,
and neither of them is particularly p easant. But there remains an
important sense in which one is sti free: there is a choice to be
made, and the harder and more erious the choice, the more
valuable it may be. Sartre would say that it is in situations like
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these that one chooses oneself	 he sort of person one s to be
say, her or coward - and thus give oneself meaning.
Or. to take another rather extreme situation, suppose one is
told t do s mething at gunpoint - eg. "hand over the money . It
seems n tural to say that one had no choice here, one was forced
to do a one was told. But the exi tentialist would point out that
even here there was a choice. We don't have to do what we are
told to do at gunpoint. Suppose we were told to harm a young
child - mightn't we then refuse, and risk the gun? This sort of
point was recognized in the trials of Nazi concentration camp
officers fter World War Two. De pite unpleasant, perhaps fatal,
consequences of not obeying orders, they were accounted both
responsible for what they did and blameworthy. The courts held
not only that they could have done otherwise, but that they
should have done so.
Inauthenticity: the denial of freedom and responsibility
The existentialist, then, argues that we are essentially free:
no matter what the external situation there is always some r om
for ch ice as to how we will respond to it. However, he would
readily agree that it does not always appear this way to us in our
everyday experience - we are often not consciously aware of this
freed m nd do not use it. We tend to act automatically, and out
of habit. Indeed, he would claim that if we survey human I fe in
general, t is clear that for most of the time we try to hide this
very fact of our existence from our elves. For example, Heidegger
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claims that we 'flee in the face of the truth of our existence", our
individual freedom We deceive ourselves into thinking that we
don't have this freedom. For most of the time we live
"inauthentically", or, as Sartre would put it, in 'bad fai h". Why,
acc rding to the existentialist, we should do this, I wi go into
presently. First, I would like to illustrate what existentia sts have
in mind when they talk of being inauthentic. Examples abound. I
will start with some fairly specific ones, and invite the reader to
consult his or her own experience to judge their plausibility and
the general characterisation of human life that ensues. We deny
our own freedom by:
Trying to get others to make our decisions for us: "what do you
think I should do?"
Pretending things are beyond our control, for example by
supposing that everything has been decided by "them" where we
don t take the trouble to see just who "they' are, nd what
influence we might bring to bear if we were determined enough.
Convenient fatalism: 'I know people say that smoking is
dangerous but I believe you go when you are Called', etc. (This
could be a genuine and deeply held belief, but somet mes it is
more an excuse for not acting.)
Personality traits: "I just am the sort of person who loses his
temper.....is inconsiderate" etc.,	 spoken in a way that suggests
this just has to be accepted as an immutable fact.
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Allowing ourselves to be determined by social stereotypes: "I'm
artistic and therefore its natural that I should be temperamental"
etc.
Pretending that problems, and therefore choices, don't exist
through various forms of double-think. Sartre gives the example
of a girl giving her hand to an amorous partner. She is enjoying
the flirtation but doesn't want to face up to where it is leading -
the decision that has to be made as he gets more adventurous. She
tries to distance herself from the problem by pretending that her
hand is somehow separate from her, not hers to withdraw.
Now these examples are but limited instances of what the
existentialist sees as being a very general condition. The extent to
which we try to deny our individual uniqueness and our
individual freedom to choose and thus shape our own lives is held
to be extremely pervasive. According to Heidegger we are
constantly tempted into the way of the "crowd". For the most part
we allow our lives to be ordered in great detail by what "they" -
the anonymous "they" - say and think, and keep ourselves too
busy with our on-going everyday affairs to realise this. We
submerge ourselves in the world by living busily and
unthinkingly according to the roles, stereotypes, expectations,
with which the "they" provide us, and thus measure ourselves
according to standards that are not truly our own. We lose
ourselves in hobbies, pastimes, intellectual pursuits, and we make
sure that we don't give ourselves the opportun ty to
	 think
genuinely about our own unique individual existence. Instead we
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get comfortably carried along in what is essentially just "gossip" r
"hearsay", and fashion in one form or another.
To take the former, for Heidegger hearsay refers to that
frame of mind in which we hear things and just pass them on
down the line, without really making them our own by testing
their validity in terms of our own unique existence. We don't ask
"What does this really mean for me?", or even probe the grounds
for believing it. We just hear it or read about it, and say it or write
about it - as perhaps in casual conversation, or in an exam answer.
In this frame of mind we live on the level of an essentially
shallow and averaged-off collective understanding - what "they" -
"everybody" - currently understands, such that problems that
might throw us back on ourselves get glossed over by easy talk
and groundless speculation. We tend to talk and think largely in
the third person.
In this way thinking is tranquillised, for such everyday
understanding is never thrown into genuine puzzlement: it is all-
knowing in the sense that it always has some ready-made answer
up its sleeve to cover all possibilities. And the fact that, in truth, it
is sometimes wrong doesn't put it out at all, for it is too busy with
the next thing to acknowledge such faults. Think, for example, of
the effects of a smear campaign: even if accusations are shown to
be groundless something of the smear often sticks. In the gossip a
web of unsubstantiated associations gets built up which are tacitly
carried forward while the truth gets quietly left behind,
inconsistencies passing unremarked or submerged by the
pressure of whatever is now current. In this way of living it s
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what the latest talk says of you, rather than what you are, that
matters. It conditions what you think about yourself as well as
what you think about others.
Now we should be clear here that in making reference to the
idea of the "they" when characterising this frame of mind,
Heidegger is not suggesting that there is some ort of governing
clique - some group of people other than ours lves - who are
actually controlling us. It is rather that the "they' is an aspect
of ourselves. It characterises a way of thinking in which we
indulge which hides from us the possibility of having our own
unique understanding f things, and thus allows us to escape
facing up to our own unique possibilities and choices. But why
should existentialists interpret things in this way? Why should we
try to escape from our individual freedom? Their answer is
simple: because full consciousness of our freedom brings
with it full consciousness of our responsiblity.
The existentialist holds that freedom and responsibility are
inseparable: in acknowledging our freedom we are forced to face
up to our own respon ibility for all that we do. We can neither
pass this off onto someone or something else, nor can someone or
something else take it away from us. We are stuck with it. From
the beginning we are thrown into a world not of ur choosing: we
did not choose to be born into the society and time that we were
born into; we did not choose the physical attr bu es of the bodies
in which we will live ut our lives; things will h ppen over which
we have precious litt e control eg., our plans may come to fruition
or they may come to nought due to factors quite external to us.
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Tomorrow one of us may be dead because someone made a silly
mistake when they were driving. Yet in the midst of all this
arbitrariness, we are free to choose and are responsible for what
we do. There is nothing behind us, as it were, that we can fall back
on to make our choices for us, tell us what o do, nor is there some
pre-ordained objectively c mpelling ideal in the future towards
which we must direct ourselves. At base, human existence is not
reasonable, not rational, but absurd. We must make our choices
and take responsibility for them in the face of this absurdity. It
pervades all that we do.
It is interesting to note here that th s was as true for the
Christian existentialist, Soren Kierkegaard, as for atheistic
existentialists such as Sartre. Kierkegaard held that Christian
belief will never be something rationally or scientifically
justifiable; if it were, it would no longer be a religious belief.
Christian belief requires a leap of faith - and you are responsible
for it. Someone who, say, turns to the life of Chri t as a source of
guidance is making a choice: they could have done otherwise.
They rema n responsible for all that they do in His name, or
guided by His example.
Now clearly this account of human existence has important
consequences for the idea of education developing children as
individuals: part of our long term task would be to bring them
gradually to an understanding of the nature, extent, and
significance of their freedom. But also, and very much to our
present point, it has large implications for the quality of thinking
in which we might be encouraging children to engage.
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For example, it would alert us to questions concerning how
much of what presently goes on in schools has the quality of what
Heidegger terms "hearsay" - how much is passed on to children in
ways that do not invite them to evaluate what they have learnt in
their own terms, and thus make it their own? John bIt (1990)
and others have claimed that there are tremendous pressures on
children in school to set aside what they really think in order the
better to produce what they believe their teacher wants, or will
keep them "in" with their peer group. In this situation, even the
rebels rarely truly express themselves, but rather engage in a
parallel form of "counter hearsay".
One would need to ask, then, is the time and trouble
required to explore how one should be affected by what one
learns - what stance one should take towards it and how it should
influence one's outlook - too rarely given? If so, on this view, what
is learnt is likely to remain lodged in the mind as so much
information which will be applied in a manner largely determined
by others and therefore with a diminished sense of personal
responsibility. As such it is, therefore, only very partially
understood, lacking the personal significance which would lift it
above the level of what is simply current and 'known', or
"knowable", by all. It remains thought in an averaged-off way,
sustained in a way of thinking - a mind - which is essentially
owned by the "they". For the existentialist, to reinforce this
already pervasive frame of mind would be a charade of
developing children's thinking and a denial of their potential for
becoming truly responsible individuals. It would leave them
143
perhaps knowledgeable, but bereft of real meaning and personal
integrity.
Authenticity
How, then, is the potentially vicious circle of inauthenticity
and enmeshment in the "they" to be broken? For the present, let
us return to the general, as against the school, context. To be
shown the truth of one's situation, and to be encouraged to discuss
and reflect upon the significance of what one learns is a start, but
simply stated thus, has its dangers. A purely intellectual
acknowledgement is not enough, and, like anything else, one
might simply relate to it at the level of hearsay and fashion. (In
this respect one might recall the trendy existentialist rebels of the
1940's and 1950's.) How does one achieve the deeper level of
response that authenticity requires? For understanding that is
properly grounded in the existence of an individual, an element of
opportunism may often be involved.
Sometimes something just happens that throws us back
upon ourselves and makes us withdraw from the crowd for a
while. Perhaps some long cherished project suddenly collapses (or
on the other hand suddenly becomes a real possibility). Perhaps
one learns of the death of a close friend or relative, witnesses a
fatal accident, or has a narrow escape oneself. Such experiences
can cut the familiar everyday ground from under one, things
taking on a slightly different, strange, aspect. In this way we may
be brought to a mood in which the crowd can have nothing to say
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to us, and we see the on going gossip and fashion for what it is;
our comfortable and reassuring absorption in the ev ryday is
disturbed for a short time.
It is at moments like these, then, that we may begi to come
to ourselves, to seriously reflect upon the meaning of our own
existence and what we really value in life. Acc rding to
Heidegger, in this mood we can truly hear the call of our own
conscience, and can be brought up against the one immutable fact
of our life: our own death. We now confront this not in terms of
idle speculation as to how or where we might die, but rather as a
full conscious acknowledgement of the force of the fact that each
of us will die. This, Heidegger holds, gives us a proper
perspective from which to view our lives. And, unlike the way we
might respond to it when we think in the way of the crowd, this
concern with death is not to be dismissed as a morb d fetish,
which is a way of turning our back on it. On the contrary, a
genuine awareness of our own death individualises us because it
forces us as individuals to face up to the problem of what we are
going to do with our lives.
On Heidegger's account, then, the essence of human being is
not so much that we are rational, symbol users, etc., though we
are these things to a greater or lesser extent), but that we are
mortal - meaning by this that we live in an awareness o the fact
that we ourselves will die - though we usually try to c ver this
awareness over. And the real problem for each of us t en - the
problem that provides the context for all our cho ces and
understanding	 is not what is the meaning of life where we 1 ok
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outside ourselves to others for the answer, eg., the church,
scientists studying the nature of the universe etc. The problem is:
what meaning will I give to my life? What will I hold true to
in the light of the fact that I will surely die? This is held to be
individualising because it is a question each person must answer
for him or herse f.
Now it may seem at this po nt that all this is getting to be a
far cry from children in the primary school. Surely, it may be
argued, issues to do with our mortality and the meaning we give
to our lives are matters for mature reflection by adults. Even if we
were to concede that it might form a long term aim of some
general notion of education conceived as personal growth, to
attempt to introduce such issues to young children would be both
beyond their understanding and a source of unnecessary anxiety
to them, making them old before their time. A response to such
objections, and some consequenc s for what it is to develop
children's thinking and understand ng in the primary scho 1, is
the subject of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER NINE
SELF-EXPRESSION IN LEARNING
/A resume
In the previous chapter I tried to make the point that, to put
it concisely, the development of thinking is a facet of mind, and
that therefore the quality of such development is do ely related
to the quality of the conscious life of the individual mind which
sustains it, and with which it is being integrated. Thus in wishing
to understand the factors which constitute the deve opment of
thinking we must look not only at whatever logical structure there
may be to the concepts being learnt - their public meaning - but
also the subjective structure of the individual mind which is to
receive these concepts. If this is so, it is clear that an important
feature of this element is not simply its existing cognitive
structure - an aspect much laboured by psychologists such as
Piaget - but its affective structure: its stance towards what is
being learnt in particular, and its attitude towards the world in
general. These will be important elements in determining the
"subjective weight" of what a person knows.
Thus, we must be alert to the different modes in which
consciousness relates to things and the motivations that underlie
these if we are to appreciate the way in which what a hild learns
is affecting the sense of an organic life referred to in Chapter One.
Our brief explorati n of existentialism highlighted two uch broad
modes: the authentic and t e inauthentic, and I ha e tried to
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sketch in a preliminary way some of the far-reach ng
consequences of these two modes for an understanding of the
development of thinking. However at this point objections were
raised to the effect that it began to appear that the relevance of
these for children in the primary age range is rather tenu us
because of the maturity of understanding that would be required
Let me now face these objections, and in the process attempt to
relate what I have taken to be some of the insights of
existentialism to the development f children's thinking in the
primary school To bring home the importance of these
considerations I intend to refer to a an educational philosophy
which is no doubt more familiar to many primary teachers than
existentialism: the philosophy of ch d centredness.
Child -centredness and authentic self-expression
Child-centred approaches to education have now a long, if
somewhat chequered, history which goes back some two hundred
years or so to Rousseau. 1 While dur ng this period it has taken a
variety of specific forms, and undergone various transformati ns,
one enduring tenet lies at its kernel the idea that real learn ng
involves the self-expression of the learner. That is to say, it
makes a fundamental claim that while children may be brought to
acquire all sorts of facts and skills through a process in which they
are essentially treated as passive receivers, for them to achieve a
proper understanding of what can be so acquired they need to
relate it all to their own experiences concerns, and purposes. Thus
they need to be personally active n their learning - to express
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themselves in it - for understanding to occur, for it is held that
under tanding is not something which can be simply mplanted
from outside, it has to be constructed by the individual, and this
requires that they are given the opportunity to pursue it in their
own way.
From this basic assumption many things seemed to follow.
There arose the notion that the curriculum should be based on
children's current interests, and that they should have significant
freedom of choice with regard to the direction their learning
would take.
	 This in turn led to a whole g amut of
recommendations as to how education should be organised eg.,
individualised learning; small group work; the integrated day;
project work; learning through play, discovery and d scussion;
practical experimentation; open-plan buildings; using the
environment as an important resource etc., etc. Perhaps most
important of all were the seeming implications of child self-
expression in learning for the role of the teacher. On the child-
centred model the teacher was required to relinquish the role of
instructor and ultimate authority on what, when, how, and where
things were to be learnt, and became more of a faci itator in
children's efforts to pursue their own interests. By s me, this
became interpreted as a role of such passivity that it consisted in
little more than that of keeping some sort of general order in the
classr om.
But, let us now bring to these issues s me of the
considerations that I have drawn from existentialism. F rstly, let
us look more carefully at the notion of self express n which I
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have suggested lies at the heart of this whole approach to
education. I would like to suggest that the existentialist
perspective can help to clear away some common
misunderstandings of this notion which have led sometimes to its
rejection as an educational consideration, and sometimes to
educational malpractice.
To begin with, the idea that self-expression is best achieved
by giving children almost total freedom to do what they like -
simply pursue what currently happens to interest them without
further ado - clearly would be a nonsense on this view. In truth,
authentic self-expression is far more likely to be criticised for its
austerity than because it is laissez-faire. There are several
elements to this. Firstly, self-expression cannot be simply a matter
of "doing one's own thing" regardless of the consequences.
Authentic self-expression must involve that one acknowledges
that one is the author of one's actions, and it is this sense of
personal responsibility that gives them their feeling of
meaningfulness - as against simply carrying out someone else's
instructions, or mindlessly complying with what is commonly
expected. To deny responsbility for the consequences of one s
actions both for oneself, and for others, is precisely to deny that
those actions were really one's own. Self-expression, then, is not
to be equated with unthinking spontaneity or unbridled ego-
centrism.
Related to this, existentialism also makes it clear that
neither is self-expression just a matter of doing what one
normally or habitually does. One may not normally be very self-
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expressive in the authentic sense of this term: an individual may
normally be caught up in the previously descfbed strategies of
self deception, unthinking conformity to social and peer group
expectations, and the superficiality of "hearsay'. such that
awareness of personal choice and responsibility is minimal or
altogether absent. Certainly many children will be liable to act and
think in ways that simply reflect what happens to be currently
popular or dominant characters in the class or at home, and to
generally prefer the security of going along with the rest of the
group. Further, it would be false to assume that all, or indeed very
many children, will necessarily relish opportunities to exercise
what powers they may have for positive initiative, independence,
choice and personal responsibility - even over matters like when
to sharpen a pencil! Indeed, some, at least, seem content to be told
in minute detail what to do and can show signs of withdrawal or
resentment when this is not forthcoming.
Finally, self-expression should not be equated (as it
sometimes is) with being extroverted, "emotional", or "loud" -
always ready with an opinion, always busy, active, and generally
"prominent". Keeping silence, being thoughtful and reflective, are
often more truly self-expressive. Indeed, the person with
everything "up front" can be a parody of self-expression, such
behaviour being more a substitute for having little depth of
personal development. Clearly, then, and at the very least, a
classroom in which children are encouraged to be self-expressive
will not correspond to the popular caricature of a room full of
n ise and blustering "busy-ness". Further - and this is very
important - self-expression becomes viewed very much as
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something to be achieved rather than something that will just
naturally "happen" if we allow it
Now a 1 this ties in very closely with a point made earlier:
the development of th nking is more than simply a matter f
cognitive development. At the centre of the idea of quality of
thinking and understandng lies a whole gamut of attitudes and
dispositions to do with honesty, responsibility, openness, and
reflectiveness. It will also be true that if real learning involves
such self-expression it will carry with it an element of personal
risk. To understand how this is so, we need to explore more fully
the way in which self-expression relates to understanding, by
pressing the question "How is it that things can come to have
personal meaning ie., "subjective weight"?
In the discussion of "hearsay" in the previous chapter, it was
suggested that things acquire subjective weight through the
responsible placing of value on them. But in terms of what, can we
value things? It would seem that the answer to this must be: the
things that bring us into personal contact with the world in the
first place - our pers nal (ie. authentic) concerns. It is these which
allow things to matter to us and enable us to enter into a
personally meaningful relationship with the world because it is
only by expressing them and feeling the world's response (either
actually, or through acts of imagination that we can feel what our
thoughts really mean. This is our means of growing both in
knowledge of the world, and in self-knowledge, for it is in this
interplay that we learn the consequences of our thoughts,
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attitudes, and beliefs, and thus allow them to be refined and
enlarged.
For example, we will understand a cituation ac friendly
and in such and such a way - to the extent that the expression of
our genuine concern for friendship receives a positive response;
an idea is illuminating to the extent that it satisfies our genuine
concern to understand something; that the next train leaves in ten
minutes matters to us to the extent that we are genuinely
concerned to catch it. In other words, precisely how and why
things matter to us personally - our own evaluation and
understanding of them - is a reflection of our genuine concerns -
either already present, or evoked by the situation itself. Learning
through such self-expression, then, is "real" in a double sense: it
has personal cogency, and it is "realistic" through its constant
reference to the real world of things, people, and institut ons. Our
concerns are, as it were, our personal bridge into the world.
To return now to the issue of personal risk: it is important to
recognise how much such learning involves a personal investment
- a certain giving of oneself. In much the same way that a novel
comes to life - is properly "read" - only when the reader lends his
or her life to the characters - in some sense lives their experiences
and situations with and for them, feeling their hopes and fears
etc., so the learner must give him or herself over to the encounter
with what is to be learnt, giv ng it life by being prepared to go
with it and personally accept what it brings. In opening oneself up
in this way one becomes vulnerable, for failure wi 1 matter
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personally, leaving one perhaps in mid-air, confused, at a loss, etc.,
and such an upshot is as likely as rapid success and satisfaction.
Further, in being willing to be personally affected by ne s
learning, facets of one's own identity may be brought into
question - hitherto firmly held beliefs and attitudes being
disturbed. Indeed there is an important sense in which our
personal identity largely consists in our beliefs, attitudes, and
concerns, and is therefore always to some degree at stake in real
learning. 2
 It is for this reason that educational learning has
rightly been characterised as concerned with the personal growth
of the individual - a point perhaps partially recognised by the
National Curriculum proposal for a pects of what has been termed
'personal and social education' to be an important element in its
cross-curricular dimensions and themes.
Clearly all this suggests that far from diminishing the role of
the teacher in education, attention to authentic self expressi n in
children's learning and the quality of subjective weight in their
thinking and understanding places great demands on it The
sensitivity and acumen required of the teacher in creating
conditions conducive to such learning could hardly be over
emphasised. Let me take this opp rtunity of spelling out in more
detail what this might entail.
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The role of the teacher in promoting real learning
I will begin by reiterating a fundamental point that
existentialism makes about authentic self-expression: we cannot
expect it simply to develop in children by itself, if only we'd "let'
it. The attitudes that lie at its kernel are shaped huge y by the
social environment in which children grow up. The attitudes that I
have in mind here are ones such as a sense of self-worth, having
the courage of one's convictions, tenacity in the face of adversity,
confidence to question, take risks, face consequences, be
constructively self-critical. These are all essent al if children are
to genuinely engage in thinking and construct their own
understanding of things in such a way as to endow them with
subjective weight. And engendering them will call for great skill
and involvement on the part of the teacher. To suppose that one
can simply provide "a stimulating environment" and then sit on
the sidelines would indeed be an abrogation of the teacher's
responsibilities, and would be based on a misconception as to how
it is possible for children's thinking to develop. It is undoubtedly
true that children can and do learn a great deal by themselves
without the direct guidance of adults. We must respect this. But
equally, it is the case that there are limits and obstacles which it is
unlikely or impossible for them to surmount without the aid of a
caring adult.
We have previously noted (in Chapter F ur) that from the
purely cognitive point of view, it is hard to see how children can
acquire by themselves, through the use of their senses, many
important concepts because of more abstract e ements to them.
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We can now add that from the affective point of view, while
young children may have many positive attitudes deriving from
their relative innocence and a degree of natural curiosity, mixed
with these, and sometimes very prominent, will be others such as
timidity, apathy, insecurity, hostility, boredom, complacency,
superiority/inferiority, which can in varying degrees get in the
way of authentic learning. Thus the teacher has a very active role
to play in encouraging and supporting children; in provoking,
questioning, suggesting possibilities. That is to say teaching on this
view becomes an empathetic challenging 3 of children to come
to terms with, and extend, their own thoughts and feelings, and to
create an ethos of mutual respect in which this can occur in a non-
threatening way for both pupils and teacher!
This view, then, demands a balance between a respect for
the thinking that children are presently engaged in, and a feel for
the possibil ties for its refinement and enlargement And it places
at the centre of such development, not simply the structure of
public disciplines of thought in terms of which rationalism sees
the mind of the child is to become pa terned, but the quality of
the teacher-pupil relationship. If learning which arises out of
authentic self-expression - ie., expression that gets below
immediate and superficial wants and interests (which are
sometimes a cover or substitute for deeper concerns and
anxieties) - is to be fostered, then teachers must be prepared to
enter a relationship of empathetic openness and responsiveness
with their pupils. When this happens we are likely to have
confirmed for us what we already know but too rarely properly
acknowledge in terms of its centrality to education, namely that
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children are real people and that like real people, they often have
deep-seated concerns about themselves and the world. For
example, they can have worries about illness and death a project
on "Health" with nine year olds in which I was once involved
revealed that several children suffered from a longstanding fear
of dying from cancer and, indeed, the prospect of death itself),
about personal relationships and their breakdown, as well as
those more conventional 'childish' concerns which we find it less
threatening to allow them to express. These can all be normal,
healthy, real, concerns and we do a child no service if we turn
some into dark spectres haunting the edge of consciousness.
Indeed, on the view we are now considering, the child's growth as
a whole person precisely consists in their being honestly explored
and better understood. Such deeper concerns become central to,
rather than peripheral to, his or her education.
It becomes a vital role of the teacher, then, to help children
to articulate their concerns without overbearing fear of censure; to
formulate their ideas and responses, and to indicate possible ways
forward. In this context, the vast resources of culture (itself a
response to the whole gamut of human concerns and dilemmas) -
from fairy tales to philosophy4
 - can be drawn upon, but at need,
ie., as and when they are felt to have a contribution to
make to the child's own understanding, rather than being
turned into a sterile strait-jacket of pre-specified teaching
objectives. For teachers to be able to facilitate this, they will
clearly need to have a sense of the vitality of culture themselves.
This requirement has wide implications for their own education.
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In a later chapter on structuring children s learning I will
attempt to spell out in more detail some specific points that these
considerations suggest for the activities of teaching. But at this
juncture let me summarise a general claim that is being made by
saying that we must beware underestimating the degree of
seriousness that children are capable of, and the possibility that in
their own ways and at their own levels their th nking and
understanding is as much a response to the problems and
dilemmas of the human condition as is that of adults, and is
equally subject to the pressures and counter pressures that the
notion of authenticity draws to our attention. Advocates of the
existentialist perspective count it as one of its great strengths that
it challenges us to see education - at whatever stage - as
contributing to initiation into what it is to lead a human life - and
not as something essentially hived off from the rest of a child's
existence. This applies both "horizontally" in terms of the child's
existence outside school, and "vertically" in terms f a past and an
open future which holds possibilities wider and deeper than those
encompassed by intellectual and career success, or contribution to
economic growth. It reminds us to bear in mind that any
education worthy of the name should contribute to equipping
people to eventually take up the risk of their own lives and decide
for themselves what they are to do with it, and what meaning to
give it.5
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A reservation
Our examination of an existentialist perspective on the
development f thinking and understanding has highlighted the
claim that fr edom and responsibility give subjective weight to
learning, and thus make it "real". On this view great emphasis is
placed on respecting the uniqueness of the individual and the role
of the teacher in supporting this wherever it may lead. While such
an approach clearly throws up many pressing organisational and
resource difficulties (which will be addressed in Part Four), might
it not also be criticised at the level of principle on the grounds
that it will encourage thinking which is unacceptably self-centred,
and perhaps insufficiently in touch with the social basis of thought
and knowledge?
Now, it might be thought at this point that there is an
obvious way forward. Why not simply combine the subjective
dimensions of thinking highlighted by the notion of authenticity
with the social/objective dimensions emphasised by rationality?
In this way could we not have the virtues of both and arrive at a
more adequate account of what it is to develop children's thinking
and understand ng? No doubt there is much to be said for this -
though we would have to be clear about exactly what we meant
by it. To accommodate the demands of authentic learning it would
be necessary f r the bodies of rational procedures and knowledge
to be drawn upon as a response to the requirements of a child
engaged in exploring his or her own concerns. As they are
incorporated into this activity, they will of course play a role in
re structuring it, but the seminal point is that things are viewed
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this way round: it is the context of the individual child's concerns,
rather than the structure of public forms of knowledge viewed
independently of this, that sets the agenda for learning.
Teaching the public forms of knowledge in the context of
respecting and eliciting children's authenticity would aspire to
developing an understanding which is both rational and truly
their own because it has become an integral part of their
individual self expression. We would then be aiming at a form of
thinking which we might term "authentic-rational".
Can we now suppose that in this way we would bring into
harmony the main dimensions of thinking - the subjective and the
objective? I think this would be premature. Certain pressing
objections now appear on the horizon which when pursued
gesture towards a turttier dimension or tnining anu its
development which is in increasing danger of being, if not entirely
overlooked, seriously undervalued and distorted. I intend to
explore this possibility in the next two chapters by examining
some further facets of the issue of "seif-centredness".
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CHAPTER TEN
AUTHENTIC-RATIONAL THINKING
Throughout the account that I gae of existentialisr, ran the
theme that freedom brings with it responsibility. In the sense that
this implies acknowledging that ne's actions have consequences,
and that one is responsible for these, a certain amount of de-
centring is clearly involved. But is this sufficient to meet the
objection that developing authentic thinking will lead to self-
centred ess? Well, it is not altogether clear that it is, for might
one not accept such responsibility and yet still think and behave
selfishly? One might recognise unpleasant consequences for others
and not care, or only care if this in turn is likely to have
unpleasant consequences for onese f. In other words one could be
authent cally immoral. Now, this is clearly a serious deficiency in
an account of what it is to develop children's thinking and is a
further illustration of the way in which the whole issue is highly
value-laden; not simply a matter of the development of a neutral
intellect, but of motives and attitudes. Clearly then, and at the
very least, an awareness of what is morally acceptable must be
set alongside a concern for what is required for authenticity.'
But there are other important ways in which the self-
centred objection may be pressed. One is as follows: mightn't
authent c thinking (including n w authentic-rational thinking)
take very narrow channels for children whose concerns turn out
to be very tim ted, and thus remain oblivious to that breadth f
understandng which is sometmes taken as the mark of an
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educated person? Further, Just how far are we to take the idea
that understanding s something the individual constructs for him
or herself? Surely most of what we learn has its origins from
outside ourselves: we do not, and cannot, invent it all for
ourselves - a po nt heavily stressed by the rationa sts we
c nsidered in Part Two. (See particularly Chapter Five.)
In responding to objections of this kind, I think it is useful to
make a distinction between seif-centredness, and what I will term
self-referencing Seif-centredness implies that one places
oneself at the centre of all that is important, taking no real
account of anything which lies beyond one's present desires and
interests, and perceptions of what will serve one's own welfare.
By contrast, self-referencing refers to a determination to
understand what one learns in terms of one's own experiences,
and to act in accordance with one's own beliefs and commitments.
Self referencing acknowledges that one is a member of a
culture, that there are duties and obligations, that there i a vast
stock of knowledge and understanding to inherit and discover. It
simply represents an aspiration to make this truly one's own by
relat ng to it dynamically, ie. self expressively. It requires that
each individual is, in some significant sense, the originator of his
judgments concern ng the meaning and value of what he is
learning. This is the fundamental tenet of personal authenticity in
learning. I would now like to say a little more about it.
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Self-referencing and the appropriation of thought 2
Clearly the world of human meanings to which we wish to
introduce the child exists quite independently of any individual
child, and he or she has had no part in its creation. 	 Without
language there may be very little worthy of the name thought,
and all of the situations and dilemmas a child finds him or herself
in occur within the context of a pre-existing culture and are
structured by it. Dilemmas over, say, who to play with, conflicting
loyalties or duties, how to develop a new friendship or spend
pocket money, are possible only against the backcloth of a set of
inherited social situations and meanings. So talk of self-origination
of thought clearly cannot be taken to mean that a child has
somehow to invent all that he thinks for himself. Rather it
expresses the demand that a child attempts to make what
previously existed simply externally to him, his own. The issue is
that of the appropriation of culture as against its passive
acquisition or repressive transmission. And how do we make a
fact or idea, or some other aspect of culture our own in this sense?
The argument of the last two chapters has been that we do this by
setting it in the context of our previous understanding, critically
evaluating it, playing and experimenting with it, deciding on our
stance towards it in terms of the things that matter to us in
our own existence, and accepting personal responsibility
for the consequences of whatever stance we adopt.
Now this is clearly often likely to be a lengthy and on going
pr cess which frequently will never be fully completed or finally
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resolved - our current understanding and commitment often
having a highly provisional status. Yet to the extent that we go
through this self-referencing process we truly internalise what
was once external to us and become the originators or authors of
our own thinking, as against merely reflecting the thoughts of
others. And to the extent that we have assimilated and used
public f rms of thought in this process we would have achieved
authentic-rational thinking. (Not that thinking could ever not
involve social meanings to a high degree - as our examination of
the rationalist position has shown. Though it remains unclear as to
how far this point, of itself, need imply the intellectual
disciplines in the way that say Hirst, and perhaps Bailey,
assume. See, for example, Elliott, R. K. (1975) on this point.)
But now two further questions arise: firstly, can we really
expect children of primary age to engage in such a demanding
process of appropriation? And, secondly, is it appropriate to think
that this degree of appropriation is necessary for everything that
they may need to learn?
The answer to the first question is that the acquisition of th s
kind of understanding is always going to be a matter of degree,
but to pursue it as far as one can - and at whatever level one can
- is both to achieve the best understanding of which one is
capable at the time, and at the same time to develop one s
capacity for future understanding.	 By this latter I mean tw
things. Firstly, there is the point stressed in Chapter Nine, and
elsewhere, that quality of future understanding will depend upon
the quality of that existing understanding which currently
164
constitutes the mind of the learner and with which it is to be
integrated. A chi d whose current understand ng of an area is, say,
largely mechanical is likely to achieve a very different kind of
grasp of further material to the child for whom the issues are felt.
Secondly, I refer to the on going enhancement of one's ability to
engage fully with whatever one is learning through developing
more demanding expectations and attitudes towards new
experience. That is to say, authentic understanding is not so
much the acquisition of various items such as sets of concepts,
procedures and truth tests, as of an outlook - a way of being.
As such, it will hugely affect the sorts of, and the quality of,
situations one is likely to provide for oneself in the future. The
child who has grown confident in asking questions, critically
evaluating evidence from her own perspective and reflecting on
the significance of what she has learnt, has a very different
attitude towards life compared to the child who basica ly seeks
accepted answers. She also makes very different demands upon
her education and will tend to direct herself towards, and to
create, different kinds of experience with n it. In these related
ways, then, the quality of a child's learning is largely a function of
what that child brings to his or her learning - their present mode
of thinking which conditions their interpretation of what they
encounter and the depth of their engagement. As human beings,
we are understandingly. For the sake of quality of understanding
in the future, as well as in the present, then, it is important to
encourage the se f referencing mode.
Now of course, diferent children wi 1 differ in their aptitude
and progress with regard to the self referencing of thought. As
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achievement here is not simply a matter of cognitive ability,
individual temperament and attitudes deriving from varying
home backgrounds and cultures will influence the disposition of
children to engage in such thinking. But this accepted, it is surely
important that all children should at least be set on their way
towards authentic understanding, and that we do not attempt to
quickly prejudge how far they may get if they are given time,
encouragement, and appropriate support. The point has
previously been made that all children have personal concerns -
however fluctuating and inadequately articulated they may
sometimes be - in terms of which they can relate to and begin to
evaluate what they learn. If this is so, the chief question, is not
whether children can make progress in this direction, but
whether we as teachers, think it worth the time and effort to
develop it in the face of other pressures (such as feeling we have
to "cover the ground" - as determined say by a national
curriculum , or other guide lines, devised independently of the
particular children we are teaching).
Further, there is evidence to suggest that quite young
children can engage in a surprisingly full way with important
basic issues about human life, and that they can do it with a lack
of prejudice and freshness that many adults find hard to achieve.
Quite a startling illustration of the latter is cited by Gareth
Matthews (1980, p. 28):
"Ian (six years) found to his chagrin that the three children
of his parents' friends monopolized the television; they kept
him from watching his favourite program. "Mother," he
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asked in frustration, "why is it better for three people to be
selfish than for one?"
It is perhaps understandable that the mother was left non-
plussed by this interesting question. Here the basic tenet of
utilitarian sm - the ethical theory which holds that we should
endeavour to act so as to promote the happiness of the majority
(and which it often seems natural to allow to guide our actions) -
is turned on its head, and one of its great defects - that it can be
seen as an appeal to selfish motives that could result in the
tyranny of minorities - is revealed. It is not of course being
suggested that examples such as these (and Matthews provides a
good number) show that children are consciously evaluating
philosophical theories, but that their thinking can be sensitive to,
and display some very telling reasoning with regard to, issues
which are the subject of such theories and which are basic to
important aspects of human life. There would seem to be
something decidedly anti-educational about a system that
intentionally or otherwise spurned such potential.
The second question concerning the appropriateness of
aiming at a high degree of self referencing in some areas of
learning s an interesting one. In response, it is probably not
possible to generalise very far, except to say that while it would
be both unnecessary and impossible for all a person's
understanding to have this element of inwardness, for which parts
it should be sought and which not, must in large part depend upon
those concerns which are central to a particular individual.
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There are doubtless countless everyday things of which an
individual needs only a token or working understanding in order
to get by and be able to devote himself to those things which are,
r sh uld be, of m re fundamental personal significance to him.
For example, it is not at all clear why every child sh uld develop
an authentic understanding of, say, number bonds. It may be
sufficient for him to be able to operate them in the everyday
contexts in which they are useful without them acquiring a deep
personal significance for him. Similarly, there may be other things
of which it seems odd to suppose this kind of dimension is even
intelligible, under normal circumstances, eg., understanding
certain basic rules of sentence construction or conventions
involved in writing a letter, or using an index. These are simply
important conventions that a child needs to be ab e use. An
element of authenticity remains desirable in that he needs to see
the point of learn ng them, ie., how they are useful to him, but
their point is not itself of the kind that illuminates human
experience.
On th other hand, there would seem to be many things
which one cannot be said to understand at all properly if this
element of broader personal significance is absent. For example,
one could have a near perfect intellectual or technical grasp of the
theory of evolution, or statistics on lung cancer or AIDS, the
beliefs and achievements of one's own and other cultures,
imp rtant historical and fictional characters and situat ons, but if
this in no way affected one's out ook on certain asp cts of life,
one's understanding would be seriously deficient and would have
contributed nothing towards one's personal growth. To take a
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specific, and I suppose now quite well worked, example, ne could
acquire all sorts of facts and figures about the First W rld War,
but to remain essentially unaffected by this knowledge, to have
received it in a way that left one unmoved by the conditions
under which this war was fought, the scale and pointle sness of
the suffering and loss of life, would be grossly mis educat ye. It is
not simply that as A. N. Whitehead once put it 'A merely well
informed man is the most useless bore on God's earth"
(notwithstanding the fact that he'd doubtless do well on Brain of
Britain or "Mastermind"), it is that such learning will not have
educated one, for the significance of knowledge of this kind lies
precise y in what it implies for our conception of our human
situation and the course of our actions.
Thus while there may be a large number of things for which,
because of their limited importance in a life, a relatively
superficial and depersonalised understanding is sufficient, there
are also many things that are frequently taught in this way, but
which are shorn of their educational worth if they lack subjective
weight This idea has been forcefully expressed by Kierkegaard
(1970) in the following way:
'I should suppose that education was the curriculum
one had to run through in order to catch up with
oneself, and he who will not pass through this
curriculum is helped very little by the fact that he was
born in the most enlightened age."
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The point here is that accumulation of more and more public
knowledge of itself does nothing to further our understanding. In
many ways we already "know" too much, and our impressive
stock of knowledge sometimes beguiles us into thinking that if
only we had more of the same kind we could solve all our
problems. But what we more often desperately need to do (both
as individuals and as a people) is to "catch up" with what we
already know, and attempt to think through what it means - to
us as individuals, and for human being as a whole.
Depth versus breadth of understanding
This last point really leads into the third aspect of the
criticism that authentic thinking will lead to seif-centredness: a
recurring anxiety that children will be in danger of devel ping a
narrowness of knowledge and understanding if they learn only
that which arises out of their own concerns, and become involved
in the time-consuming process of self referencing. There are two
things that need to be said immediately to this, before raising a
more serious dilemma that this point presents to us.
The first is a reminder that we should be wary of supposing
that children's real concerns - as against their more superficial
wants and surface interests - are likely to be narrow in scope.
This point was developed in the previous chapter.
The second is that, of course the teacher has a role to play in
provoking and stimulating new thoughts and concerns. Developing
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a ch id's authenticity is not to be equated with stultification and
teacher passivity - How could it be when so many other aspects of
a chid's experience and social environment are actively shaping
his or her ideas in all sorts of ways - sometimes for the worse? As
has been previously emphasised in the notion of "empathetic
challenging", respect for authenticity is not advocation of
passivity and the laissez-faire, but is more to do with accepting
that the child is the final arbiter of what is making sense, and the
conditions under which things can acquire personal significance.
Children's concerns are the touchstone of their learning, not its
completion.
We now come up against what I think is the real issue at
stake: the notion of self-referencing places emphasis on the value
of depth of thought at the expense of breadth. But instrumental
considerations apart, why should breadth be preferred to depth?
Straight rationalism in both its "hard" and "soft" forms would
claim that lack of introduction into a wide range of areas of
knowledge is an obvious deprivation, and runs counter to a child s
"entitlement". But, on the other hand, it seems plausible to argue
that real understanding and its associated insights, satisfactions,
and challenges to think, only come with depth and sustained
involvement with a relat vely limited range of issues. Heidegger
once made a remark to the effect that every great thinker thinks
one thought, rethinking it and re-expressing it again and again
from a variety of perspectives and through its many ramifications.
Surely there is some truth in this which has app cati n to lesser
mortals? Would it not be thinking of this sustained and focused
kind which would generate the attitudes necessary for full
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engagement with an issue - including the authentic evaluation of
what one learns -and which therefore con titutes personal growth
and carries one fruitfully into new situations? Such attitudes are
in stark contrast with those which go along with compendium
knowledge acquisition. In his famous attack on the transmissi n of
"inert ideas" in education A.N. Whitehead (1932, pp. 2-3)
beseeches us to guard against such "mental dry rot":
"We enunciate two educational commandments, 'Do not
teach too many subjects," and again, "What you teach, teach
thoroughly.' ......The result of teaching small parts of a large
number of subjects is the passive reception of disconnected
ideas, not illumined with any spark of vitality. Let the main
ideas which are introduced into a child's education be few
and important, and let them be thrown into every
combination possible. The child should make them his own,
and should understand their application here and now in the
circumstances of his actual life."
In the light of such considerations, and in a situation where
in reality a choice is to be made between children having breadth
of knowledge as say advocated by Hirst or Bailey, or the nine
foundation subjects and myriad attainment objectives of the
National Curriculum, and quality of understanding in terms of
depth of personal significance required by authentic learning, why
should we assume that the latter constitutes a greater deprivation
than the former? Is someone who, say, knows only enough maths,
science, history, and geography to get by in a practical everyday
way, but has a deep personal understand'ng and love of literat re
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and music, really deprived or less adequate as a person compared
with someone who, relatively speaking, has a superficial formal
understanding of all these things? For the moment I will simply
leave this as an issue for the reader to consider.
But such a me of thought does suggest a certain general
methodology for producing the content of a child's education. It is
what one might term the method of "depth sampling". By this I
mean that instead of trying to cover the seemingly endless ground
of what "in the abstract" may be thought to be important for
children to know , we treat what is taught as exemplars: as
themes that have the potential to illustrate both what a broader
area of study has to offer in terms of its human significance and
something of its depth structure (central concepts, ideas and
procedures) so as to encourage early active engagement. In
keeping with the notion of self referencing, the detailed selection
- ie., what becomes treated in this way - crucially will depend on
its potential to develop and refine that which motivates children's
deeper interests and concerns. But in this way it may be that a
fair degree of what is representative of a broader curriculum may
be achieved at a level which is intellectually challenging and
personally satisfying. For given that culture has itself grown out of
attempts to articul te and understand human concerns - and as
we have noted, in turn conditions the kinds of concerns it is
possible to have - it would be odd indeed if there was not
potentially a large degree of coincidence between the more
developed forms of thinking within culture and the felt needs of
children in pursuing their concerns.
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Now I suspect that something of this approach is not such a
far cry from what many of those who originally sat on the
separate subject committees to produce proposals for the content
of the National Curriculum sometimes had in mind - at least in
some degree. But the cumulative effect of their proposals, and
the interpretation and modifications sometimes subsequently
placed on them, is in danger of allowing this element to become
swamped in the resulting overall package. It is, then, of the
greatest importance that such considerations are reasserted. Not,
of course, that it is being supposed that they can change - in the
short term at least - the legislated curriculum framework with
which the primary school has now to comply. But they may affect
the spirit in which it is interpreted in practice and this could be
of the greatest importance. What scope there may be for this is
taken up in Chapter Twelve.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN: POETIC THINKING
"The world is too much with us: ate and soon,
Getting and spending, we lay waste our powers;
Litle we see in Nature that is ours;
We have given our hearts away ......
Wordsworth.
In the previous chapter I looked at some ways in which the
objection of seif-centredness might be pressed against authentic-
rational thinking. Is the notion of self-referencing - conceived as a
determination not to subject everything to personal whim, but to
refer everything to one's self so that one genuinely responds to
what one encounters and thus make one's understanding of it
one's own - sufficient to characterising the kind of thinking and
understanding with which education should be primarily
concerned?
As it stands it is not clear that it is. Just as straight
rationalism seems to pay too little attention to the element of
individuality in thinking and the importance of subjective weight
in a proper understanding of non trivial things, so the notions of
self expressi n and self-referencing which are at the centre of
personal authenticity and authentic rational thought m ght seem
to underplay a further essential element, namely that of
receptivity. What I have in mind here is a considerat on which
we have n fact already briefly touched upon in the discussion of
the role of the teacher in Chapter Nine, and which is much
amplified by 'philosophers of Being . It is an aspect of the self-
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centredness issue which is perhaps best brought out by again
making reference to some of the features of rational sm noted in
Part Two.
The "calculative" and the "poetic"
It will be remembered that one of the main ideas to emerge
from the analysis given in Part Two was that rationality is not a
neutral form of thinking: it involves, often implicitly, a certain
project with regard to the world. It seeks to explain, predict,
evaluate, and control the environment - ie., it is essentially
manipulative in motive - and to this end it represents things
to itself through the use of categories which define things in
standard ways. That is to say, it turns things themselves into
objects of thought, which have the properties of the categories
to which they have been assigned. Now it has been claimed that
this way of thinking is fundamental y unreceptive in that it closes
off much of the many sidedness of the things with which it deals
What can appear for such thinking is only those a pects of the
thing pre-specified by the categories applied. Thus we may be
predisposed to see, say, a flower not simply as it is in the fullness
of its standing there, but as an exemplar of a certain genus,
exhibiting certain pre-specified characteristics, the product of a
certain evolutionary process, the source of some drug or other
commodity, etc. Similarly, it may seem, by requiring that thinking
reference things to the concerns and previous experience and
understanding of the individual, may not authentic learning also
be blinkered to the fullness of wh t is actually present? May not
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things be seen in terms of a relatively narrow set of individual
aspirations and interests which are possibly even more
instrumental in stance than those of the public forms of
rationality?
What seems to underlie the bjections implied by these
questions is some idea that it is pos ible to relate to things in a
more open and unprejudiced manner which will thus allow them
to show themselves more fully. That is to say, there seems to be a
claim that we can have a more direct awareness of things where
what we perceive and think is not exclusively mediated by - and
therefore limited by - the public categories we employ and the
idiosyncratic or social purposes we may as individuals pursue.
Rather there is a form of thinking which springs from things as
they are in themselves. Such thinking has been termed by
Heidegger 'poetic" (also "meditative") and the claim would be
that it involves a mode of relating to things where both rational
categories and personal self are in some sense, and to some
degree, transcended. All forms of thinking have to make
distinctions. What is in question is t e extent to which they are
essentially a matter of social conventi n and imposed on reality as
against an expression of things themselves and thus truly
responsive to reality.1
Lest all this is beginning to sound rather esoteric, let me
attempt to give some examples of what might count as poetic
thinking. Perhaps one of the most powerful ones is when we are
struck with wonderment and awe at some aspect of Nature. In
such experience we seem to leave behind both our self-orientated
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interests and our normal everyday categories in terms of which
we manage things, and become absorbed by the phenomenon
itself. We experience something whose presence by far outstrips
our ability to fully grasp or articulate it, and in some sense we
simply give ourselves over to celebrating the experience itself. We
are there in the experience rather than somewhat abstracted
from it, as in the case of rational scrutiny, and we are there in a
way determined more by the quality of the thing we are relating
to than by our personal concerns, as in what I have so far
characterised as authentic thinking. An acute awareness of this
active "presencing" of things fills the poetry of Gerald Manley-
Hopkins:
As kingfishers catch fire, dragonflies draw flame;
As tumbled over rim in roundy wells
Stones ring; like each tucked string tells, each hung bell's
Bow swung finds tongue to fling out broad its name;
Each mortal thing does one thing and the same:
Deals out that being indoors each one dwells;
Selves - goes itself; myself it speaks and spells,
Crying What I do is me: for that I came. 2
And then again in the following thought which expresses
something of the sense of respect and responsibility that is part of
such awareness:
To mend her we end her,
When we hew or delve:
After-corners cannot guess the beauty been
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Ten or twelve, only ten or twelve
Strokes of havoc unselve
The sweet especial scene,
Rural scene, a rural scene,
Sweet especial rural scene. 3
A similar phenomenon of becoming involved in the
particular can occur in the contemplation of a work of art.
Somehow we can get drawn into the work in such a way that our
habitual categories and concerns fall away and we experience
what may be a familiar thing or situation afresh - see it in a way
freed from our everyday associations which average it off and
turn it into an ordinary and unremarkable object. The paintings of
Vincent Van Gogh are perhaps particularly powerful examples of
attempts to portray the vital presence or "thingness" of things.
Take his painting of a chair. We are not invited to see it as simply
an instance of something you sit on, or a chair of a certain sort as
in a catalogue, but as this chair with its own unique vibrant
qualities - an ambience into which we can be drawn. Entering into
a novel, poem, or piece of music has a similar transporting quality
which frees us up to receive what is there in its own right
And again, poetic experiences are sometimes had in the
context of human relationships. For example situations in which
we find ourselves genuinely empathising with another, seeing life
from another's point of view, or a love that is whole-hearted, have
as a central feature not what we impose on another in s me pre-
specified way, but what we receive • n our willingness to make
ourselves vulnerable and respond caringly to what is there. We do
179
not order anything up, rather we are held in the sway of the
person as he or she is in themselves. But perhaps this is all now
beginning to sound rather precious. Let me refer to some
examples of the kind that Heidegger uses which have a more
earthy" feel to them.
Heidegger tries to refer us back to a time when our way of
relating to things was less aggressive than it is in modern
technological society - a time when we took on the role of
something more akin to creative midwife to things as against
wilful challenger and consumer. For example, he invites us to
consider a contrast between the way things were produced by the
craftsman of older technologies and the process of modern
manufacturing. He takes the example of the making of a sacrificial
silver chalice, and suggests that there was a time when the
silversmith would not have been conceived of as the cause of the
production of the chalice, any more than the midwife is the cause
of the birth of a child. Rather they both have a role of "co-
responsibility" with other powers that are involved, and bring
forth something which was in some sense already there,
inchoately. In the case of the silversmith this is expressed through
his working with the material so as to bring out its own quality -
its texture, lustre, colour - and with the creative forces of the
tradition, and the culture, within which his work has meaning. He
does not decide and fix beforehand the precise properties of the
metal required, what the chalice is to look like, what is or is n t
sacrificial, but participates in the interplay of these enabling
forces - responsively gathering them on a particular occasion so as
to bring this chalice into appearance. His creativity and his
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making are a result of his receptivity, his evolving feel for the
powers he is working with and w h which he assumes joint
responsibility for what is made. And his essential att tude towards
things is one of "working with"	 co-operation with Nature and
culture	 rather than 'working upon which is an expression of
self-will.
This, Heidegger feels, can be contrasted with modern
manufacturing which fabricates objects according to some pre-
given blueprint set up by man's self-will, whereby the object is
the product of a challenging rather than a responding and the
chief problem is how to produce the maximum yield for the
minimum outlay. We can perhaps see this stance as being in part
reflected by the kinds of materials modern making favours - such
as plastics which are almost infinitely malleable and require a
minimum of "working with" in the sense outlined above. We try
to design materials to satisfy our purposes rather than allow our
purposes to be modulated by, and find creative expression
through, the qualities of the materials. Our attitude is n t one of
an on-going responding during the process of making, but of
demanding and imposing: What is wanted in all its s gnificant
detail is decided in advance of the process of making, and
Nature is then challenged to provide the necessary resources for
the processing which is to be set in train.
A parallel can be found in modem agriculture. Here again,
the stance is basically demanding and manipulative. Our attitude
is one of engineering materials (eg., p ants) and condit n to meet
our self-given purposes in as effic ent a manner as possible.
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Factory farming techniques in meat and egg production perhaps
provide particularly gross expressi ns of this general underlying
attitude. Heidegger (1954b) suggests a contrast between this and
the way in which we engaged in farming in earlier times:
"The field that the peasant formerly cultivated and set in
order appears different from how it did when to set in
order still meant to take care of and maintain. The work of
the peasant does not challenge the soil of the field. In
sowing grain it places seed in the keeping of the forces of
growth and watches over its ncrease."
The central point that Heidegger is trying to draw to our
attention here is not that there was some "Golden Age" in the
past to which we should try to return, but simply that with older
technology our way of relating to things is still to await and
respond to Nature's granting - a di posing in her own way and in
er own good time, in which her integrity is thus preserved and
revealed. In such a way of relating our being is very much bound
in with Nature rather than being et apart and impo ed upon it.
And in this way our thinking is more respectful and revealing of
what is there, for what is subjugated does not reveal itself, and we
do not live in harmony with some hing by seeking to manipulate,
"manage", and master it
These, then, are but examples of two distinct ways of relating
to the world. One is termed by Heidegger "calculative' because it
tries to "reckon everything up" in terms of categories and theories
which serve its various self given projects. This would include
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many aspects of rational and authentic rational thi king as
characterised in previous discu ion. The other, as we have noted,
he termed "poetic" because of its receptive and open tance to
things themselves. There are many other examples th t ou1d be
drawn upon to illustrate how these two attitudes towards the
world can express themselves in everyday living. I will take one
more: the way we think of each other. In some context we are
increasingly encouraged to th nk of people as a resource, as
"manpower", with all that this brings in its train for how they
shou d be treated. And certain y there are important parallels to
be drawn here, I think, for the ways in which we can conceive of
the teacher-pupil relationship in the context of developing
children's thinking. The possibilities involved here will be
expi red in later chapters. But what must be said at this point is
that, of course, in concrete human existence these dimensions of
thinking are matters of degree, and it is not to be supp sed that
they exist in their pure forms. Much is hybrid. Rather, the claim
is that we can formally distinguish between such modes, hat they
represent significantly different ways of relating to and revealing
the world, and that in modern technological society the calculative
mode is very much in the ascendent - to the extent even that it
makes the poetic appear unfami iar and archaic, or worse, a frothy
irrelevance to the real business f life.4
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It is perhaps possible to summarise the differences between
calculative and poetic thinking in he following way. Firstly their
stance towards things:
CALCULATIVE
self-purposeful
goal-orientated
analyses things into problems
to be solved
turns things into defined
objects	 manage ble, familiar
POETIC
celebratory
openly curious, wondering
intuits the wholeness of
things and receives them as
they are
stays with things in their
inherent strangeness
Secondly, the two kinds of thinking can be characterised by the
feelings and aspirations that they e icit:
POETIC
CALCULATIVE
satisfaction as a result of
sense of sorting thngs out,
getting things ordered, made
clear, transparent
effects things
seeks control
makes statements
seeks truth as c rrectness
sense of mystery, awe,
wonder, fascination
evokes feelings of attunement
affected by things
allows itself to be vulnerable
"sings", "says", what is
seeks truth as revealing
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Poetic truth
The final reference to different kinds of truth in the above
list is very important, and in many ways lies at the ha e of the
differences between the two modes of thinking, and what would
be involved in developing them. Rational thinking seeks to
express itself in statements which are correct - meaning by this
that they have been tested for their validity against public tests
for truth. In principle a statement is either true or false in these
terms; it is assumed that at the end of the day there is a correct
answer (even if we don't know what it is at present). In contrast
to this, the poetic view of truth is simply that of things coming to
disclose themselves as they are - rather than how we choose to
represent them to ourselves through statements of what is the
case in the ways, for example, emphasised by Paul Hirst. There
are no correct or incorrect answers because there are no answers
at all: in this mode we are not in the business of calculating - we
do not set ourselves specific problems to be resolved. We are not -
to refer to Bacon's characterisation of modern experimental
science at its inception - "putting Nature on the rack" of
interrogation, but simply trying to be open to what is there and
allow that reality to affect us and provide us with a sense of what
is fitting and what not.
Expressions of poetic thinking, therefore, do n t give us
inf rmation - data to be inserted in some argument, theory or
formula - but in essence simply "sing" or "say' things so as to
point us to things themselves and invte participati n n them. If
they were simply informative statements in the rational sense,
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the idea of, say, returning to a poem, piece of literature or
artwork, or listening to a song, again and again would be as
senseless as returning to a reference manual whose information
we had already assimilated. In the poetic mode an expression
such as "trees dancing against the sky" states no proposition to be
learnt up, gives no information which is correct or incorrect, it
simply says or sings an aspect of experience which we can enter
into, celebrate, be affected by. The pre-Socratic philosopher
Parmenides described this thinking as a native "letting-lie-before-
us and a taking-to-heart". It is only when we fall out of harmony
with things that we set them up as problematic and in need of
manipulation. Thus developing this kind of thinking will be a
very different enterprise to that of developing rational thinking.
But before we move onto this issue, we must confront a prior
question: why bother? If poetic thinking does not provide us with
answers to our problems what use can it be, why should it be
considered at all important enough to spend valuable time on in
school?
The "use" of poetic thinking
There are a number of things that may be said in this regard.
Perhaps the first is that to raise the question in the above form is
already to have taken up the stance of calculative rationality: we
are seeking an instrumental value for such thinking in order to
justify it. From the perspective of poetic thinking this is to have
begged the fundamental question about the purpose of thinking,
and its reply would be that it may be less a case of how we can
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use such thinking, and more a case of how it might use us.
That is to say the question is raised as to why we should assume
that the only way of making progress, of ameliorating the
conditions in which we live and giving our lives meaning, is to
assume the mastery. There are traditi ns which hold that the
inspiration wh ch comes from service to something recognized as
infinitely greater than ourselves, and through which we achieve a
freedom, dignity, and worth larger than any we can manufacture
for ourselves, is a fuller realisation of human nature. Further,
have we not at least been given pause to question the manifest
success of the calculative aspect of rational thinking in terms of its
devastating consequences for the environment? Does Heidegger
put it too strongly when he claims that before we annihilate
things in actions we have already annih lated them in thought ie.
turned them into objects at our disposal, and the latter is a
condition of the former occurring?
The central point in all this is that surely we need to consider
carefully the mplications of our basic tance in thought for our
relationship with all around us. Does t embody a fundamental
lack of respect for things themselves? If, however implicitly, we
assume the earth is there for our use, that we can possess it and
have the right to interrogate and exploit t so as to fulfil our own
self-given purposes, clearly this sets as a norm a very self-centred
view of human being which will colour our perception of all that
we do - lead us to identify problems in a certain way and seek
solutions of a certain kind. For example, increasingly, conservation
and environmental issues would be described and weighed in
terms of what is thought to be to the long term advantage of
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human beings, rather than of things themselves. The motive for
protecting endangered species would be largely in terms of them
having some as yet unknown potential to serve us in some
manner, and attempts will be made to manage the problem
accordingly - maybe by creating convenient sanctuaries or
reserves. Rather different solutions might suggest themselves if a
genuine respect for things themselves was operative - approaches
that involved modification of human aspirations so as to enable us
to live harmoniously alongside things. This could be very
important. We have little opportunity to develop a proper feel for
things hived off in reserves - indeed, in this way they are turned
into curios and even more forcefully set up as being at our
disposal and requiring our management.
And there is another danger. Such fundamental self
centredness leads to a form of nihilism which is already
manifesting itself in our everyday lives. The rampant growth of
consumerism, it m ght be claimed, is only the becoming explicit of
underlying motives which have always been prese t implicitly in
rational calculative thinking. Material growth and consumption
becoming ends in themselves is simply an expressi n of the self-
will which is embedded in such thinking, and the ultimate sterility
that it leads to is simply a feature of a thinking which is
increasingly closed in upon itself and can no longer be inspired by
meaning and values outside those it has provided for itself. For
inspiration precisely consists in being held in the sway of
something beyond oneself, outside the current compass of one s
thinking - something distinctly other - which thus brings a new
dimension, vital and strange, into our life. A hinking which
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pred sposes us - no matter how covertly - to seek control by
constantly pre-shaping our interactions is in grave danger of
retracing increasingly hollow circles. Any originality that it
posses es will be of a peculiarly constipated kind.5
Thus it may well be, then, that a recognition of poetic
thinking is needed not just for our material welfare (and possibly
survival), but for our spiritual welfare. To meet the problems
that now confront us we may need a radical change of heart - a
radical de-centring which rationality in its modern calculative
form systematically denies, but covers over by its claims to be
objective and impartial. Finally, on a somewhat less elevated
plane, the sense of wholeness that poetic thinking can give may be
essential to our sense of personal well-being. This is nicely
described by William Barrett (1978) in the following way:
"I take walks in the woods near where I live; and if I take a
walk in those woods in an afternoon I am thinking all the
time. But if I come back, and someone says: 'What problem
did you solve?' I would say: 'I wasn't doing that kind of
thinking. I was ruminating, orientating myself to myself and
to Nature.' I feel much more sound and whole when I come
back from that sort of reflection. But you can imagine the
other person thinking to himself: 'That s
	
very strange. He
says he was thinking, yet he wasn't 	 considering any
problem and he didn't calculate anything."
The value of poetic thinking lies not in specific and tangible
results or conclusions that f how ogically from it, but rather from
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a sense of attunement, place, and fittingness that it engenders,
and within the ambience of which, the rational-calculative
systems and arguments in terms of which we have become
habituated into thinking of ourselves, need to be re-located in
order for their broader significance to be understood and for them
to become re-humanised in a deeper sense. This re-orientation is
often very subtle and not something of which we may be very
consciously aware. Yet it can on occasion be very powerful and
explicit as when for example, the image of a starving child may
cause us to adjust our sense of financial or political priorities, or
that of a single oil covered bird our sense of what risks we should
be prepared to take with the environment.
Poetic thinking, then, can help to reveal the ground in which
our rational calculat ons are rooted and give us a sense of our own
rootedness - or its lack. Through developing our capacity to enter
into the very being of things themselves - to be affected by them
- we apprehend the underlying qualities of the human world
which sh uld ultimately condition our purposes and give weight
to our reasonings.
Developing Poetic Thinking
If the central features of poetic thinking are openness and
responsiveness, it does not make sense to conceive of its
development in any pre-structured way that parallels the way we
might still be tempted to think of the development of rational
thinking. It is doubtful that we should conceive of the
development f poetic thinking as a series of definable steps at all
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because it does not have at its kernel a set f logical relations
articulated in conceptual schemes. Rather we are concerned with
the degree of deve opment of certain qualities and attitu es which
the child exhibits in his or her natural dealings with the world. I
attempted to list these qualities of thought ear er in this chapter,
but how are they acquired?
Well, to begin with, clearly not simply through instruction:
being told about such attitudes and having them explained in
some formal way is a far cry from actually acquiring them - as we
know only too well in an analogous way in the area of moral
education. And unlike moral education where social pressure is
constantly present and sanctions can be applied to "correct" wrong
behaviour, there are no such unpleasant consequences to be
immediately felt for ignoring the poetic. Qu te the reverse. In
terms of the currently dominant instrumental values of efficiency
and mastery, those attitudes which I have associated with the
poetic appear as something of a dispensable side-show.
Exhortation, then, has small chance of success, and indeed would
in any case be contrary to the nature of poetic thinking itself.
Rather, it would seem, the child needs to rub shoulders with
people who themselves value such thinking, who all w it to
influence their lives: give it space and time somewhat in the
manner discussed earl er in relation to initiating children into the
living traditions of thought described by Michael Oakeshott. (See
Chapter Four.)
Thus, teacher and children might share a sense f wonder
and astonishment at, say, the sheer variety, complexity and
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beauty of micro- rganisms in a drop of pond water; the sheer
magnitude of distances and masses in human terms in the solar
system or the ga axy, the sheer vibrancy or intensity or softness
of a colour; the sheer ambience of a particu ar place or situati n;
the sheer courage, tenacity, selfishness, etc of an historical or
fictional character; the sheer evocativeness or transporting power
of a piece of mus C; and so on. Throughout, the power of metaphor
to mix, and break the hold of, rational categories so as to invite
fresh responses might be highlighted. A teacher who valued the
poetic would give ample time to simply experience, celebrate, and
express such ways of relating to things before they get
incorporated into some cosy classification or data-base which
neutralises their particularity and tranquillises their strangeness,
by turning them into instances of generalities. In such
classification, analysis, and explanation, it is easy, too, for the
quiet beauty and wonder of things familiar and near at hand to be
covered over, for in rational ordering it is the overarching idea or
concept that sets the pace and the thing itself is in danger of
silently vanishing from view. A gross examp e of this might be
when, say, the wing quality of a particu ar colour becomes
transmuted through analysis and explanation into a mere
mathematical wavelength.
In many ways, then, the poetic outlook must be caught
rather than taught in any didactic sense. Though not simply this,
for many of the qualities and attitudes which constitute the poetic,
such as whole hearted involvement and sense of wonderment,
seem to be exhibited quite naturally by many young children, and
therefore it is often a matter of maintaining and enlarging
192
something that is already present as against introducing
something alien. Sensitive provision of opportunity, evocative
images, experiences and situations, encouragement, and genuine
(ie., open) conversation are the ways in which an appeal can be
made to the poetic aspects of a child s nature such that it can
consolidate itself and grow. Here, of course, the arts have much to
offer - if treated in the right spirit, ie., not as things to be
learnt up or evaluated in a rational/critical mode, but as things to
be entered into and felt. Free, though not undisciplined,
participation in poetry, literature, art, music, drama are vital
forms of poetic thought, as is the sense of wonderment in the face
of natural phenomena and certain human artifacts previously
mentioned. But the term "free" here now refers less to
existentialist notions of self-conscious and deliberated choice and
decision, as to uninhibited and whole-hearted involvement in
which a person is inspired by, and carried along by, their
engagement. Their thinking is uninhibited not in the sense that
any old response will do, but in the sense that it is "commissioned
by Being" - is apt to things themselves - rather than operating
through imposed systems. This capacity to enter into, and
experience wonder in, the things around us is perhaps the best
protection against the insatiable appetite for cheap sensationalism
which is its corrupted counterpart.
Nonetheless, there remains a sense in which authent c choice
remains a constituent part of poetic thinking: it is closely
associated w th the nature of this rigour of poetic thinking and
involves the quality of responsibility inherent in authentic choice
being shown towards things themselves so that they may be truly
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revealed. Some of this has already been hinted at earlier in this
chapter, but I think the issues here are particularly difficult, and
since it is not strictly necessary to enter them in order to engage
in the t pics covered in the remaining chapters, I wi 1 not pursue
them here. I have placed some discussion of them in Appendix
Two for any reader with sufficient inclination - and stamina - to
wish to take them further! 6 At this point, rather than pursuing
the arguments in more depth, it would be useful to take stock of
the position that has now been reached by drawing together some
of the diver e strands that have so far been explored.
A summary: dimensions of understanding
It is clear that thinking has many facets and that in many
ways it is best thought of as a generic term embracing
significantly different kinds which exhibit or emphasise differing
qual ties and characteristics. "Rational-calculative", "authentic",
and "poetic have been suggested as examples of such forms
which in turn give rise to differing qualities and levels of
understanding. If, then, we wished to analyze a child s existing
understandi g in order to diagnose its strengths and weaknesses
to identify where lacks and problems are arising so as to attempt
to make them good - it could be useful to examine it from the
point of view of the differing facets which our examination of
thinking has brought into view. In Figure 1 below, I have
attempted to set out some of the factors that can be constitutive of
understanding looking at it from this perspective. Clearly there
are strong possibilities of overlap with regard to the qualities
shown, and equally, which of them is appropriate w 11 depend on
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the context	 for example, that which is to be und rsto d. Tho e
components applicable to, say, a proper understandi g of a
mathematical calculation are likely to differ from those applica le
to the understanding of a poem or human relationsh p. It is,
perhaps, largely in this way that such a diagram might be of mo t
use in helping to select and identify those components which are
constitutive of the understanding that we wish to develop so that
we can more precisely evaluate what provision we are making to
engender them in the experieices we offer to children.
Figure 1. Constituents of Understanding
Public rules, standards
and conventions for
defining categories,
Specific information of terms, procedures	 Knowledge of "patterns"
public facts, evidence, data arguments, webs of
explanation, theories
Compatibility /	
/	
anti oer
informanon
reconcilability with
existing beliefs N	 undering motive,Apprecianon of its
purpose project towards
abü ty to enter nto	 UNDERSTANDING	 real ty
Empathy
Relation other / Active sympathy - bang
personal expenences /
	
\able to posiavely relate to,
accept
Active involvement I
parucipau n, sense of
responthng and respon ibilitv
Personal cogency
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Be ng affected by,
having outlook transformed,
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PART FOUR: THE ROLE OF THE TEACHER IN DEVELOPING
CHILDREN'S THINKING
CHAPTER TWELVE
THE PLACE OF STRUCTURE IN DEVELOPING CHILDREN'S
THINKING
In recent years there has been much emphasis on the need
to thoroughly structure children's work in the junior school. This
movement has largely been a reaction to what was perceived as
the excesses of child-centred or progressive education where lack
of continuity and progression were considered to pervade what
children were doing. This in turn led to many attempts to provide
m re detailed gu de- ines and schemes of work in the various
school subjects or a eas of experience" by such bodies as the
former School's Counc 1 and some Local Education Authorities so as
to ensure a more sy ematic appr ach to children s learning. And
now, of co rse, we have moved into a period where greater
national u form ty is being sought through the legislation
co tamed in the Educ tion Reform Act of 1988.
As is well known this legislation sets out a detailed national
curriculum in terms of the areas of study to be covered in all state
maintained schoo s, and the attainment targets to be achieved
within each of these areas by the end of the period of compulsory
sc oohng. Within th s broad framework various key stages have
been identified in terms of children's ages with their associated
evels" and detai ed "statements of attainment" and "programmes
of study". Related to this is a set f procedures for monitoring and
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communicating children's progress which centre on the continuous
assessment of the teacher and a battery of "standard assessment
tasks" which are adm nistered at the end of each key stage. In this
way it is intended to "raise standards" in education and to provide
a comprehensive record of what each individual child has
achieved during his or her progress through the system.
With regard to the primary age-range, which is our main
concern here, the outline arrangements amount to the following:
Each child will study the three "core subjects" of English, Maths,
and Science, and in addition the other "foundation subjects" of
Technology (including design), History, Geography, Music, Art, and
Physical Education. Further all schools must make provision for
religious education, and certain cross-curricular themes such as
those relating to Health, Environment, and Citizenship. Each of the
core and foundation subjects has its own overall targets of
attainment specifying a number of general aspects to be studied,
and each target is broken down into five or six levels felt
appropriate to span the primary age range. Each of these levels is
itself then broken down into a number of more specific
statements of attainment. It is anticipated that the average child
will achieve the attainments set out in level four by the end of his
or her junior schooling, with a range of two levels either side to
cover the extremes of the less and the more able.
Clearly we ha e here, then, a very detailed prescribed
curriculum which maps the paths of children s learning across a
broad range of subjects independently of any individual child. In
the light of previou discussion a clear and pressing question
197
arises: how compatible is this degree of pre specification with the
principles that have emerged from our consideration of the
development of authentic-rational and poetic thinking? Before
answering this question directly, I would 1 ke to locate it in a
broader framework of considerations.
Five sources of structure for children's learning.
There are a large number of considerations which intimately
affect the way children's learning is structured in the primary
school. Many are of a highly practical nature to do with, for
example, the availability of staff and equipment, the timetabling
of certain key rooms such as the hail or AVA room, the particular
published schemes that are currently on hand, etc., etc. But
underlying such practical issues there are a number of more
fundamental points of reference which decisions concerning the
structuring of children's learning draw upon. I believe that it is
possible to identify five such underlying structuring principles
that in varying degree and combination commonly serve this role,
and which it would therefore be useful to examine from the
perspectives developed in this book.
Firstly, there is what one might call the i n d i v i d u a 1
teacher's viewpoint. By this I refer to the way a particular
teacher s conception of what should be taught might influence the
content, style and direction of the children's work. It will reflect
the personal associations that the teacher makes between
different items of learning, her values, her enthusiasms, her felt
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strengths. This point of reference may sometimes determine only
the degree of emphasis placed on different aspects of what is
taught or how it is taught, but may on occasion determine m ch of
the framework for learning, as say in a project largely devi ed by
the teacher. The point is that structure is provided by the
teacher's personal perception of what is valuable, needed,
possible, enjoyable, etc.
Now in evaluating this source of structure we might be
tempted to say simply that it has the advantage of maximising
teacher commitment but the disadvantage of risking a
considerable degree of idiosyncrasy. Yet while there must be some
truth in this, it is not quite this straightforward. Let us think back
to some of the considerations raised in Parts Two and Three.
Oakeshott's view of education, for example, strongly suggests a
sense in which the teacher should be regarded as to some
significant degree an individual embodiment of the culture and
traditions into which we may wish to introduce children. Through
her individuality she exhibits a particular way in which they have
become integrated into a human 1 fe and therefore to the extent
that she is authentic she is capable of displaying to children what
an honest engagement with them might mean how they make a
difference to what we see and feel Now this can become apparent
not only in the role model she provides in her day to day
interaction with her class - important though this is - but also in
her on-going selection of content. Through this latter, by deciding
certain priorities and giving certain emphases, she can bring an
area of study into relief - a relief which expresses the life f an
area through being imbued with her life - her sense of what is
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important, problematic, analogous, interesting, fascinating or a
source of wonderment It seems to me that this potentially
important source of integration and vitality in what we present to
children should not be lightly overridden.
The second principle, or point of reference, for structuring
children s work is the structure of knowledge itself. The idea
here is that if we examine the realm of public knowledge
available to us today we will see that it has its own logical
structure of facts, concepts, and procedures, which children need
to acquire if they are to gain systematic and disciplined
knowledge and understanding. The rationalist view of knowledge
discussed in Part Two (especially that of Hirst) would be a
paradigm example of such an approach, and it is reflected in many
published schemes of work, particularly in the areas of maths and
science where children may follow a fairly prescribed path for
learning step by step, page by page, card by card. etc. (Though it
is important to recall here that such linearity of learning was
radically called into question by the more sophisticated forms of
rational sm we considered in Part Two.) This princ ple ensures
that a certain conte t is covered in a systematic way and has the
further advantage of focusing on what we may call the "depth
structure' of knowledge - the underlying concepts and procedures
that one needs to acquire in order to participate in an area of
knowledge rather than be a passive receiver of informati n only.
But as such it makes no direct reference to what is seen as
interesting or relevant by the learner. While it certainly al ows for
matching between child and task, this is seen in terms of ability
nly - and then only in narrowly conceived terms which takes
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little heed of the extent to which the child s own motivation and
quality of engagement can actually determine perceived ability.
Further, as was pointed out in Chapter Four, there is the danger of
such knowledge losing its organic feel if it is subject to a detailed
analytic dissection into compo ents, and that poetic understanding
- because intrinsically it is not susceptible to this kind of analysis
- will be heavily distorted or gnored altogether.
The third approach is what one might call the skills-
centred principle an approach which has become closely
associated with so-called "process" views of the curricu urn. Here
the idea is that there are a number of important skills that
children need to learn - relatively independently of any particular
knowledge content - which wi 1 enable them to operate effectively
in a wide range of situations and to find out, evaluate, and
generate knowledge for themselves. For this reason their
acquisition has sometimes been denoted by the epithet "learning
how to learn". The "communication skills" of reading and writing
would be a case in point, but also a wide range of so-called
"thinking skills" such as hypothesizing, interpreting, evaluating
etc, "observation skills" in art and science, "social skills required
to get on with people, down to very specific skills such as being
able to use an index or a pair of scissors. This emphasis n know-
how as against know-that often brings an overtly instrumental,
and sometimes vocational element to the structuring of children s
learning. Learning is not done for its own sake - ie. Ut of some
sense of its intrinsic worth - but as a means to s me further
purpose. Alone, this principle runs the danger of lead ng to skills
being learnt in a relatively mechanical way through lacking a
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ufficient context of understanding to guide application. Further,
as with the knowledge-centred principle, there is the danger f
them remaining unrelated to the concerns of an individual chi d so
that their value is not felt and the possession of them is n t i n
fact empowering.
Now a feature shared by each of the sources of structure so
far descnbed is that they are essentially closed: they attempt to
prescribe in advance what is to be learnt. For this reason they
lend themselves well to a way of structuring learning which sets
out clearly defined objectives which give both a strong sense of
direction, and reference points against which work can be
monitored and progress measured. This in turn can give a sense of
security in knowing that "the ground is being covered" and
facilitates clear organisation of teaching and resources. Learning
structured in this way gives the impression of having been well
thought through and efficiently administered, and clearly this
impression has appea ed strongly to the authors of the Educati n
Reform Act. The remaining two principles are potentially far mo e
open-ended in character.
The first of these is where the investigation of some real
problem or issue becomes the point of reference for what is
learnt. Such investigations may be into some aspect of the ocal
environment (eg., i sues concerning where to place a new by-pass,
the design of some local amenity, etc.), or drawn from life in ome
broader respect (eg. the plight of the Third World, endangered
species, pollution), or then again, much narrower in focus - such as
a specific maths investigation The point is that when this
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principle as umes dominance, the structure of children's work is
provided by the enquiry itself - content and direction develop
according to wherever the enquiry happens to lead.
The advantage of this approach is held to be that it endows
the work w th a realism and relevance to normal life and better
reflects the character of human endeavour. On the other hand,
depending on the particular issues chosen for investigation, it may
not cover the ground in as thorough and systematic a way as some
of the other principles of structure previously mentioned. Also, it
is important to notice that while the problem-centred approach is
clearly open-ended in a significant sense, it is not necessarily
so from the stand-point of the pupil. Certainly, precise
learning outcomes are not pre-specified - emerging rather as the
enquiry develops - but it remains the case that the problem itself
could be, and often is, initiated by the teacher, and its
development determined by his or her view of what needs to be
done. This being so, teacher- , knowledge- , skills- , and problem-
centred approaches, while providing structure in a fairly clear
sense and thus providing a fairly firm basis for planning for
coherence and continuity, of course do this only from within their
own perspective. Such perspectives - which represent points of
reference external to the learner - take little account of the
possibility that one person's coherence can be another person's
confusion, ie. that different individuals have different concerns
and learning styles, and make sense f things in different ways.1
This consideration brings me t the last of the principles I
am going to consider as a source of structure in the work of the
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child: namely that of the consciousness of the child his or
herself. By this I refer to that subjective structure of beliefs,
understandings and concerns which constitute the child S own
outlook n the world, and in terms of which he or she has
ultimately to make sense of what is learnt if it is to gain the kind
of sub ective weight discussed in previous chapters. Clearly this
principle will always be operative to some degree whatever other
sources of structure we seek to impose on the child s work. The
question it poses is the extent to which we seek to celebrate it, or
ignore or repress it - and the extent that it will therefore find
positive or negat ye expression in the child's response to the work.
From the point of view of developing thinking and
understanding it is perhaps open to two central objections. The
first is that nterpreted in the way that it has been by some
proponents of the "child-centred" or "progressive" tradition in
education it could lead to work of a very superficial nature. Our
previous d scussions on the nature and value of self expression
and authentic ty have made it clear that not any old whim or
transient interest should constitute the touchstone of learning. Nor
even, straightforwardly, the child's everyday way of being. We
may recall that it was argued that as far as possible we should be
actively seeking to identify, explore and refine those deeper
concerns which a child may have, and which in t me give an
increasing sense of personal engagement and resp nsibility in
learning.
Now in the light of these important qualificati ns might it
not be reasonable to suggest that it would be better to simply
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abandon the term 'child centred" in order to avo d inviting
unwanted associations with the laissez faire in education? I'm not
my elf convinced that this w uld be best. To begin with the great
thinkers in the child centred tradition such as Ro seau and
Dewey have never advoca ed a totally laissez faire approach.
Practices of this kind - to the extent that they have ever achieved
a reality beyond the caricatured portrayals of those ho t1e to the
tradition - have largely an en on the basis of misunderstandings
of its underlying philosophy. To abandon the term on this basis,
then, would be to provide yet another example of not allowing
issues of truth to pervert the course of dogma! But also, no really
satisfactory alternative labels come to mind. I'm not sure that
terms such as, say, "learner-centred" or "pupil-centred' either
sufficiently escape these associations, nor, very importantly, do
they do justice to the way our discussion of authent c learning
emphasised its essential relationship to life in a broader sense
than that picked out by thinking of someone as a "learner" or
"pupil". I intend, then, to stick with the term "child-centred" on
the understanding that it is to be interpreted in the qualified way
I have tried to develop.
The second objecti n is that the child-centred principle,
even thus interpreted, could clearly lead to an idiosyncratic and
narrow path of learning when viewed from the stand p mt of the
pub mc forms of knowledge But the arguments c ncerning its
strengths and weaknesses n this regard have already been
exp ored in our discussion of the issue of breadth versus depth in
children s learning and so I will not rehearse them again here.
How the child centred prmncip e might actually be br ught to bear
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explicitly in the planning of children s work is a matter that I will
return to presently.
For the moment, it is important to be clear on another p nt.
in no way is it be ng suggested that in practice the five princip es
I have sketched are mutually exclus ye. The structure of a less n,
a scheme of work, a teaching or learning episode, may be
influenced by varying combinations of these principles: it is often
more a matter of relative emphasis than exclusivity. But to grant
this does not in the least undermine the claim that such
distinctions can be made and that it is important to make them.
An awareness of them can alert us to important questi ns
concerning priorities to be given between them in differing
circumstances and ways in which they interrelate in their
contribution to developing children s thinking. The chief funct on
of these principles, then, is to serve as interrelated points of
reference in the preparation for, and analysis of, how we deve op
thinking and understanding. That they are interrelated is ea ly
demonstrated in the way that, say, the defining and investigat ng
of problems draws on knowledge a d skills, and insofar as he
teacher exercises any control over the conditions in wh ch
learning takes place, and responds to on going developments, his
or her own perception of what is needed must be operative, etc
However, this is not to deny that also there can be
significant tensions between them w ich can only be resolved by
coming to some decision as to which are the more central to the
quality of learning we should be trying to achieve in a particular
context. For example, with regard t a particular piece of learning,
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do the qualities of understanding offered by the problem centred
principle justify the extra outlay of time? Ju t how great a context
of previous knowledge and personal under tanding is needed for
such and such skill to be effectively taught? Views on such issues,
at the very general level of what counts as truly educational
learning, have been rehearsed in Parts Two and Three of this
work. I will now explore some more deta led considerations by
turning to an examination of the National Curriculum.
Structure and the National Curriculum
While there is a certain amount of variation from one
foundation subject to another, it is I think true to say that i n
general the attainment targets and statements of attainment
draw heavily on the knowledge- and skills-centred principles of
structure, whereas the programmes of study show more
recognition of problem-solving and possibly child-centred
principles. In one sense one might think that it could hardly be
any other way. How can one have specific statements of
attainment for genuinely open ended forms of structure? Is it not
quite correct to see a range of prescribed outcomes in terms of
knowledge and skills setting the objectives of education while
considerations concerning problem- and child centred principles
bear more appr pr ately on issues of met odology ' I wish to
suggest that such a view assumes too neat a distinct on between
ends and means - between the desired outcomes of education and
the procedures of education. A consideration f this issue will lead
us to address three related questions:
207
1) What is the relationship between mean and ends in the
development of children's thinking and u derstanding?
2) Is it possible to give coherent structure and sense of
direction to this development without the detailed pre-
specification of objectives of the kind set Ut in the National
Curriculum?
3) Given that all teachers in state-mainta ned schools have
to work within the legal requirements of the National
Curriculum legislation, to what extent is there scope for
them to structure children's work in the open-ended way
which the problem- and child-centred principles advocate?
The main point that I would like to make with regard to the
issue of means and ends is that unlike, say, the production of
sausages where the nature of the processing is not carried
forward as an ntegral part of the end pr duct, where the
development of consciousness is concerned, it certainly is. Indeed,
the 'outcomes" of mental development are really largely
summaries of the paths taken to achieve them. That is to say that
in the context of developing thnking and understanding, the
means are often constitutive of the ends. This can be true in two
ways: logically and experientially.
It is true logically in the sense that acquiring and
developing certain aptitudes and attitudes is only achieved by
exercising them. Imagination, or cnticalness of mind can be taught
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in no other way than by exhib t ng and practising these powers:
there is nothing separate that ne can do in dev lop ng them
which is n t an integral part of what it is have them. Thus the
quality f thinking and understanding in such cases is v.ry much
an expression of the experiences through which they were
acquired
The means can be experientially constitutive of the ends
in that the exercise of thinking often requires that we bring into
play those experiences through which previous understanding
was formed. It is a drawing upon these experiences, not some
discrete product that exists quite independently of them s in the
case of a mechanical skill such as the use of scissors which may
make no reference to the contexts in which it was riginally
learnt. (And even here, skilful cutting may on occasion involve
bringing to mind past experiences of cutting.) Similarly the
affective aspects of thinking and understanding, whose central
importance I have previously attempted to bring out in Part
Three, feed off the experiences from which they sprang. As well
as particular attitudes, ones general stance towards th ngs, are
very much a carrying forward of the past into the present and the
future.
This means, then, that the noti n that we should go about
structuring children's learning by first y identifying in detail what
the end-products are to be and t en devise the means invites too
mechanical and closed a view as to h w thinking devel p5, and an
underestimation of the intrinsic worth of the procedures (means)
themselves. That is to say, it as umes that defining ends is both
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possible and desirable with regard to how people should think,
and discounts unquestioningly the possible value of allowing the
means - ie., the procedures and intrinsic direction of on-going
experiences - to determine the ends.
Structure without stricture?
The issue of structuring work in the absence of specific pre-
specified objectives is one which now has a considerable history.
It was perhaps first brought into clear focus by the thinking of
Lawrence Stenhouse in relation to the work of the Humanities
Curriculum Project (See Stenhouse, L. 1971.) The problem that he
addressed there was that of how schools should teach
controversial issues, given that pupils were going to come up
against them and have to make judgments about them in the
world outside school. Stenhouse's point was that in the case of
genuinely controversial issues such as say, abortion, voluntary
euthanasia, war, it would be improper for a school to attempt to
specify the particular views children should hold, yet clearly they
needed to be prepared to face such issues as part of their broader
education. In this situation Stenhouse argued that the teacher's
role should be to organise discussion which was genuinely open-
ended but which reflected certain basic democratic values in
terms of its procedures. That is to say, the development of
student's thinking in these areas w uld be structured in terms of
such principles as hearing both sides of the story, being made
familiar with relevant evidence, listening to and examining each
others attempts to articulate their opinions and rationally justify
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t em It was held that such procedural principles w uld give
a certain structure and quality to the student's experience without
prejudicing the outcome in terms of the final beliefs that they
came to hold as a result of that experience.2
At the kernel of this approach, then, is the n tion that
learning can be structured without reference to objectives
conceived in terms of precise outcomes. Of course, the se ection of
procedural principles could not be made without reference to
cert in general aims in this case the understanding of the issue
and the development of independent thinking - but such aims are
themselves an expression of the ideal of openness of thought and
do not pre-specify a particular content in terms of know edge and
beliefs to be acquired. Rather they suggest what is to be built into
the quality of the experience ie., the kinds of opportunities the
experience will provide, leaving it open as to how individuals will
resp nd, and exactly what they will take away from it.
How, then might this approach be applied to the primary
school as a way of structuring children's learning on a broader
front, and so as to express the problem- and chi d-centred
principles? Below I have listed some questions that a teacher
concerned to bring these principles to bear in the way she
structures learning might ask herself as she comes to plan the
expenences she intends to provide for her class:
1. In what ways will she allow encourage individual pupils to
mit ate their learning activities (e g. through expressi n of an
Interest or concern)?
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2. When, and to what extent, will she allow/encourage pupi s to
negotiate their learning activities w th her?
3. When and to what extent will he at least consult pupils
bef re deciding what she will ask them to do (e.g. by taking them
into her confidence and explaining the underlying rationale and
relevance to them of what she intends and seeking their
opinions)?	 And to what extent w 11 she consult them after the
activity to seek their opinions regard ng its success?
4. To what extent will she allow/encourage pupils to choose how
they will follow up something that he has initiated?
5. To what extent is she prepared t allow pupils to experiment
and genuinely experience the consequences of their own deci ions
(e.g. even when they appear to be aking 'mistakes')?
6. In what ways will she provide pup ls with challenges which
arise out of, or are relevant to, their own concerns and
which will require the use of their wn initiative?
7. To what extent wi 1 she genuine y seek pupils' own feelings
and opinions and take up and bu d upon their ideas, e.g. in a
discussion situation?
8. To what extent, and under what conditions, might she be
prepared to enter "sensitive areas", for example, to explore with
children personal matters to do w h , say, concerns they may
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have about friend hip or family relati nships, m ral and
controversial social i sues, anxieties about health, illness, death?
9. To what extent will she encourage pupils to discuss and
evaluate their own progress in terms that they feel are
appropriate?
Some of these questions can further be analyzed in terms of
pupil choice concerning:
(a) resources and materials they will use;
(b) organisation of time;
(c) organisation of place;
(d) who they will work with, if anyone;
(e) which skills to employ.
It should be clear from the above list - which is not, of
course, by any means exhaustive - that the ways in which the
child-centred principle can be brought to bear in practice are
many and various, and operate at different levels, thus giving
wide scope for the teacher to decide their applicability in differing
circumstances. It is likely that the teacher, given that she
certainly cannot assume that children a) are naturally authentic,
b) will want to be authentic, c) will be encouraged to be authentic
by other agencies, w uld have to be prepared to work at some of
these aspects with considerable perseverence in at least some
cases. And she may well need to pay Just as much attent on to the
stage an individual child is at with regard to pro iding situations
for making choices, taking responsibility and engaging in deeper
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personal reflection, as she would with regard to providing work at
the appropriate level in, say, maths. But each of the questions on
the list focuses on the quality of experience provided for pupils
rather than pre-specified learning outcomes, and taken in
conjunction with the teacher s assessment of what her children
can cope with in terms of freedom, reflection and responsibility,
are capable of providing a clear source of structure for their work.
The underlying claim (as I hope has become clear from
previous discussion) is not that the other principles of structure
should be ignored - indeed, they are essential sources of content
for thinking and understanding, contributing as they do a vast
realm of knowledge and experience beyond that which the child
currently possesses - but that their educational potential can only
be realised by bringing what they offer into the ambit of the
child's own thought so that he or she can make what they offer
more genuinely his or her own Previous argument suggests that
this requires that the child's own deeper concerns play a
significant part in structuring learning, and the supposition that
we can somehoN by pass this in the interests f "efficiency" and
breadth of coverage - and still avoid superficial ty is to engage
in a convenient but dangerous myth. The truth is that if we wish
to develop children's thinking and understanding we must
structure their work in accordance with the features which are
immanent in the activities of thinking and coming to understand
themselves, rather than some separated and predefined end
product. Our stance must be to think of opportunities given rather
than precise outcomes to be achieved. (Which is not, of course, to
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deny that we may want to check what has been achieved - insofar
as this is possible. This issue is taken up in the next chapter.)
This approach to the ofstructuring learning which focuses
on the quality of experience offered is very much in keeping with
what was said concerning the appl cation for the teacher of the
constituents of understanding summarized at the end of the
previous chapter. In this broader context it would provoke
planning which centred around complementary questions
concerning the extent to which children are given opportunities to,
say, empathize, be affected by, appreciate underlying motives,
apply pubFc classificatory rules, patterns and webs of argument
etc. It would place at the centre of our planning the question: In
which contexts should we be attempting to be building such
qualities into children's learning experiences, and how can this be
married with the intrinsically more closed principles of structure?
Somehow in our planning, the latter have to be restored to the
position of being potentially enriching of authentic understanding,
ie., as desirable possibilities, rather than as a potentially
deadening straitjacket of prescribed outcomes.
Openness and the National Curriculum
We must now consider the last of our three questions: to
what degree is it possible to structure learning in this way in the
context f the National Curriculum? Clearly this will vary to some
degree across foundation subject areas. As one might expect, there
would seem to be generally more scope in areas such as English
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than in Mathematics and Science. In a moment I will consder this
in more detail, but first it is important to reassert a general point
made in Part One concerning the relationship of teachers to the
National Curriculum: they have an interpretive and
formative role to play. Strictly speaking the National
Curriculum is an abstract set of formal legal requirements which
have to be interpreted in a wide range of differing practical
situations to the benefit of the children concerned. The
helpfulness of the framework provided by the National
Curriculum is not a given, but is yet to be discovered and
d e v e 1 o p e d. It is therefore a framework which will need to
evolve in the light of professional response. If quality of
development in children's thinking and understanding is to be
enhanced, teachers will need to continue to exercise a significant
degree of autonomy in terms of how they implement it. In
particular they will need to mediate it in a way that mit gates the
possible negative effects of the extensive and detailed c mpulsory
elements on the quality of children's understanding, as I have
previously tried to explain and defend it. Interestingly, as we
shall see, certain aspects of the National Curriculum - particularly
elements in the various Programmes of Study - seem to be very
much in harmony with this, but there can be little doubt that the
strong pressures in the opposite direction will require teachers to
be very active in seeking opportunities to organise in appropriate
experiences.
By way of example, let us now consider some of the
statements of attainment in Science to see what scope there is for
structuring children's learning in the way we have been
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discussing. One thing that bec mes rapidly clear is that far from
this possibility being prohibited it is to some degree required.
For example, consider the f liowing statements of attainment
taken from levels 1-5 of Attainment target 1: Exploration of
scie ce (DES 1989a):
- observe familiar mater als and events in their mmediate
environment, at first hand, using their senses.
- describe and commun cate their observations, ideally by
talking in groups or by o her means, within their class.
- ask questions and suggest ideas of the 'how', 'why', and
'what will happen if vanety,
- interpret findings by a sociating one factor with another.
- record findings in charts, drawings and othe appropriate
forms.
- formulate hypotheses.
- identify, and describe simple variables that change over
time.
- distinguish between a 'fair' and an 'unfair' test.
- raise questions in a form that can be investigated
- construct 'fair tests'.
Such a list could clearly be construed as a deta led set of
procedural principles, and reference to the acco panying
Programme of study which suggests that such activities should
"mv l ye children and their teachers in promoting ideas and
seek ng solutions" and 'promo e at first hand the expi ration of
objects and events', only encourages such an interpretati n.
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It is true, of course, that other attainment targets are more
content specific, so we find under "Attainment target 2: The
variety of life", such objectives as 'know that plants and an mals
need certain conditions to sustain life", and under "Attainment
target 6: Types and uses of materials" .. "be able to make
comparisons between materials on the basis of simple properties,
strength, hardness, flexibility and so ubility" and "be able to relate
knowledge of these properties to the everyday use of mater als".
But even here, there seems to be a considerable degree of
openness with regard to the deta ed experiences that chi dren
may have which could develop such understandings and abil ties.
The main point to be taken from this, I think, is that in theory
many (though maybe not all) statements of attainment have i n
some degree the potential to be achieved in ways consi tent
with the approach to structuring children's learning which has
been advocated in this chapter. There is some space for this, and
even in the area of Mathematics (DES 1989b) we find uch
promising statements as "Pupils sh uld use number, algebra and
measures in practical tasks, in real-life situations, and to
invest gate within mathematics itsel ' - though the statemen of
attainment tend to be far more con ent specific and hierarchi a ly
ordered than in Science.
In the light of this assessment of the situation, it seems t me
that we are left with two crucial questions with regard t the
future of the chi d centred princ pie of structure within t e
National Curriculum. The first s whether teachers be eve
sufficiently in its value to seriou y pursue it, given that the
various elements of negotiation with children which it entails will,
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on the face f it, place extra demands upon them. The second
question is whether they will receive the necessary help in terms
of encouragement, time, and resources to support them in the
attempt.
These questions are particularly pressing in a situation
where teachers are having to cope with rapid change, and the
sheer range of demands which comprise the nine foundation
subjects with their myriad detailed statements of attainment, and
additional cross curricular themes. It is not so much that any
single element within the National Curriculum framework is
inherently hostile to the child-centred principle - though there
undoubtedly is a tension over the issue of pre-specification as
such - but that the cumulative requirements of planning,
teaching, monitoring, and reporting such an extensive and detailed
set of objectives will pre-occupy teachers to such an extent that
there is a real danger of the concerns of children simply
disappearing from view. But perhaps of equal significance, the
approach of teachers to structuring children s learning in this
context is likely to be strongly inf uenced by the forms of
assessment in terms of which their own and their children's
performance is to be judged. To this complex issue, I will now
turn.
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN
ASSESSING CHILDREN'S THINKING AND UNDERSTANDING
Some basic considerations
In Chapter Two the point was made that the very notions of
education and 'development' contain within them the idea of a
person's achieving some new, higher, standard in their thinking
and understanding. That is to say, teaching in this context is
concerned with the bringing about of some kind f desirable
change in children. If this is so, it would seem to follow that
anyone seriously involved in such teaching must be committed to
the idea of assessment in some form or other, for how else could
they judge whether this desirable change was taking place, and
therefore the extent to which their teaching was work ng? This is
not of course to deny that some important educational changes
take place that do not necessarily manifest themselves in an overt
form directly observable by the teacher. A chi d's deeper
understanding of an issue, a piece of literature or mus c, may find
no expression that can be identified and used as a measure by an
observer. Here assessment must be of the qua ity of the
procedures, materials, interaction, that are provided t facilitate
change rather than the change itself. But one way or another
assessment seems to be absolutely necessary if we are to discover
whether our teaching is doing, or is likely to be doing, any good,
and what improvements should be s ught. This being o, the main
question is not whether to assess - since to seriously engage in
the activity of teaching at all seems to require it - Ut how t 0
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assess. What form(s) should assessment take in particular
circumstances?
The aspect of assessment which focuses on the educational
potential of a situation through an analysis of the quality of
experience being provided for a child has in fact been discussed in
the previous chapter where the possibilities of structuring
children's thinking through principles of procedure were explored.
Such principles, along with others relating to the nature of the
materials being used and the resources provided, would provide a
set of criteria for analyzing and evaluating such educational
potential - As would the components of understanding offered at
the end of Chapter Eleven. This general perspective will be taken
a little further in the final chapter on teaching as poetry. In the
present d scussion, I will focus on the issue of attempting to assess
what children have learnt as against what they may have had the
opportunity to learn. That is to say I will be addressing the
following fundamental question for educational assessment: What
conditions provide the maximum opportunity for overt
responses which are a true expression of a child's
thinking and understanding?
Clearly how one sets about answering this question will
depend upon ones underlying philos phy of education - what one
values and what precisely one is trying to achieve as a teacher.
And it will be against this backcloth that three more precise
questions present themselves with regard to selecting a means of
assessme t in any particular context.
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1) Precisely what is it that you wish to assess?
- what is its nature?
- of what is it compnsed?
2) Precisely why do you wish to assess it?
- what advantages do you hope to gain?
- to what purpose will the assessment be put?
- what will hang on it?
3) What are the possible side-effects - intended and
otherwise?
- are there any dangers/reservations about
making this assessment, and in this form, in
terms of possible effects on other aspects of
what one values educationally? For example how
will it affect children's motivation, attitudes, and
the relative status of those things that can
be/are assessed as against those things that can't
be or are not?
In sum, the appropriate form of an assessment must depend upon
consideration of the nature of the thing to be assessed, your
purpose in doing so, and its possible broader consequences. In the
light of these very basic points about assessment in general, I will
now turn to the more specific issue of assessing the development
of children s thinking in the climate of expectations created by the
National Curriculum.
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Assessing authentic-rational and poetic thnking
I have tried in this thesis to describe two kinds of thinking,
and a third dimension of thinking which is in interplay with them.
Since these accounts con titute an answer to the f rst of the three
basic questions listed above, it may be helpful at this point to
summarise the position we have reached. Basically, I have tried to
make a distinction between rational-calculative thinking and
poetic thinking, each with its own project with regard to reality:
the former seeks to master reality by interpreting it through
imposing a system of defining categories which standardise things
and thus make them manageable, the latter seeks to simply reveal
reality through a direct relationship with things themselves which
is receptive to their uniqueness. The one gains organisational and
explanatory power by levelling off the particular and seeing it as
an instance of something more general, as, say, when we see a
person as being of a certain 'personality type' or exemplifying a
certain cultural background. The other gains depth of felt
response by involving itself in the here and now and thus
apprehends universals concerning eg., the human situation, that
are immanent in the present as, say, when we are moved by a
particular individual's courage or compassion wh ch deepens our
understanding of what these things can mean.
The third dimension comes into play as fo ows. Insofar as
rational calculative thinking emphasises the impersonal a pects of
thinking in the form of public conventions and standards, from
the point of view of the individual it holds within it the danger of
overlooking his or her own understanding of the ideas and
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pr cedures he or she may be employing - their subjective weight.
Thus there is a need to encourage what I have termed
authenticity of th ught, wherein individuals make what they
have learnt their own by coming to feel its value in the context f
the r own real concerns, ie, concerns, for the expression of
which, they accept personal responsibility. In this way the
use of rational think ng can become self-expressive, and when the
subjective and object ye e ements are so combined we have what
I have dubbed authentic-rational thinking
Poetic thinking , on the other hand, as I have characterised
t, necessarily involves elf-expression within itself, for at its
heart lies a relationship of direct personal response of the
ndividual to the thing being thought. The individual is attuned to
what things themselves nvoke in him with no further end in
view, though it is important to note that this is not to deny that
such attunement may well affect his understanding of, and
attitude t wards, many ther things. For example, ones m re
poetic apprehension of a situation may condition ones stance
towards rational interpret tions and explanations of it, and affect
the way one weighs a ternative reasons and evaluations in
relation to it, as, say, when the sublime subtlety of a wild flower
in the grass may j t a predisposition to see life as merely the
mechanical product of bli d evolut onary f rces.
Having thus sh rpened our focus in terms of the broad
modes of thinking we are trying to assess, let us firstly look in
m re detail at the case of authentic-rational thinking.
Examination of this iew of what it is to think and understand has
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made it clear th t what we should be trying to assess is the extent
to which chi dren have acquired publicly shared con epts and
procedures and pply them • n their experience. And in providing
this focus, it dr ws our attention to two uestions central to the
idea of assess ng the development of children s thinking.
1) What c unts as having learnt a concept?
2) Is there any necessary order in which concepts have to
be learnt?
There is much that could be said on both of these issues, but
previous discussion has drawn attention to the following
important points. Firstly, the rationalist notion of webs o f
concepts emphas ses that concepts do not exist in isolation, and
that they derive their meaning from the human activity in which
they are embedded, and which they articulate. Thus, the answer
to the first question is that we must think less in terms of the
learning of individual concepts and more in terms of initiation
into conceptual networks and the practices in which they
are embedded. From this it would seem to follow that the
degree of success here can only be displayed in how someone
organises exper ence over a relatively broad front and in a
meaningful context.
Now if this is so, and we recall the point underlined by the
notion of authenticity concerning the need f r a psychological
rather than a logical point of reference for the sequencing of
learning, a second important consideration arises. It may well turn
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out to be the case that any attempt to tightly pre-specify the
course of learning for an individual will be counter-productive.
We saw that "straight' rationalism tended to focus on the public
dimension of meaning - a point of reference which is essentially
external to the individual. But if we allow credence to the view
that understanding has a personal dimension that is a function of
the particular individual's present concerns and conception of a
situation, then effective learning will require that its precise
direction will be significantly shaped by the learner. Thus the
route that an individual will follow cannot be prescribed, but will
result from an on-going process of negotiation within a situation.
If this is the case, there are some important consequences for the
assessment of authentic-rational thinking.
Firstly, assessment will need to be retrospective in
character. While it may be possible to pre-specify the area to be
assessed in general terms, eg., by indicating some of the central
concepts and procedures which characteri e it, selecti n of precise
elements and levels can only be made with hindsight. That is to
say, an appropriate assessment must take as its po nt of reference
an evaluation of the potential of the experience that the children
actually had. This is not, of course, to say that it should simply
replicate such experience - far from it. We should recall here the
point made by Wittgenstein (Chapter Five) that understanding is
only demonstrated when a person shows that they can apply what
they have learnt in situations which are new to them. The point is
that it is only in the light of such a looking back that we can
establish fitting criteria for testing what has been learnt, for the
detailed course of the child's learning cannot be predicted if he or
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she is active in shaping it. Thus while assessment may rightly take
place within the context of a broad framework of general
att inment targets, it must be designed to reflect the real
learning experience and not prescribe it.
Secondly, it would seem to follow that assessment shou d aim
to take a form in which children perform in situations which are
as "natural" as possible. That is to say, it should have as its focus
episodes which have a psychological continuity with the
children's own concerns and conceptions. Quality of learning is
most trenchantly measured according to the degree of novelty of
the situation in which it is having to be applied, and the
opportunities it offers for application of the web of concepts
(rather than one member) in a context that has intrinsic
meaning to the learner. This last consideration is perhaps
particularly endangered when heavy emphasis is placed on
attempting to standardise assessments.
Thirdly, as Christian Schiller (1946) once claimed, assessment
should be of children "in the round". The ability to give a formal
statement of the criteria for a concept, to match terms with
definitions, and to recognize instances in a prescribed situation,
says little concerning the extent to which children have made such
an aspect of understanding their wn. To judge this authentic
quality, we need to take the trouble to see how it has bec me
incorporated into their normal way of gong about things - how it
affects their outlook and their lives. To what extent d they
employ out of their own volition concepts and procedures
they have learnt? That is to say, we need to observe what
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difference their learning makes to them as individuals. As we
have noted, develop ng children's thinking is not a purely
c gnitive matter, it is centrally concerned with attitudes and
dispositi ns, and asses ment which does not reflect this is of very
lim ted value, f r it tel s us nothing about the meaning of w at
has been learnt for the learner. These considerations, taken
together, seem to argue powerfully for forms of assessment wh ch
are either illuminative descriptions of the child's developing way
of identifying and deal ng with problems, or more standardised
test material which has become an integrated part of the child's
on-going work.
Let us now consider some of the implications for the
assessment of the deve opment of children's thinking, which ur
consideration of the poetic raises. Clearly, it would seem to
reassert the great imp rtance of aspects of thought which are not
readily developed n a t ghtly structured way, and which are
notoriously diffic U to ssess objectively. Poetic thinking demands
a kind of personal invo vement which cannot be standardised and
pre specified because, in essence, it consists of forms of unique
sub ective response which require openness and freedom. And it
follows from this that it requires a teaching relationship which is
itself poetic in character, such that what an individual brings to
the situation is respect d in its own right and is developed in
ways that maintain its inner integrity But as I have previou ly
been at pains to empha ise this is far from saying that whate er
response a child may have is simply to be indulged (and theref re
likely ossified and stultified): it has to be challenged and
deepened, but in ways which are an empathetic response to t at
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individual, nd whch we therefore can ot map out in advance. It
is not that there are no standards in this area, but rather that
they are of a qualitatively different kind to those employed in
rational calculative thinking.
Let me illustrate this, and its consequences for assessment,
by using a familiar example. Consider the development of, say, a
child's creative writing. Clearly this depends upon the acquisition
of many basic social conventions to do with the shared meanings
of words, grammar, symbolism etc. whose use can be assessed to
some extent "objectively". But also, we feel able to make
judgments concerning the quality of such a piece of writing which
go beyond the correct application of conventions, yet are not
thereby purely arbitrary. Here, such standards as we employ are
themselves subservient to something more fundamental, namely
the inner integrity of the piece - the extent that it reveals the felt
reality of its subject. That is to say conventions are employed, and
standards are applied, in the service of expressing and invoking a
fresh and direct response to things themselves. It is this
relationship of open awareness which is the final point of
reference, the ultimate standard. And this itself is infinite in
terms of its variation, and cannot be standardised. Thus truly
creative wr t ng is always a manifestat on of a vital and receptive
involvement with a situation or thing, and it is for this reason that
a piece wh ch displayed perfect grammar and syntax, richness and
breadth of vocabulary, could come across as hackneyed and
somehow second hand when compared with another piece which
consisted of a few simple lines.
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And what is true here, is, I suggest, as true in analogous
ways for quality of th nking in many other areas of the arts and
humanities, and also, importantly, in the area of interpersonal
relati nships. Ultimate y, there are no recipes, no prescripti ns,
there is no "method", and therefore no pre-specifiable outcomes in
terms of which the qua ity of poetic thinking can be mechanically
measured. On the contrary, those who would assess such thinking
must themselves be prepared to enter into the
experience - the relationship - in which it occurred. To
assess the development of children's p etic thinking, then, must
involve an empathetic relationship with the individual child his or
herself, for what we are attempting to evaluate is genuineness of
self-expression, where this latter term denotes not a self-centred
indulgence, but a demanding and creative relationship with things
- a receptive, and therefore genuinely personal response.
In having our attention drawn to the empathetic and
receptive role of the teacher in developing a child's poetic
th nking - and therefore to the openness and unpredictabil ty of a
learning episode - it can be seen that any "test' of such thinking
needs to be modifiab e by the participants during the progress of
the test. Only through a significant degree of such interaction
with the form of assessment can the pupil s own under tanding
come into play in such a way as to allow on-going psychological
continuity and the demonstration of her capacity for creative
response to the situation (which itself becomes modified in line
with the pupil's evolving conception of it).
230
Similarly, it will be highly d sirable f r the teacher, thr ugh
oral and other contributions, to be able to elicit fuller and deeper
responses from p pus and to be ab e to modify the test so as to
a ow it to build upon these and t us reflect more accurately the
qual ty of understanding of the children. This facility, then, is not
merely to safeguard aganst inaccuracy of assessment an ing from
ambguit es or vagueness in the descr ption of a situation (w ch,
in a test where some depth and creativity of response is sought,
can never be totally circumvented in abstraction from the
particular interpretation brought by the participants), it is
required to enable fullness of response which may indicate the
extent to which the pupil has made what she knows her own, and
how it has affected her outlook to a situation.
But now, if, because of its open and highly subjective nature,
it is clear that there cannot be a narrow and tightly pre-specified
set of standards to refer to with regard to poetic thinking, the
question arises as to how we are to assess children's progress here
at all. What seems to be needed is an understanding of a wide
range of loose textured potential cr teria which can be called
into play as appropriate to evaluate a particular response - to be
interpreted in ways that reflect the inner integrity of that
response Such potential criteria would include degree of vita •ty,
perceptiveness, sensitivity, freshness of expression, aptness,
engagem nt, empathy
	 with subject, atmosphere, integrity, depth
of	 meaning,	 revealment,	 truth,	 self-expressiveness,
ima mat veness, effectiveness of im gery and symbolism, etc. As
previous y mentioned, such evaluation will largely rest 	 n an
intuitive entering into the work and would need to be
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accompanied by the pupil's own v ew of his or her achievement.
In the same way as one can often only convey the quality of a
poem or novel by quoting extracts because its quality lies
precisely in its particular and unique expression which is
therefore not quant fiable in any straightforward sense of that
term, so it would eem that the progress in the development of
children s p etic thinking will be best conveyed by the collection
of selected examples of children's responses together with
appropriate scene-setting and evaluative comments, which could
then be compared over a period of time. Judgements might then
be made which mv l ye some degree of re-entry into the situation
which provoked the pupil's response.
Resume: criteria of assessment
Let me n w summarise the view of assessment we have
reached. In the light of the distinctions I have made, I have
suggested a number of features which forms of assessment which
would genuinely reflect the development of children's thinking
would possess. From a consideration of authentic rational thinking
arose the importance of assessments which assess understanding
of webs of concepts, are retrospective in orientation, hold
psychological continuity and intrinsic meaning for the
learner, and reflect the way what has been learnt affects the
learner's own way of dealing with problems in their
everyday living. Our exploration of the notion of poetic thinking
has suggested the desirability of assessments which are open-
end e d, modifiable by the participants through	 their
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evolving interaction with a situation, and involve the empathetic
sharing of particular responses by the assessor. It is
important to note that although these latter requirements arose
out of a consideration of the nature of poetic thinking, there is a
highly significant sense in which they are appropriate to the
assessment of any thinking, since if we wish to achieve
assessment in any full educational sense we must be
significantly concerned with the progress of unique individuals in
their own understanding of what they have learnt. This need for
genuine receptiveness to the individual child means that
educational assessment itself, therefore, has an integral
poetic dimension. Once acknowledged, this clearly has huge
implications - most of which run counter to the current drive to
produce standardised scores. Finally, such considerations taken
together have suggested that assessment will be most illuminating
where:
1] it arises out of an on-going learning situation and is an
integral part of it;
2] it draws on real concerns of the participants;
3] it parallels but does not simply repeat previous classroom
situations and tasks.
Assessment and the National Curriculum
Much of the current concern in primary schools with
assessment of pupil performance has been provoked by the
demands for monit ring the achievement of National Curriculum
attainment targets and more detailed statements of attainment. It
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is difficult to say very much concerning the specific requirements
of the National Curriculum in this regard at present as they are in
a state of flux both in terms of their scope and form. For example,
at the time of wnting an increase in the prop tion of "pencil and
paper" tests is being advocated on the grounds of ease of
administration and economy of resources. However the underlying
principles which were to guide assessment in the National
Curriculum are set out in the report of the Task Group on
Assessment and Testing (TGAT) (DES, 1988) ' and examples of
what are considered to be suitable tests are described in
Appendices D and E of that report. Since one of the central
aspirations of this report was to produce a framework for testing
which would avoid many of the well known pitfalls in the area, I
intend, in the final part of this chapter, to look at these proposals
from the point of view of the criteria for assessment which have
emerged from our fore going discussion. The likely effects of any
future deviation from the TGAT proposals - particularly in the
direction of streamlining tests for ease of adm nistration 	 will, I
think, become very apparent in the course of this discussion.
The first thing to note is that it is clear (and hardly
surprising) that the tests described in the TGAT Report focus on
rational-calculative thinking in its various forms. All the tests,
when they rise above the level of basic comprehension, set
problems to be solved, albeit of a wide variety and involving
differing modes of presentation, operation, and response. Indeed,
in the school context, perhaps the very notion of a "test" implies
this calculative orientation towards the nature of thinking, since it
commonly denotes evaluation in accordance with a carefully pre-
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spec fied set of pub! c standard . Be this as it may, t is is clearly
the case with the "standard assessment tasks" - "SATS" - with
which the report is concerned, for as their name suggests, their
purpose is to provide common points of reference in the
moderation of more informal on going assessments made by
mdiv dual teachers.
Now if we consider such tests in the light of the criteria of
adequacy previously set out, one welcome feature of many of the
tests described in the report is the importance attached to group
discussion of the problem set. This has two virtues fr m the point
of the view expressed in this chapter. Firstly, it enhances the
possibility of the pupil's understanding of the web of interrelated
concepts being brought to bear in working towards a solution;
secondly, it may facilitate some degree of psychological continuity
(albeit, in a weak sense) through calling into play previous
experience and concerns. Both of these considerations are likely
to be best accommodated in what TGAT refers to as " ntegrating
tests', exemplified in Appendix D, which consist of a series of
evolving tasks (eg investigations into the properties and uses of
various materials) which could form an integrated part of the on-
going work of a class.
Again, psychological continuity and intrinsic mean ng for the
pupil could well be retained to some degree in tests who e specific
content consisted of subject matter and situations which are
commonly of interest to the group being tested, eg perhaps
"animals" for younger children, though better still wou d be a use
of SATs which maintained a fairly constant form in term of skills
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and underlying concepts involved but which allowed of some
substitution of differing specific subject content - to be
determined by the teacher in the ight of her knowledge of the
concerns of her pup is. Finally, from the point of view of
appropriate testing of rational-ca culative thinking, the notion
str ngly emphasised in the TGAT Report of teachers being able to
select from a bank of SATs, might allow some scope f r the
criteria of attainment being selected retrospectively, so as to
reflect the actual learning experiences of a particular group of
children, though clearly this will largely depend on the range and
imaginativeness of the tests "stocked".
The above features are, then, generally to be welcomed, and
some of my comments intimate ways in which considerations
raised by the notion of poetic thinking have a bearing upon, and
could lead to exploring, ways in which pupil participation n the
assessment could become more interactive. But so far I have only
considered the Report's recommendations for assessment from
the point of view of rational-calculative thinking, and the poet c
role of the teacher in facilitating ts authent c development. With
regard to the issue of the assessment of the development of poetic
thinking per Se, clearly the notion of a standard assessment task
would need to become even more tenuous, and is perhap best
abandoned altogether. If this is in fact the view of those who
compiled the TGAT Report, it is to be applauded - as long a , that
is - this does not carry with it the practical consequence that the
development of children s poetic thinking becomes viewed as
being of lesser importance, and tha assessment of progress in this
area need not receive proper atten ion. It may be that here there
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will be a pressing need for teachers to engage in what Charles
Bailey has called "artful subversion" if the place in the curriculum
of aspects of education that are not susceptible to standardised
measurement is not to be undermined.
By way of conclusion I would like to make a final comment
on the implications of taking assessment of chi dren's thinking
seriously. It is only too evident that if we really wi h to assess the
development and quality of children's thinking in either its
rational-calculative or poetic modes, this is like y to be time-
consuming, require sensitive and skilled judgment, and will often
not produce results that are straightforward and easily
understood by people external to the teaching situation. Real
assessment of children's thinking will rarely produce a simple set
of grades and will be seriously corrupted by any attempts to
impose such reductionism. Now these features are not criticisms of
such assessment, but criticisms of some of the purposes to which
some people have seemed to wish to put assessment (eg., as a
cheap and public way of maintaining standards, making easy
comparisons of quality f education between teachers, or schools
etc.). Both the large resource implications, and the strict
limitations on the extent to which assessment of children's
thinking can be used as a yardstick for purposes external to the
educative process itself, must be honestly acknowledged if what
should be a spur to m re effective teaching is n t to be turned
into a distorting and vacuous charade.
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CHAPTER FOURTEEN
TEACHING AS POETRY
Towards a philosophy of teaching
In this final chapter I would like to try to draw together a
number of points which have emerged in a rather piecemeal way
during the course of this thesis, but which seem to me to provide
a coherent philosophy for teaching with regard to the
development of children's authentic thinking and understanding.
It may be recalled that in a number of places I have made
mention of the idea of there being a poetic element to the
teacher pupil relationship in which authenticity of thought is
being encouraged. Similarly, the notion arose again in the context
of assessment which seriously seeks to reflect an individual s true
understanding. What lies at the bottom of these suggestions is a
claim which is fundamental to poetic th nking itself, namely, that
to reveal an individual in its uniquene	 one's stance has to be
basically receptive-responsive, rather than manipulative. One
has, in the first instance, to listen non-judgmentally ie., non-
evaluatively, if the thing or person is to be self-expressive, and
thus authentically known.
But, as we have noted, teaching not merely a matter of
being receptive to what is there, it is c ncerned with the bring ng
about of desirable change, ie., development. That is to say it is a
form of building -
	
a form of bui ding which respects the
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integrity of the self of the learner and the nature of the th ngs to
be learnt. It has to be somehow both accepting and demanding. I
have previously used the term "empathetic challenging" to
denote this idea. I would now like to say a little more about it.'
In many approaches to education, and life in a more general
sense, there has been a tendency to reflect an enduring
philo phical dichotomy between the subjective and the objective,
personal feeling/intuition and public rationality, what is present
"in the mind" and what is present "in reality". This is in part, the
history of a dialectic between classicism and romanticism which,
in turn, has underpinned the educational debate between
traditionalism and progressivism - the one taking the structure of
objective, public, knowledge as its main point of reference, the
other taking the consciousness of the learner as its main point of
reference. While there have been varying attempts to overcome
this dualism, in many cases they have not really succeeded
because they have either fallen back into it, or attempted to
reduce everything to one or other pole - as in the cases of
philosophical materialism and idealism. How then, does the idea of
poetic thinking help in this regard? How can it help to restore a
proper balance between the subjective and objective poles in the
devel pment of thinking and understanding? It does this, I
suggest, by encouraging us to focus not on the poles, but the
relationship between them. That is to say it predispo es us to
take as primal the relationship between teacher and learner, and
learner and what is to be learnt.
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It is the quality of these relationships, which in effect form a
triad, that should be the central concern of those who wish to
promote the development of children's thinking. The elements of
this triadic relat onship are n thing independently of it, t ey are
sustained only insofar as they remain expressions of it.
Existentially, there is no teacher in the absence of a learner and
something to teach; there is no learner in the absence of
something to be learnt; and there is nothing to be learnt in the
absence of a learner. Put more generally - and starkly - things
have no significance in the absence of consciousness and
consciousness has no existence in the absence of things, for it
precisely consists in its relating to them.
Our starting point for a theory of effective learning has to be
the actual experience of learning. Experience is the name we give
to the relationship between consciousness and things in their
mutual reaching towards each other. Thats what they are: a
mutual reaching out, elements-in-relationship. When we are
struck, say, by the bnlliance of a colour, the heaviness of a rock,
the solidity of a building, the s ft ess of a fabric, the appe I of a
story, the magnificence of the heavens or a mountain, the e egance
of a proof or theory - all these qualities of things, that make
them what they are, are neit er simply human projections
(there's a clear sense in which we regard them as belonging to the
thngs themselves), nor simply independently existing pr perties
(they exist as such - stand forth - only in being apprehended by
consciousness), but are expressions of the relationship in which
consciousness and things are rooted From this perspect ye the
240
rt
1
e en al relati nship in which h activiti s
	 f t a h g are rooted
can be represented dia rammatically as foil ws
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The triadic relationship.
If we take, then, the quality of this triadc relationship as
primal, we have to look at the quality of ts openness, and the
extent to which it is free to follow its own path and establish its
own goals in the light of its own constantly ev l ying needs. From
this perspective, facil tating learning requires the teacher to
"listen" for what is incipiently there in the consciousness of the
pupil - the questions and possibilities tha his or her present
thinking inherently holds within itself - and to chal enge him or
her to acknowledge and pursue them. To do this t e teacher mu t
also "listen" to what th ngs themselve ( ncluding, of course,
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human culture and its artefacts) have to offer so that she can put
the pupil in the way of new experiences which may contribute t
a deeper and broader understanding. Thus she is attempting t
f cus on neither the individual child in isolation, nor some pre-
specified piece of knowledge, but the engagement of children
in whatever seriously occupies them - the r way of relating
in a situation, and what is provoking it. In the light of her own
knowledge and experience, she can thus try to help the child t
identify and explore what calls to be thought in this situation
and to give the space for this to occur.
Since I am here advocating a stance towards teaching which
takes as a central point of reference the quality of particular
learning situations it is difficult to be very specific about exactly
how the teacher should operate. There must be considerable scope
for professional judgement here. Indeed, this is f the essence. But
there are some features of this stance which can be sketched out a
little more fully. For example, it is clear that d scussion will be an
important element of this approach and that the sorts of question
asked in order to stimulate it would need t be of a certain
character - essentially focusing on the qual y of relationship
between learner and what he or she is learning rather than
assumed end-products that the teacher may have in mind. They
would therefore tend to be of the following variety:
How are you getting on?
What do you feel about this?
What made you decide to do it this way?
How do you know?
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What else did you think of?
What was the hardest thing here?
How could you deal with this problem 7
 etc, etc.
Such an approach to questioning has been termed "person-
centred" because it focuses on the learner's actions, ideas and
problems rather than the subject matter as such, and provokes
the child to articulate how he is engaging with the situation, to
justify his ideas, to reflect on problems. (See, for example, Elliott,
J., & Adelman, C. 1975.) But it seems to me that it is important for
the teacher to further challenge thinking by on occasion offering
something of her own response to the situation - pointing out
features that strike her as significant - but again, in relation to
aspirations expressed by the learners in their own
engagement with the material rather than in terms she simply
wishes to impose on them. Through this she would be able to help
children to become aware of more than what may be immediately
apparent to them - in terms, for example, of the fullness of what
is present, what it could be taken to exemplify, relationships to
other things they have learnt, and of possible alternatives through
offering the views and experiences of others who have been
engaged in a similar enterprise (drawn perhaps from the history
of the discipline, or work that other children in the class have
done). In other words she will attempt to bring out some of the
further possibilities of the situation, a sense of the fuller
potential that the engagement holds within it.
Now of course a crucial aspect of all this will be the spirit in
which it is done - and received. It needs to occur in a spint of
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offering ra her than prescribing - and offering out of a sense of
what things themselves demand rather than purely out of the
teacher s personal preferences or anxiety to cover some externally
pre spec ied content. That is to say there is an important
impersonal e ement to the relationship in which the tea hers
c ntribut ons arise out of her sense f something other than
herself. her sense of things themselves in the traditions in which
they have achieved their significance. Thus such interaction is not
in anyway about indulging the egos of those involved, but about
getting c oser to truth, an understanding rooted in responsiveness
and resp ns bility to what is there. Harking back to the distinction
made when we were discussing authenticity: self-referencing, yes,
but not se f-centredness - on the part, now, of both pupil and
teacher.
Th s last reference brings back to mind another important
aspect of t e interaction between teacher and child: the need to
w an the child away from "crowd" re pon es. In the educational
situati n the riadic relationship I have introduced into our
d scussi n t is chapter offers, I think, an important perspective
on this ss e. It begins to make it clear that personal meaning",
subject ye weight" is not purely a personal matter; it occurs as
part of a arger relationship in which things themselves and the
views and experiences of other people are also involved. Thus in
helping he ch id to identify and discover his deeper concerns -
o es for w ich he feels a sense of responsibility - the teacher s
r e is prec sely this: to point him at things which he can recognise
as relevant, but not simply in the sense of what satisfies
im ed a e whim or curiosity, rather in the sense of what makes a
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call up n him, what demands something from him, what he feels
(however embryonically) needs a response arising from his own
sense of the nature of the thing he is dealing with.
And, clearly, the role of the teacher here in helpng the child
explore his concerns is not to jump in for him and hand him back
his problems ready sorted out. By taking over someone's concerns
and problems in this way one throws them out of position -
disengages them - leaving them to mentally "free wheel"
aimlessly while at the same time becoming dependent and
dominated. Rather, by attending to the enterprise itself, one helps
the child to understand himself in his care - in his "relationship-
with" - to grasp it more adequately and work towards his own
provisional solutions. Thus he becomes liberated through being
more deeply situated in his relationship with things - through the
enhancement of his ability to receive and to respond. In this way
he is given positive freedom rather than the negative freedom of
thoughtless non-intervention that has become associated with
some forms of child-centred education.
In this way, too, teaching can become what one might term a
form of "poetic building" - a f rm of building which expresses
respect and harmony rather than manipulation and imposition.
Such teaching would have as its central concern the organic
growth of individuals in their own relationship with the world,
and not to process them in accordance with norms that are
external to them. Yet, nonetheless, it would be concerned, too, to
help them feel the call for themselves of what is there to be
thought. This at least would be the ideal. But, of course, it is well
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known that teachers do not operate in circumstances where pure
ideals flourish. So what is the point of all this in real terms? How
can it make a difference to anything?
Ideals and practice
It would be disingenuous to advocate such an educational
ideal as teaching as poetic building without discussing some of the
obvious practical issues that it throws up in schools as we
presently know them. It is probably true that we are entering a
period when the formal constraints on teachers' freedom and the
explicit demands on an individual teacher's time and energy are
greater than at any period since the turn of the century when the
system of payment by results was in operation. How then, is the
ideal of poetic openness and building to find practical expression
in such a situation? Before attempting to answer this question
d rectly I must make clear some important points concerning the
nature and function of educational ideals.
The first - and central - point is that it is not in the nature of
an ideal that it be perfectly attainable: it is not the functi n of an
ideal to provide a fulfillable objective, but rather to provide a
sense of direction and underlying purpose. An ideal
indicates a path one may wish to tread rather than a destinati n
to have arrived at. Two things follow from this. The fir t is that
the extent to which anyone achieve an ideal is always a matter of
degree. Sometimes one may not get very far, but the assumption
would be that it is better to get some of the way than none of the
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way. The second is that one measures success not imply in terms
of how far one gets, but equally in terms of the conditions under
which one is "travelling . In uncongenial circumstances to travel a
chort way deserves to be a source of considerahle saticfaction.
Many teachers have a well developed sense of what counts as a
real achievement for a particular child which takes proper account
of where that child is starting from. This is prec ely the stance
that needs to be adopted in gauging their own performance in
terms of an ideal. It is lack of realism in the application o f
ideals, rather than lack of realism in the ideals themselves, that
leads to frustration and disillusionment in practice - which in
turn can so easily form a (false) basis for dismiss ng them out of
hand.
A second very important point is that it is not the function of
ideals to provide recipes for teaching. How, in detail, one is to
teach cannot be simply determined by an ideal, which by its very
nature exists independently of a particular teaching situation.
Indeed, as was noted in Chapter Three, there are s mply too many
context-dependent variab es in teaching to permit the successful
use of any off-the-shelf recipes. An ideal provides a sense of
purpose which is one consideration to be brought nto play along
with many others in making practical decisions ab ut what to do.
That is to say, how an ideal is to find expression in a particular
teaching context - the extent to which it should even come into
play - is a matter of the creative response of the teacher involved.
It wi 1 need to take acc unt not only of such objective features of
a situation as resources and externally imposed constraints, but
the disposition of the children and the teacher's own strengths
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and weaknesses and level of confidence. There are always going to
be many compromises, and the thing to be aimed for is to stnke
the best compromise under the circum tances. Teachers never
start with a blank slate upon which to simply etch high flown
ideals, they always take up an on-going situation to which they
often have to re pond in a piecemeal way over a period of time.
Indeed sometimes the most effective way of working towards an
ideal is to use it as a criterion in term of which one evaluates
past and present practice and in the light of this propose small but
significant changes to try in future. That s to say, ideals are often
best pursued through gradual evolution rather than revolution,
and in this process they may themselves become reinterpreted
and refined in the light of new experiences and deeper
understanding of particular contexts that the attempt to express
them can itself provoke. For to seek to actively promote an ideal
can lead us to a k new questions, see existing practice from new
perspectives, re conceptualize old problems and become alert to
new soluti ns 2
Practical organisation
Given this understanding of the way an ideal functions in
terms of practical decision making, let us now turn to the issue of
p anning and organising for teaching as poetic building. The first
thing that I should like to emphasise is that there is nothing
particularly esoter c involved here. Focu ng on the quality of the
openness in the triadic relationship between teacher, learner, and
that which is to be learnt, broadly requires three things:
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1) To establish as clearly as possible wh t is, in tially at
least, negotiable and what is non-negot able about one's
situation. In a context
	 of increasing formal requirements
placed upon teachers, what real freedo to respond to
individuals remains? Discussion in Chapter Twelve suggests
that there is no blanket answer to this question and that we
need to examine different aspects individually, and in terms
of degree of possibility rather than all or nothing.
2) To gain a clear understanding of, and feel for, the
procedural principles involved in structuring and monitoring
openly developing situations, as discussed in the previous
two chapters.
3) To develop strategies for the practical management of
such situations and the organisation of res urces.
It seems to me that the poetic approach has both its advantages
and its challenges in these practical respects. It will be helpful to
outline these as a preliminary to looking at ways of approaching
more specific practical problems.
The practical advantages of the poetic approach are as
follows: the teacher is released from the stress nvolved in
maintaining an appearance of being "all-knowing and totally "in
charge"; as children grow in confidence in their own thoughts and
ideas, so the teacher is released from the m 11 of having to
constantly provide them with inspiration; the teacher becomes a
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learner a co worker with its concomitant satisfactions in terms
of receiving from the situation as well as giving to it; children
become less demanding of teacher time in terms of petty
instructions as they learn to use the r own initiative and take on
more responsibil ty for their own learning. The main problems
are, I think, a oss of the sense of security that a carefully pre-
specified set of objectives can provide; the loss of convenience of
pre-packaged schemes of work; the difficulty in anticipating - and
therefore providing - relevant resources; anxieties about
monitoring progress.
How are such problems to be overcome? Solutions are clearly
going to be very context specific, but perhaps the first thing to be
said is that the poetic approach suggests a change of attitude
towards the problems themselves. They become regarded less as
obstacles to be overcome in order for learn ng to occur, and more
as sources of learning in themselves. The notion of co-
responsibility and working with children rather than upon them
suggests that finding practical solutions to at least some of these
problems is an integral part of de eloping children s thinking and
that they therefore need to be brought mt such decision-making.
In this way they will be able to share the teacher's concerns and
benefit from rich opportunities to develop their own practical
judgment in matters which are of prime concern to them. In this
way, too, their thinking can become rooted in the realities of
situations where compromises have t be negotiated and
responsible foresight and planning have to be exercised. With this
in mind, let us consider some practical suggestions for enabling
such co responsibility and particip t on.
250
Firstly, it will presumably be important for the teacher to
have a clear idea of the likely practical opportunities and
constraints under which the work will generally have to be
undertaken - such things as availab ity of rooms and other school
based re ources, notice needed to obtain material from the local
library, to arrange day trips etc. Secondly, it will be important to
allow sufficient time for proper di cussion and negotiation of the
area of work itself, and for it to be properly resourced. While
clearly, for the many reasons rehearsed throughout this book, it
would be quite inappropriate to attempt to provide a universal
procedure for the practical organisation of such work, the
following represents an example of but one such approach - and
one that I have seen used to good effect with a class of seven to
eight year olds - which might be considered and adapted (or
rejected! according to circumstances.
Having established through d scussion the general character
of an enterprise in terms of its broad aspirations and content, the
class might be divided into groups to consider in more detail their
own interests, and the possible requirements of different
elements in terms of skills and knowledge, time and resources.
(They may well record their ideas in their own webs or flow
diagrams etc.) The results of these discussions could be brought
back to the class as a whole for further evaluation in terms of
their rationale and feasibility, and sts of preparatory tasks could
be made with responsibility be ng assigned to appropriate
individua s or groups. Depending on the extent of the enterprise,
such pre minary discussions might take place before a weekend,
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r a shorter school holiday such as half term or Christmas, so that
there is proper opportunity for all involved to get together
whatever is needed before the project proper gets under way. In
this way everyone has the chance t develop a feel f r t e w rk
and a responsible attitude towards it in terms of its demands and
practical constraints, Of course, as new opportunities and
problems arise during the progress of the work solutions will need
to be negotiated between the interested parties and compromises
worked through. Throughout, the role of the teacher would be to
support, provoke, challenge, in the ways previously discussed in
order to enhance the quality of children's engagement and
understanding.
But, now, can young children handle this? I suspect there
can be no general answer to this. No doubt some will better than
others and we must simply be careful not to make quick
assumptions on the matter. There is certainly considerable
evidence to suggest that even pre school children can, given the
right kind of supp rt, engage in the procedures of plan, do,
review" in quite a systematic way and thus take some expl cit
responsibility for the organisation of their learni g. 3 But
whatever the possibilities here, all children need to learn to begin
to take on such responsibility one way or another - and in degrees
compatible with their capacities - if they are to begin to develop
the qualities of thinking a genuinely free society demands. Of
course many children exhibit precisely these qualities naturally
enough and to a lesser or greater extent in play situat ons, and
provided the attitude of the teacher is such that she appreciates
the value of learning to discuss and negotiate, to exercise
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judgement and choice, to accept personal resp nsibility and the
wide range of attitude that go along with this - that is to say, to
achieve a degree of authentic understanding - as being at least the
equal of ihe learning of "subject matter", there eems to be every
reason for extending this activity into the "ser ous' work of the
classroom. But, in truth, this way of speaking is itself now
somewhat misleading It is in danger of re-erecting the old
dichotomy of child and subject matter when the burden of what I
have been trying to convey from the poetic perspective is the
essential relationship between learner and what is to be learnt.
It is an attempt to pr vide a re-interpretation of what it is to b e
a "learner" and what counts as "subject matter", in a truly
educational situation, which overcomes this dichotomy.
To draw things to a conclusion, one of the central points
about the poetic appr ach to teaching, then, is that it provides a
stance for dealing w th problems which makes them the shared
concern of both teacher and pupils, and works towards an
openness in which they are resolved in ways which draw upon
the ideas of all concerned. The resolution of arising problems
through this kind of social relationship gives both a sense of
ownership and responsibility to all involved and an increased
likelihood of solutions which are genuinely tailored to the
situation which they have to meet. In eschewing pre-
specified perceptions f situations and stock answers, in listening
to and freely responding to the subtle nuances of particular
situations in the senses previously developed, t e teacher is not
thoughtlessly pursuing some impractical and irrelevant ideal, but
facing up to reality in a fuller sense. How well she will cope with it
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will, as always, remain to be seen, but at least she and her pupils
will be honestly attending to the truth of their situation. And,
ultimately, there is no other path to secure the development of
those central aspects of thinking and understanding which have
been the concern of this thesis.
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3. See the research of Blackburn and Mann cited in Robins, K., and
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whole provides an interesting commentary on the striking lack of
skills that modern industry requires of its operatives.
4. This point was recognised by the National Curriculum Council
soon after the inception of the National Curriculum in it's
publicati n Curriculum Guidance One: A Framework for the
Primary Curriculum (1989). Para 2.11 states that "It is not
appropriate, or desirable, in the Council's view, that all primary
schools should follow the same pattern of curriculum organisation.
Schools ary in so many respects that such an approach would be
unlikely to succeed". Then again under "Key Issues" (para 3.3i) it
states that "More effective and coherent learning will take place
throughout a school where there is...a shared understanding of,
and comm ttment to, curricular goals and "...real participat on of
all staff in curriculum policy making'. And finally, in its
Conclusion we read: "It is headteachers and teachers who will
translate the National Curriculum into opp rtunities for learning
and it is only through the imaginat ye application of pr fessi nal
skills that standards will rise".
5. The imp rtance of pursuing alternatives to commonly accepted
truths - and the broader relevance of this to the welfare of a
liberal democratic society as a hole - received its classic
statement n J. S Mill's attack on "de d dogma" in On Liberty, Chs.
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2 and 3. Here Mill argued forcefully that accepted tru hs should
be subject to on-going critical evaluation from alternative
perspectives since if they cannot be defended from such criticism
they should clearly be rejected, and if they can be so defended
they are more securely established and their grounds are better
understood Either way, then, the result of such scrutiny aids the
pursuit of truth increases understanding of the issues, and
educates the participants through their active engagem nt in the
debate.
6. See the ongoing references to this in the following DES reports:
Primary Education in England, HMSO, 1978
Education 5-9, HMSO, 1982
9-13 Middle Schools, HMSO, 1983
The Curriculum from 5-16, HMSO, 1985.
A useful discussion of these can be found in Dadds, M, "Whose
Learning is it anyway? Concern about continuity and control in
Topic Work", in Conner, C., (ed.)(1988) Topic and Thematic Work
in the Primary and Middle Years.
7. Some of the extended possibilities of this are explored by, for
example, Henry Giroux who has called for teachers to act as
"transformative intellectuals". A transformative intellectual is one
who takes up "the task of making the pedagogical more political
and the political more pedagogical. ...In the first instance, this
means inserting education directly into the political sphere by
arguing that schooling represents both a struggele for meaning
and a struggle over power relations........In the second instance,
making the pout cal more pedagogical means utilising forms of
pedagogy that treat students as political agents, problematizes
knowledge, utilizes dialogue, and makes knowledge meaningful,
critical and ultimately emancipatory." In order to maintain this
stance while having to work within "the overall hegmon c role of
the school and the society it supports" teachers will be required to
work with any number of groups "that advance emancipatory
traditions and cultures within and without alternative public
spheres". (See Aronwitz, S. & Giroux, H. 1986, Chapter 2.
Chapter Two
1. This point can be followed up in more detal in Gilbert Ryle's
book The Concept of Mind (1949). See, for example, his cii ique of
what he calls the "intellectualist doctrine" in Chapter 2, especially
pages 28-32.
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2. See, for example, Peters, R. S. "The education of the emoti n in
Dearden, R.F., Hirst, P.H.,and Peters, R.S. (eds.)(1972).
3. This approach is developed in some depth and with special
reference to the contribution of the arts by Hepburn, R.W. in The
arts and the education of feeling and emotion" in Dearden, R.F, et
al op. cit.
4. An interesting analysis of some of the possibilities here is
provided by the Gestalt psychologist F. Krueger in his "The Essence
of Feeling" (1928), translated by Magda Arnold and published in
her collection The Nature of Emotion, (1968). See also, a useful
discussion of two differing views of the relation between em tion
and the intellect in Dunlop, F., (1984) The Education of Feeling and
Emotion, Chapter 6. Here he contrasts R.S. Peters' emphasis on the
cognitive with John Macmurray's view that: It is not that our
feelings have a secondary and subordinate capacity for being
rational or irrational. It is that reason is primarily an affair of
emotion, and that the rationality of thought is the derivative and
secondary one... .The emotional life is not simply a part or aspect of
human life. ...It is the core and essence of human life. The intellect
arises out of it, is rooted in it, draws its nourishment and
sustenance from it, and is the subordinate partner in the human
economy. This is because the intellect is essentially instrumental."
5. This point has been developed considerably further by some
writers in the field. See, for example, Kieran Egan (1990) Romantic
Understanding, Chapter 2, in which in contrast to the notion of
"conventional literacy" he expounds a notion of "comprehensive
lieracy" which derives from what has been termed "the literacy
hypothesis". The "literacy hypothesis" makes the claim that
historically the advent of reading and writing, and subsequently
the printed word, brought huge cultural implications such as to
quite transform consciousness from how it was in the ral
tradition. Literacy - through objectifying and g ving a permanency
to thought (since all knowledge and belief nolonger had to be held
in memory) - made possible and predisposed us towards,
reflective abstract thought, skepticism, systematic conceptual
organisations of ideas and data, a sense of objective history as
against mythical stories supporting just our own culture, a sense
of self separate from nature - indeed, the realm of modern
rationality itself. Such qualities of consciousnes Egan argues can,
and should, be recapitulated by individuals (particularly he
believes by children in the 8-15 age range) and constitute what
he refers to as "comprehensive literacy". This notion clearly
invites subscription to a set of standards vastly broader than
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those asssociated with the mechanical ski is of decoding and
encoding which he ascribes to 'conventional ii eracy".
Chapter Three
1. In an interview given on The Education Programme', broadcast
by the B.B.Cin April 1987.
Chapter Four
1. This sort of point has the ring of truism about it and is perhaps
now something of a commonp ace, but the incredible power of
publicly shared concepts to transform existence is brought into
sharp focus when we recall the following episode taken from a
biography of He en Keller:
Helen was blind and deaf. Soon the few words she had
learnt before her illness withered on her tongue, and soon
she was mute too. Her body continued to grow, but her mind
was cut off in the dark silence. She seemed more like a
phantom than a child - a phantom wandering through a
world she could n longer understand......Then came Annie.
One morn ng Annie led Helen down to the old well house
that stood at the foot f the garden. Helen loved to play in
its cool dampness, s now she scurried cheerfully inside.
Annie took a deep bre th and followed. She began to bang
the pump handle up a d down, and soon a stream of water
poured fr m its I p. 5 e grabbed Helen s hand and stuck it
under the icy flow, a d in the same instant began to spell
W-A-T E R nto the wet palm.
Helen went rigid and pulled wildly towards freedom. But
Annie held on. W-A-T-E-R... .W-A-T-E-R....W-A-T-E-R - she
drummed the word faster and faster into Helen s hand.
Suddenly Helen stopped struggling. Or breathing. Or doing
anything except concentrating on the shapes in her palm
W-A-T E R. She felt the word burn down through her hand
and into her brain. W A T E-R... .a light flooded across her
face.
W-A-T... she began to spel the word back to Annie. And
with each movement f her own finge s, the namelessness
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retreated. She understood! These movements stood for the
cold liquid that was pouring over her hand! They always
stood for that, and nothing else! She understood!.... The little
girl who'd been locked away in dark silence would never be
quite so lone y again. She would never see the world
outside. She would never hear it. But he was learning to
communicate.
She could talk with her fingers and listen with her palm.
(Mickie David on, Helen Keller's Teacher
2. The general point concerning the way human purposes
condition our whole categorial apparatus is discussed from an
interesting perspective by Ernst Cassirer (1946) in Language and
My t h, ch. 3. Here he argues that the classical theory of
abstractionism which supposes that concepts are formed through
comparison and the abstraction of shared properties may
characterise the formation of an upper stratum of concepts
produced through the activity of intellectual discursive thought,
but this itself presupposes that there are pre-given properties in
experience to be so denoted. Thus there is a need to postulate a
lower stratum of what he terms "primordial linguistic concepts"
which he believes are the product of a process of mythico-
lingiustic "naming". Here, far from ideation being the result of a
reflective comparison of attributes, the attributes themselves are
posited by a process of extreme condensation in which they are
first heightened and thus to some extent stabilised in experience
as "momentary gods' which arise without discursive reference to
anything beyond themselves. They are exper ences in which the
subject is totally absorbed in the here and now of the
phenomenon itself. Now the empirical claims being made here
about the character and contribution of mythical thinking
(interesting and important as I think they are) are not for us at
present so much the issue as the clear recogn tion that "noticing...
must precede mentally the function of den ting" and that the
direction of our noticing will be conditioned by our purposes.
Thus, on this view, both the concepts formed through intellectual
discursive thought and the particular pr perties that it works
upon - selects and brings into combination - are thoroughly
conditioned by hum n purposes and practices. As Cassirer himself
puts it:
"..the recognit on of function precedes that of Being. The
aspects of Being are distinguished and co-ordinated
according to a measure suppl ed by act n - hence they are
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guided, not by any "objective" similarity among things, but
by their appearance through the medium of practice, which
relates them within a purposive nexus." p.39)
3. It is important to note that the view is al o clearly compatible
to s me extent with the use of what Robert Dearden (1967) has
termed "guided discovery" in which the teacher constructs a
learning situation - perhaps by setting a problem in a certain
context - in which the child arrives at some knowledge new to her
for herself. But given the sheer volume of concepts to be learnt
and the abstract character of many of them previously noted,
together with the likely practical constraints, this approach could
only be advocated on a limited scale by the rationalist. However,
as will be seen in subsequent chapters, if the scale of this
approach must necessarily be limited, its contribution might be of
the greatest importance to fostering some of the qualities of
thinking which rationalism requires.
4. Some of the confusions and educationally unsound motives that
inform much loose talk of "skills" in educa on are explored in
Barrow, R (1987) and Smith, R (1987).
Chapter Five
1. This account is set out in his paper "Education: the engagement
and its fstration' in Dearden, R.F. et a! (eds) (1972).
2. See, for example, Lane, II (1976) The Wild Boy of Aveyron.
3 See Wittgenstein, L., (1958) Philosophical I vestigations.
Chapter Six
1. See, particularly, Hirst, P.H., "Liberal educati n and the nature
of knowledge" in Philosophical Analysis and Education,
Archambault, R.D. (ed), (1965). See also Hirst, P.H., and Peters,
R S, (1972) The Logic of Education, Ch 4.
2. As Hirst put it in The Logic of Education, op it. p.62. "...there
can be no experience or knowledge without the acquisition of the
relevant concepts. Further, it is only when experience and
thought, which necessarily involve the use of concepts of some
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sort, mv l ye those shared in a pub ic world, that the achievements
with wh ch we are concerned are p ssible."
This view was itself foreshadowed by Richard Peters (1966, pp.
48-49): The ideas and expectations of an individual centre of
consciou ness ... .are the product of the initiation of an individual
into pub ic traditions enshrined in the language, concepts, be! efs,
and rules of a society." Prior to th s.. "His 'mind' is ruled perhaps
by bizarre and formless wishes in which there is no picking out of
objects..
3. Another way of making this p mt would be to consider the
following situation: Suppose as a result of experimenting with
blocks a child were to come up and say "Look, come and see, I can
show y u that 2 + 2 = 5". Would we not know in advance that
the child was doing something wrong? - ie., as a matter of
principle there is nothing he cou d show us that would establish
the truth of such a claim.
4. The iews expressed here are taken from his book Beyond the
Present and the Particular: A Theory of Liberal Education, (1983).
5. Ibid. The full list is to be found on page 105.
Chapter Seven
1. See Peters, R.S. (1974) "Subject vity and Standards" reprinted in
the collection Psychology and Ethical Development. Here he quotes
with approval G.H. Mead's idea that the reasonable man adopts
the point of view of the "generalized other'.
Chapter Eight
1. In particular, I will be drawing upon ideas expressed in Sartre,
J-P., Being and Nothingness, trans ated by Barnes, H. (1957), and
Heidegger, M., Being and Time, translated by Macquarrie, J., and
Robinson E., (1962), especially Sections 26-27 and 35-37.
2. With regard to the latter, history is littered with examples of
the destructive effects of those who have had a strong sense of
the "Moral Law" and a weak sense of human compassion which
would have allowed them to temper their high principles so as
properly to meet differing circumstances. Ibsen's "Brand" is a
particularly powerful exemplificati n of this in literature - the
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village priest who, through his stern will and uncompromising
adherence to his principles, brings about the death of both his
wife and child, alienates himself from his people who come to
revile him, and who, as he is engulfed by the death he has
brought upon himself, recognizes the cold emptiness of his life and
cries in despair
"Answer me, God, in the moment of death'
If not by wil, how shall Man be redeemed?"
And a voice rep ies:
"He is the God of love."
Chapter Nine
1. Rousseaus's Emile first published in 1762 is often thought of as
founding the child centred tradition.
2. See, for example, the notion of "constitutive self' in B nnett, M.
(1978) "Authent city and Education".
3. I have tried to develop this idea in Bonnett, M., "Personal
authenticity and public standards", in Education, Values and Mind,
Cooper, D., (ed , (1986). It will also be taken further in Chapter
Fourteen. But ee also the moving account given by Virginia
Axline (1966) in Dibs: In Search of Self of what was involved in
restoring a sense of self-worth and the capacity t become
authentica ly self expressive to a young child who was seriously
repressed.
4. An interesting account of the contribution that fairy tales can
make to a child s understanding of, and ability to come to terms
with, his or her own concerns and anxieties is given in Bettleheim,
B.,(1976) The Uses of Enchantment. Those who are scept cal about
the ability of children in the primary age range to engage in and
benefit from ph losophical thinking might like to read Matthews,
G ,(1980) Philo ophy and the Young Child. They may a o like to
look at the materials produced by Karen Murris (1992) Teaching
Philosophy with Picture Books
5. It should be acknowledged here that such an educational
aspiration is not completely ignored by rationalists. md ed, in a
certain sense, it could be thought to be amply illustrated by, for
example, John \\ hite who has placed much emphasis on the role of
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education in developing aut nomy and the notion of considering
different "ways of life" and constructing "life-plans". Nonetheless
the spirit in which this is undertaken bears all the hallmarks of
rationalistic approaches naturally!) which thus ransform it into
something of a significantly different character to that which
existentialism here wishes to emphasise.
Chapter Ten
1. Some of the broader issues relating to moral values in school
are explored in Bottery, M., (1990) The Morality of the School.
2. Some of the under ying ideas in this section have been
developed in more depth in Bonnett, M. (1978) Authenticity and
Education".
Chapter Eleven
1. See some of the later works of Heidegger, such as the collection
of essays Poetry, Language, Thought translated by Hofstadter, A.,
(1971). Also, The Question Concerning Technology and Other
Essays, translated by Lovitt, W., (1977), and Discourse on
Thinking, translated by Anderson, J.M., and Freund E.H, (1969).
2. From Manley Hopkins, G., The Major Poems (edited by Walford
Davies)(1979) p. 87.
3. Ibid. From "Binsey Poplars" (p. 76)
4. I have attempted to develop these ideas in their relation to
education in Bonnett, M (1983) "Education in a destitute time".
For an outline of Heidegger's more thorough-going analysis of
some of the issues raised for thinking per se, see Appendix One. In
this appendix the term meditative" is used instead of "poetic".
This reflects something of Heidegger's own usage when he
explores its possiblilities for rethinking the ground from which
calculative thinking springs.
5. Although coming from very different perspectives, such
concerns over the percei ed tendencies in discurs ye rationality to
insulate, uproot and mechanise, thinking have been expressed by
many thinkers. For example, D. H. Lawrence argued that thinking
through the medium of trains of ideas" prevent us from living
more spontaneously - and therefore more truly - Ut of our "vital
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affective centres' (eg., in Education of the People, 1936) and he
vigorously attacks what he takes to be the cheap instrumentalism
and stultifying effect of rationality in general in the polemical
Benjamin Franklin (1923). (See, also, the very useful discussion of
Lawrence on these issues in Bantock (1952 , Ch. 6.) A particularly
vehement attack on the uprooting aspect of modern rationality at
its incepti n in the thinking of Socrates was mounted by Nietzsche
in Twilight of the Idols. Here he accuses Socrates of making a
tyrant of reason which reflected the destroyed trust in the vital
instinctive life. In contrast to Socrates elevat on of dialectics - the
pursuit of truth through rational argument and debate - and his
"phony" equation of 'reason = virtue = happiness", Nietzsche
writes:
"With Socrates Greek taste undegoes a change in favour of
dialectics: what is really happening when this happens? It is
above all the defeat of a nobler taste .....Before Socrates, the
dialectical manner was repudiated in good society: it was
regarded as a form of bad manners, one was compromised
by it. Young people were warned against it. And all such
presentation of ones reasons was regarded with mistrust.
Honest things, like honest men, do n t carry their reasons
exposed in this fashion. It is indecen to display all o es
goods. What has first to have itself proved is of little
value......" (p 41)
6. I have also explored them in "Personal authenticity and public
standards' in Cooper, D (ed.)(1986). See also an interesting
discussion of a number of issues that relate to my position on this
p mt and the general theme of this chap er in Paul Stand sh
(1992) Beyond tie Self, Chs. 5 & 6.
Chapter Twelve
1. Thus over recent years researchers have identified differences
in terms of convergers/divergers focusers/scanners,
holists/serialists, analytic/global, reflective/ mpulsive. See Conner,
C. (1988) f r a useful survey of such findings
2 See Stenhouse, L ,(1975) Intr duction to Curriculum Resear h
and Development, Ch. 7. Also there is an interesting discussion of
some closely related issues in Bridges, D ,(1988) Education,
Democracy and Discussion, Chs. 1, 2, and 7.
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Chapter Fourteen
1. I have also developed this idea in direct comparison with
rationalist approaches to education in a previously mentioned
paper "Per ona! authenticity and pubi c standards" in Cooper, D.E.
(1986).
2. For so e further development of this claim, see Bonnett, M.,
and Dodd ngton, C. "Primary Teach ng: what has philosophy to
offer?' n The Study of Primary Educ tion: A Source Book, Volume
One, edited by Lofthouse, B, (1991).
3. With regard to the capacity of pre-school children to work in
this way see, for example, the work and publications of the
High/Scope Institute, London. See also the interesting account
given by Alistair Fraser of ways in which primary school children
took an active part in broad areas of decision-making in his school
(Fraser, A, 1987) and the accounts of child-led project work given
by Roger Revel! (1987, 1988).
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APPENDIX ONE:
	 Heidegger on thinking
A cen ral theme which runs through much of Heidegger s
work - particularly his later work - is the notion that broadly
speaking there are two ways of thinking: the "calculat ye' and the
"meditative' ( r 'poetic"). Heidegger holds that both are justified
in their own way, but that the former, because of its groundless
nature (i.e. its necessary non-concern for ground) and its
aggressiveness, is coming to dominance in a way which is
uprooting man so that all his works are becoming increasingly
vain. Somehow meditative thinking has to re-open the possibility
of re-establishing a ground for modern man and his calculative
thinking It has to bring him to a place from which he might
discern how the different forms of calculative thinking which he
has developed might be properly rooted, and thus how they might
enter into his 1 fe without usurping his essential natur
But, now, what is this distinction between ca culative and
meditative thinking and how are Heidegger's claims regard ng
each of them t be understood?
The designation "calculative' implies a thinking which
orders and manipulates - a thinking which operates within a
means ends context It applies, according to Heidegger, to all
thinking which we would today normally think of as tak ng its
rise from the tenets of logic, in particular the law of non-
contradiction. Heidegger argues that for any such thinking to
operate it has to f x things in advance by representing them to
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tself, for only on this basis can statements - he assertion of
omething about something - arise, and thus therewith a place
occur for the operation of such laws. Proposition 1 thinking then,
in accordance with the logic of propositions, analyses, combines,
and orders representations and in this way sets th ngs up so as to
be manageable, i.e. suscept ble of subjugation to some more or less
pre determined end. It allows us to possess reality by
processing it. Through representation we are involved in a
generalizing beyond the here and now in such a way that a space
is created for a wilful manipulation of it. Thinking, itself, then,
becomes increasingly conceived as related to intentional action
(indeed, in extreme cases it is seen as some sort of mental shadow
of action, or as a sort of truncated action as in, for example,
Hampshire, S. 1959) with the consequence that originality and
creativity become identified with forms of "doing" such as
dissective analysis and ingenious synthesis, understanding with a
grasping and judging, whi e clarity comes to mean a demand for
the eradication of ambiguity in favour of univocity (equivocity
being anathema to the practical man).	 Thus such thinking is
caught up in a resolve to overlook the richness, vitality, and
openness of things in favour of levelled-off abstractions.	 The
spontaneous order of the concrete is sacrificed to the mechanical
rder of abstract organisat on.
Heidegger claims that this conception of th nking has long
been on its way, embedded as it is in the ancient and fundamental
distinction between subject and object, and that its coming to
dominance is the historica unfolding of the hold ng sway of this
distinction. His line of argument would seem to be as follows: in
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the setting apart of subject as ego and object as that which is
there "beforehand" independently of the ego and lying ready to be
perceived, a mode of thinking is set on its way in which the goal
of human dominion over the earth bec mes ever more explic t
and dominant. This is so because in setting up things as
something "other" - as objects - which must stand over and
against the ego, the ego must be thought as will - as something
that can act purposefully upon these objects. The ego thought as
anything less - e.g. as a purely passive recipient of sensations -
would deny its independent status and thus represent a collapse
of the subject/object distinction, since object for-a-subject implies
a notion of significance which cannot be dissociated from the idea
of agency.
Of course, none of this need necessarily be explicit in the
beginning when the subject/object split occurred to thinking On
the contrary it could, and seemingly did, remain implicit, covered
over, awaiting its historical working out and arriving into
dominance. Thus it certainly need not be the case, and seemingly
was not, that early Western thinkers who t ought in terms of the
subject/object distinction were necessarily sensible of any wilfu
motive when, for example, they developed extensive classificatory
systems as a way of making sense of he world. Indeed that
which was thus fundamentally holding sway in their thought
would be precisely that which remained - and largely remains
today - unthought. Now for Heidegger, this lack of appreciati n
of its own essential self-assertiveness wou d not be for calculative
thinking a merely contingent matter.	 Through its necessarily
representing things to itself, it sets things up in a certain way,
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making them readily available - "on cal " - as a sort of "standing
reserve" (Heidegger, M. 1954b). And taking its start in
representations and busying itself in manipulating these
representation it becomes incapable of thinking its own ground,
of being op n to its own wilful essence: by its very nature it
thoroughly covers this over and ensures that it remains
unthought. That is to say, by virtue of its own essential nature it
must remain oblivious to what Heidegger terms the "ontological
difference" - the difference between "Being" and "beings" - though
it, itself, is only possible in the space that this distinction opens up
(Heidegger, M. 1957). The "differencing" of this difference is
something to which we must return presently, but let us just note
here that the traditional notion of being as presence, which all
modern thinking presupposes, is never properly determined by
that thinking even when it is metaphysics.	 It is not just that
traditional m taphysics has yet to offer a satisfactory answer on
this; it does not acknowledge the question.	 Presence is the
undetermined given.
The ab ye characterisation of calculative thinking begins to
suggest some of the qualities of a thinking that will overcome it.
Clearly such thinking will need to free itself from a pre-occupation
with the act lity which is given to us through representations -
the actuality of what for us has become the familiar world of
specified bei gs with which we are involved in an ordering and
accounting way. It will involve what Heidegger has termed a
"step back' t wards the originary (Heidegger, M. 1957). By this is
meant not an historiographical stepping ack - a return in thought
merely to certain factual occurrences which are seen perhaps as
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quasi causal precedents, or a comparing of an early thinker s
ideas with those of later thinkers where we dwell nly with what
is said, seeking similarities and modifications. Rather the step
back f r Heidegger is the attempt to get away from what has
been said - the ideas which have been expressed and datable
factual occurrences which we attempt to subsume through an
ab tract ordering. The step back is to be a step away from this
actuality that allows us to come towards it afresh - by being
released to that which has withdrawn itself in what has been
said and what has happened, but set all this on its way.
Through the step back meditative thinking seeks releasement to
"that which grants" (Heidegger, M. 1954b).
in contrast to calculative thinking, then, meditative thinking
does not categorize represent things to itself - and is non willing,
or rather it is non self-willing (since Heidegger wishes to
maintain for it a certain steadfastness). Further it does not
proceed on the basis of some pre specified conception of its
destination as say scientific thinking does where the "destination'
is some sort of generalized explanatory account of the phenomena
set up in a certain way. But how could this be? How could a
thinking proceed without some conception of its goal and without
some sort of categorization of its material? Would it not then
collapse into a totally undifferentiated and directionless
enterprise, i e. not an enterprise at all? To understand why this
need not be so a number of qualifying remarks shou d be noted
Firstly, Heidegger is not suggesting that a thinking can
proceed which does not involve an acknowledgment of
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di tinctions. It is rather that distinctions need not be categories of
the sort which traditional 1 gic presupposes. He develops this
p0 nt in his consideration f the "transcendental orizonal re-
pr senting" character of calcu ative thinking (Heidegger, M. 1969).
By this characterisation, I take him to be picking out the way in
wh ch such thinking involves a standing back from things which
overarches them so as to locate and articulate them n accordance
with a certain pre-existing meaning-giving framework ("horizon")
wh ch thus secures them in terms of the familiar. (S mewhat akin
to the Piagetian notion of the development of understanding
thr ugh the process of " assimilation"). Elsewhere, in Science and
Reflection, he refers to the methodology of scientific enquiry as an
"entrapping securing" where:
"Every new phenomenon emerging within an area of science
is refined to such a point that it fits into the normative
objective coherence of the theory" (where science itself is
seen as "the theory of the real'). (Heidegger, M. 1977.)
Our general comportment towards things today, then, is such that
that which cannot be so secured is closed off, qu etly covered
over: calculative thinking is the ordering of the orderable, and this
wi I ultimately be seen as an ing from the ordering f the orderer
- the perceiving subject as agent. (The course of the coming to
dominance of calculative thinking has been marked by the
unf lding of subject as will as gathering ground of bjects - i.e.
man as the primary subiectum - from out of subj ct as merely
op osed to object, in which t was already implicit (Heidegger, M.
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1952). Thus, for Heidegger, 	 the completion of metaphysics is
world as will of this subject, the "will to power" of Nietz che).
Such thinking, then, is necessan y a closing off which c ers
over this very facet of itself since it cannot acknowledge a reality
beyond the orderable. It demands (and must demand) not nly
that things be represented as object but that the subject as
subiectum - the ground of objects - be represented as an object
too. Thus Heidegger argues in The Ont -theo-logzcal Constitution of
Metaphysics (1957b) that traditional metaphysics is itself just as
much a form of calculative thinking as are the exact sciences, and
is therefore also located in that region which rests in the oblivion
of the difference between Being and beings. In seeking the ground
of beings both as that which is indifferently general to them - the
original - and as that which accounts for each of them, un fies
them	 the highest - it posits this ground as itself a being: the
First Cause". But in this, "the philosopher s god", that out of w ich
its own essence arises, remains unthought.
Somehow, then, meditative thinking is to mv lye
distinctions which are non-objectify g and thus not imp sed
upon the things themselves. Rather they are to authentically
arise out of things, are in some real sense received from them.
According to Heidegger this can occur through, amongst other
ways, our listening to their names. He argues that names,
proper, are not the result of a designation - as if there were first
of all the thing to which a word is hen applied, the thing name
relationship being a relationship between two independently
existing objects. Such a conception f naming supposes that we
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have already represented the thing to ourselves - caught it under
some description wh ch reifies it - and then labelled it. It would
also imply that we had already understood the name. But then,
how could a name arise in the first place independently of things?
Rather, a name can only have its significance through its
relationship to things In essence, then, naming is an originary
occurrence: name, nameable and named occur t gether.
If this is so, if the thing comes into its being through the
name, and the name is therefore not a description but a "saying-
of-what-is", then by listening to the name - that is to say, by
trying to enter into the experience in which it arises - we may
come into a relationship with what is without fixing it (in the
sense of defining it n terms of standards which are imposed upon
it). We become freed for what is in its own freedom. It would be
for this reason that Heidegger gives so much attention to a radical
etymologizing on "key' words as a way of cueing us to possibilities
of experience which have long since been forgotten as language
has become increas ngly "worn out" in the service of wilful
communication. In th s way, through seeking to listen to what the
word tells, thinking ceases to be an ordering and becomes from
our point of view a waiting, and from the point of view of things a
"call'.
Clearly much more needs to be said regarding this sort of
approach to thinking, but what is really vital for Heidegger's
enterprise is to establish a willingness to seriously call into
question our present notions of thinking - to treat them as
genuinely problemat c - and thus to be genuinely prepared to
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acknowledge that thinking need not be what it is presently, and
for the most part, taken to be, and indeed that it has not always
been so taken In his discussion of a Parmenides fragment
(Heidegger, M. 1954a, Part II Lecture IX) Heidegger tries to show
how our current notion of thinking was distilled in the Roman
ratio as reasoning through propositions, but that this distillation
occurred as a restriction upon and covering over of a more
original Greek notion in which thinking was experienced as a
"letting-lie-before-us and taking-to-heart" which was of a non-
conceptual and non-grasping character.
Let us try to explore a little further the possibilities of such
a notion of thinking. It was suggested above that there is a
necessary level of naming which is not a describing but a "saying-
of-what-is". But how is this to be understood and what of the
possibility of 'rnis-namings" which might lead us astray in a
resolve to enter a more direct relationship with things? Further, is
it supposed that through listening to what he name says we are
to somehow re enter into the experience of the Ancients? And
how are we to tell which names to listen to i.e how will we
recognize "key words", and what will guide us in our
interpretation of them? We seem to require early assurances that
solutions are forthcoming on issues of this kind before we can
even begin to take seriously Heidegger's quest. Now, this is a very
real problem, for, on some issues at least, it seems unlikely that
we can receive such assurances as would be acceptable to the sort
of thinking which seeks them. Demands for clearly defined criteria
and concern for correctness derive from a notion of rigour which
is prized by precisely that sort of thinking Heidegger is trying to
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overcome. Meditative thinking is to be qualitatively different
from c Iculative thinking, and it is therefore to be expected that
the rigour to which it subjects itself will not accord with the rigour
of calculative thinking. Heidegger makes the point in a number of
places hat there is a fundamental discontinuity between t e two
- as, f r example, in his remark that "science does not think"
(1954a, Lecture I, also developed in Heidegger, M. 1952, 1977b) -
and th t to enter meditative thinking will ultimately require a
leap. However, there may be a number of considerations we can
make which prepare the way towards this leap.
Let us return to the notion f originary naming as a saying-
of-what-is rather than referring to any sort of description which
implies some set of objective defining properties. Clearly a
particular thing may keep its name while it, itself, changes and
thus requires redescription. This would be clearly true of a
develop ng organism. In this sense, then, the name need not fix
the thing - or rather it need not completely fix it - for one might
still maintain that it does fix it in certain respects namely,
through the cnteria for the use of the name. This is clearly so for
general names, but is perhaps less so for personal names, f r here
the criteria of use derive wholly from the relationship of name to
named. A name such as "John" is non-classificatory and non-
specificatory (in the generic sense). The name is given but does
not impose an order on the named (though it may invite certain
associat ns). Here, then, we would seem to have a sense in which
a nami g might not delimit the th ng, but just "says' it. H wever,
this would still appear to be a labelling rather than an originary
naming though in some circumstances uttering the name might
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n t involve fir tly representing the thing to oneself but may, f r
example, c nsti ute ones recognition of it or an evocation of it
("John!')
Now to be sure, a pre-conception of the reference of the
name is involved here, but perhaps we can dimly perceive some
trace of orig nary naming, for in such experience of utterance of
the name there seems to be an element of bringing something
before ourse yes in its own terms. But the trace is faint, for
representati n s never far away and maybe the experience is
parasitic on it. This remains in contrast to originary naming which
says nothing that we need - or could - represent to ourselves, but
brings something to stand forth so that it can be what it is by
creating an open region for it. Thus, to refer back to the query
raised earlier concerning the possibility of a "mis-naming' this
would only be possible for that sort of naming which is a labelling,
1 e. it has a p ace only in the realm of representational thinking
w ere truth s een as correctne s rather than a primal revealing
The re at on hip between these two kinds of truth is set out
by Heidegger n On The Essence of Truth (1943), but might be
usefully restated here in the following terms: in the naming of
representational th nking a thing is characterized in a certain way
by attributing cer am properties to it such that the naming may
be correct or incorrect depending upon whether the thing does or
does not exh b these properties. But what of the thing itself, and
these properties themselves? Does not such representational
nam ng presup ose a prior nam ng (if it be granted that naming
may have a tru y originary function) which allowed the thing, and
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the properties which are n w being attributed to it, t first stand
f rth? This would mean that the naming of representational
thinking which preoccupies us today is possible only through the
h Iding sway of a prior naming whose origins and nature we have
largely forgotten.
Now conceivably it might still be objected that what we are
really pointing towards here is a range of prior concepts - basic
categories - in terms of wh ch we classify and describe things, and
that the question of a "prior naming" is really the que tion of what
these concepts are. That is, to listen to originary name is really to
engage in conceptual ana ysis because concepts are the primal
units of meaning. From a 1-leideggarian standpoint a d sposition to
regard things in this way would be both interesting and wrong. It
would be interesting as an example of how modern thinking is
conditioned by another of those fundamental distinctions which
stand at the beginning of Western thinking and which Heidegger's
contemplative thinking attempts to overcome, viz., the distinction
between essence and existence, where essence is thought as form-
giving idea and thus ach eves a certain priority over existence.
The objection will not do because it assumes precisely what is
h id to be at stake: that prior awareness of things which the
origin of categories requires. For Heidegger, the disposition from
which the objection arises is, in fact, an aspect f the self-
ensnaremtnt of representational thinking: its nability to
acknowledge that which a ready touches those who re called to
th nk and to utterance, but which always remains unthought and
unsaid through a withdraw 1.
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Here we seem to have some ink with another of th e
problems noted earlier: what will give meditative thinking a
directi n if it claims to forego a pre- pecified goal? Now f c ur e
in one sense meditative thinking has a goal, viz., a releasement
t wards things in their essence - thus Heidegger s talk of "resolve'
and thinking as an "undertaking'. But this is n t a g al in t e
sense in which calculative thinking has a goal, for it is not pre-
conceived (we cannot represent it to ourselves), but shows its f
only as we move towards it. What does this mean? Merely th t
instead of a clearly defined goal we must make do with some
vague intuition to guide us? As if we really have a goal in the
sense of calculative thinking, but we have not as yet taken the
trouble to think it out carefully? Yes and no. Yes, in the sense that
we must in some way, I think, make appeal to intuition, but no, f
this is interpreted as a lazy substitute for clear thinking. On t e
contrary a thinking that waits is t e most demanding sort f
thinking there is, for if its goal cann t be pre specified it requires
a level of sensitivity and alertness t poss ble signs on its way
which are unknown to calculative th king.
Meditative thinking is not, then, a thinking which strays
arbitrarily in any direction for lack f a clearly defined objective.
It is guided by the way it is on, which is its resolve to be open to
things. According to Heidegger when we cease to represent things
to ourselves it will be "the silent c urse of the conversation th t
moves us'. But how are we to make a beginning on th s
conversation? It has already been noted that to seek clear y
defined criteria here is both impos ble and undesirable in that
attempts to make such definitions w uld go against the spirit f
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the undertaking. H wever, there are two sources of guidance for
getting us underway: certain key words (as previously mentioned)
and our own sense of place in Being. Med tative thinking will
involve an intimate' interplay between these two aspects, but I
intend to try to come at this interplay through an initial focus on
the significance of key words".
As calculative thinking, by its nature, closes itself off from
the question of Being so meditative thinking attempts to th nk
Being. This is its one essential and abiding characteristic, and the
source of its rigour. Thus, 1-leidegger's remark: "The limitlessness
of the same is the sharpest limit set to thinking." (Heidegger, M.
1954a, p. 50). It may begin this attempt by question ng
concerning those words in which the experience of Being was
conserved before calculative thinking assumed dominance and
emptied them of th s meaning. This means, in effect, an attempt to
return to the beginning of Western thought, but not with the
intention of seeking to somehow re-live the pre-Socratic
experience of Being (which would be impossible). Rather, it is the
attempt to re-think it from where we are now in order that we
might forethink a new beginning. In this way we may genuinely
begin to think about where we are now - the way we are on
(which, for Heidegger, is the essence of techn logy (1-leidegger, M.
1954b) ) - and how it might be transcended.
It is important to stress that in accordance with the
undertaking of the tep back to the unthought discussed earlier, in
attempting to return to the beginning f We tern thought in this
way we are:
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(a) necessarily condit oned by our starting point i e. our
present historical situation;
(b) seeking to come nto a relationship with that which is
holding sway in the Greek experience, such that we might
become aware of other possibilities for experience and
history than those wh ch have been achieved so far (since
history so far has been that of the progressive withdrawal of
Being from thought).
To quote Heidegger, himself, on his approach to etymologizing:
"The mere identifying of old and often bsolete meanings of
terms, the snatching up of these meanings with the aim of
using them in some new way, leads to nothing if not to
arbitrariness. What counts, rather, is for us, in reliance on
the ea ly meanings of a word and its changes, to catch
sight of the realm pertaining to the matter in
question into which the word speaks. What counts is
to ponder that essential realm as the one in which
the matter named by the word moves. Only in this way
does the word speak, nd speak in the complex of meanings
into which the matter that is named by it unfolds
throughout the history of poetry and thought." ( My
emphasis) (Heidegger, M. 1977b)
Thus, this re-thnking is to be a radical re-thinking which is
not to be confused with a more refined organ sing of pre-Socratic
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ideas in terms of further, more abstract ideas for the sake of
intellectual mastery. It is to be a genuine going back rather than a
covert going forward within the parameters of existing thinking
(e g. as when Plato's forms become riterpreted as concepts,
thinking as reason ng, etc.). As Heidegger puts it.
"The criterion of the unthought does not lead to the
incorporation of what has been thought previously into still
higher levels of development and systematisation
surpassing it, but demands that the heritage of thought be
liberated in respect of what still lies in reserve in its 'has
been'." (Heidegger, M. 1949)
This means that re-thinking is to be a thinking of origins -
i e. of those originary powers that shape experience - and thus it
is on the way to a concrete transcendence and not an abstract
one. Only through such concrete transcendence could "what still
lies in reserve" be set free, call forth from its present oblivion.
(Thus, for Heidegger, 'Being' is not the most abstract of notions
and the most empty, but the most concrete and most full. It is not
generic but originary.) By listening to various pre-Socratic words
and fragments of thought the attempt is made to interpret them
in a way which enables them to disclose that which is originary in
them. This requires a growing sensitivity to the Greek experience
of reality (rather than some pre-determ n ng assumption), but one
necessarily arrived at from - and conditioned by - our own
modern sensibility, the one vitalizing the ther. Here, then, we are
reminded of the other aspect of the interplay: our own sense of
Being.
281
The undertaking of re thinking key words remains possible
f r the modern only through his own relati nship to Being
manifest, for Ileidegger, in his sense of alie ation from the
p ntaneous, creative, and unitary as powers in the world. That is
t say it is possible through our sensing of the withdrawal of
Being in our time from within the region of Being that man by his
nature as thinker always occupies. The "silent course of the
conversation" with key words receives orientation not by
reference to clearly defineable criteria, but because it (we) are
already within the region of Being and are touched by its
'destining'. Thus:
"....waiting upon something is based on our belonging in that
upon which we wait" (Heidegger, M. 1969)
Man as thinker belongs to Being prior to everyth ng else, "isness"
being a presupposition of all thought and language -
unacknowledged and unexamined in the case of calculative
thinking the food of thou ht in the case of m d tative thinking.
Man as thinker always already belongs to Being; he has yet to
achieve an authentic relationship to it and thus realise his essence.
Heidegger attempts to illustrate the truth of this
primordiality of Being and man's inauthentic relati nship to it in a
number of places, in particular in his treatment of the nature of
identity. In The Principle of Identity (1957a) he shows how this
notion which is absolutely fundamental to ny thinking is
incapable of being adequately thought by traditi nat metaphysics
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He argues that the usual statement of the principle of dentity as
A - A s in fact the statement of the principle of equality which
already assumes identity. The principle of identity i A is A,
i e., A i elf is the same with itcelf. Thus:
a the principle of identity really speaks of the Being of
be ngs (how beings are in their presencing),
b it speaks of it as a unity, a belonging togetherness.
But the traditional way of thinking of unification, togetherness,
thinks it as a co-ordination of eparate terms whose identity,
therefore, we must already assume. We are thus brought to a
dead end. To think the principle of identity through we have,
therefore, to think it differently, i.e., properly thought, the
principle of identity comes to be a spring away from traditional
metaphy ics into another way of thinking - a radically different
thinking which concretely transcends propositional articulation of
separate pre-identified terms, and focuses rather on the
phenomenon of the belonging f unity, togetherness, as that
which is originary in it. This is to say that only a thinking which is
released to the relationship of be onging as relationship will
be adequate to the problem of identity.
Fr m the standpo nt of this s mple belonging, think ng man)
and Bei g are seen as aspects of identity, that is, as determinable
only from their mutual appropriati n (which is in sharp c ntrast
to the ay metaphysics has to th nk of identity as an aspect of
Being . Thus, for He degger, trad tional metaphysics - and all
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calculative think ng - through its assumption of identity and yet
its covering over of any way of adequately knowing dentity
remains in an inauthentic relationsh p to that which is i s source,
i e., that to wh ch it truly belongs: the continu ng but ingu ar
event of appropnat on f Being and man thinking).
From the standpoint of the event of appropriat n then,
J-Ieidegger believes it becomes possible to re-experience
calculative think ng in a way that it can never experience itself.
From this perspective it will be seen that the mutual bel nging of
man and Being - that which determines their mode of presencing
- at present is a mutual "challenging enframing" (Heidegger, M
1954b). For Heidegger, this is man's identity in the modern age.
But at the same t me the possibility of being able to experience
this from out of its origin opens up the poss bility of another non-
challenging and more originary kind of appropriation arising. This
is the hope of meditative thinking.
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APPENDIX TWO: Poetic thinking and personal
authenticity
As c aractensed by the writers we have been considefng,
rational thinking achieves its rigour by the application of public
rule-governed procedures to experience in terms of which it is
thus organised and validated. In this way objectivity essentially
becomes a function of agreed conventions - a function of the
shared criteria for deciding how things are to be classified and
what is to count as true. In contrast, it has been argued, the rigour
of poetic think ng has a more demanding basis: the source of its
discipline and objectivity is not an orthodoxy of this kind, but
adequacy to the thing being revealed. This involves a unique
subjective response, and thus, it will be suggested, in a certain
sense a heightened sense of personal responsibility. As previously
mentioned, the argument here is difficu t
	 but it is important
from the point of view of establishing the overall position. It
revolves around the not on that genuine openness to things as
they are in themselves, as against perceiving objects defined by
categories, mv ives awareness of negation. I will now try to
spell this out a little.
The ma n point is that to see something in one way, to
reveal it on one occasion, is always at the expense of other ways
of seeing it, ot er possibilities of revealing There are always sides
of the thing to which we will not be attending, or are out of view.
There are aspects that will always rema n unknown and beyond
our grasp but which are not any the less part of the thing itself.
For example, and above all, its simple ability to stand there, to
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exist. Thus openness to the thing itself, in its fullness, involves an
apprehension of denial - a sense of the ambience of what is
incipiently present but not revealed as such in our
awareness of it. Only in this way can things have restored to
them their inherent strangeness - which is essential to their own
integrity. In this sense even the most familiar of things has its
mysterious aspect.
We can sometimes experience something of this if we stare
intently at an object for a period of time - say a flower. In such an
experience the public criterion-referenced properties in terms of
which we classify it and it can be known" as a defined object can
fall away, become less dominant. And in its place a sense of the
flower's own presence - standing forth - as something essentially
inscrutable with a quality we cannot adequately articulate, can
strike us and inspire us with a sense of wonderment: an
awareness of what simply is - arising out of what is not. For
much of the time, of course, dominated by the need for goal
orientated action, such staring is a comparatively rare experience.
We are too busy organizing things, and need for t e most part to
see them as instances of everyday categories which can be
routinely manipulated. In this way we come to live
predominantly with objects rather than things.
Now such awareness of negation is precisely what lies at the
kernel of personal responsibility: an awareness of what one has
denied in what one has achieved For in a way that parallels the
above, every achievement, too, is gained at the expense of other
real possibilities - it involves the realization of certain options as
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against others which could have been taken up but which were
passed by It is only in the consciousness of such choice -
awareness f such negation - that responsibility arises and a sense
of guilt c n be possible. In this ense, then, it is the same
developed ense of finitude that comes into play in revealing the
individual ty and particularity of things themselves as is being
engendered in the self expression of individuals who are striving
to live authentically in the existentialist sense. And thus, only true
individuals can relate poetically, for the discipline and rigour of
poetic awareness are rooted in this underlying sense of
responsibil ty being applied towards the finitude of things in their
present and particular standing out from what they are not. We
could perceive, represent, create, things differently, but we are
always involved in a limited selection of the possibilities that are
actually open. This is part of the nature of things and our own
essential f nitude in relation to them.
Now this claim concerning the relationship between a
developed sense of our own finitude and our capacity to reveal
the individuality of things themselves has broader implications.
It suggests that the development of thinking in its deepest and
fullest sense will indeed involve initiation into the essence of the
human condition in the way advocated by existentialism. Human
finitude is most poignantly expressed in human mortality. As
long as we are living - as against being caught up in some state of
mental limbo characterised by inauthenticity - we are also dying.
Sense of fe, assertion - its felt urgency - is enabled by sense of
death, den al. As poetry often tries to make explicit, joy in what is
present occurs against the backcloth of sadness of what s past or
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lost or cannot be, and vice versa. This characterises our situation
and enables our way of revealing things, giving human
awareness, receptiveness, and responsiveness, its own essential
qual ty. An omnpotent god cannot experience things as humans
do - cannot reveal things in the way humans do, nor share in their
meaning the way humans do - because it lacks this sense of
fin tude. There s no finality in its 1 fe - it has unlimited time and
unlimited power to undo and re-do. Whatever meaning it is
capable of experiencing, it is not of a kind intelligible to humans.
Humans are individual sed by their sense of finitude - they are as
individuals, as much in virtue of what they are not - what their
individuality denies, negates - as in virtue of what their
individuality positively expresses or enables. Awareness of
finitude is not, then, awareness of nothing, but a remembrance of
what is being forgotten when we sum things up in categories and
attempt to order our lives and the world in terms of them
Now the important upshot of all th s is that fully fledged
authentic thinking is not ego centric, but acknowledges the
negation which pervades whole hearted human involvement.
Respons ble choice and decision are still present in poetic th nking
- are essential to it - but the sense of responsibility is not now
simply of the kind emphasized by the notion of self referencing.
It is not self conscious deliberation, but a tacit respons bility
towards a revealing relationship with the thing itself. We live
richly, a d think poe ically, nsofar as we reveal things in their
fullness. This means a responding to what is there in its arising
from what is not, and a sense of wonder that things are. In this
apprehension lies poetic thinking's sense of wholeness of the
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wor d - its intuiti e sense of t e ground out of wh ch things an e
and in whch they are rooted - which is qute different from the
d scursive sense of interrelatedness conveyed through the
imp sit on f webs of rationally constructed categories upon it.
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